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Abstract 
The thesis follows a critical theory approach and suggests, that the 
academic study of terrorism would benefit from incorporating into its methodology 
an approach, which actively seeks to guide ethical discourse and policy making.  
The thesis asks how Terrorism Studies, in light of its proximity to policy-making 
and the policy-relevance of its object of research, can utilise its expertise to   
encourage moral learning and shape the public discourses around terrorism. It 
does so to problematises the marginalisation of normative theorising in Terrorism 
Studies. 
The thesis shows, that Terrorism Studies mirrors public discourse around 
terrorism in so far as it focuses on the instrumentality of violence, which 
necessarily invokes questions of values and consequentialist morality. These 
questions are shown to be central to the wider political, social and cultural 
contestations in modern societies. Treating normative questions as merely 
tangential in the study of terrorism therefore, renders Terrorism Studies 
intellectually vulnerable, if it cannot provide its expertise from an empathetically 
reasoned normative basis. This is the case, because the study of terrorism cannot 
overcome its own participation in perpetuating and indeed reifying exclusionary 
social practices within the hegemonic power-relationships provided for by the 
state. 
The thesis demonstrates, that any claim to neutrality in the study of 
terrorism is illusive and therefore, demands that Terrorism Studies must provide 
its expertise based on an explicit normative framework that enables critique 
beyond a focus on the nation state. It suggests, that Terrorism Studies must shift 
its focus from the ‘problem of terrorism’ to the ‘problem of misrecognition’. In 
doing so, the thesis not only identifies moments of implicit normative bias, 
particularly in relation to preventative counterterrorism, but furthermore, allows 
Terrorism Studies to treat terrorism as a social phenomenon, which carries with 
it opportunities for moral learning. 
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The thesis therefore, provides an intervention in the form of an explicitly 
normative framework for the study of terrorism.  This framework places Terrorism 
Studies in a normatively grounded position to self-reflexively critique the social, 
cultural and political manifestations of hegemonic power relationships in modern 
societies in which it participates. This equips Terrorism Studies with the 
methodological tools to provide concrete ethical guidance to make sense of, 
relate to and navigate the incoherences of the questions raised by terrorism and 
take the social embeddedness of the actor, and not the nation state, as its point 
of reference. It thereby encourages Terrorism Studies to participate in broader 
emancipatory truth claims, because it can identify barriers to, and opportunities 
for, moral learning. 
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Introduction 
 Terrorism Studies has since its inception grappled with a discourse of 
failure (Stampnitzky, 2013) and following Mark Sageman’s assertion in 2012, that 
Terrorism Studies stagnated, the question as to the health of academic research 
of terrorism regularly recurs in scholarly exchanges at conferences and beyond. 
(Morrison, 2017) While this thesis starts with the conviction, that Terrorism 
Studies, because of its disciplinary and methodological openness, contributes 
enormously to the generation of a rich, diverse, and innovative body of research, 
it is particularly interested in the disciplinary fragmentation of Terrorism Studies 
and the possibility of formulating, what Chenoweth (Morrison, 2017a) calls a 
‘collective story’. In this, the thesis agrees with her observation, that the 
intellectual distance between Orthodox Terrorism Studies, that is the more 
empirical, dataset-based study of terrorism, and Critical Terrorism Studies is 
overstated, and indeed at times counterproductive. Chenoweth notes, that 
discoveries and insights from both orientations align in their scepticism in relation 
to state-centric policy intervention and in their broader concern for the moral and 
ethical implications of making certain empirical claims. This proximity however is 
lost, if the question ‘what leads an individual to participate in political violence’ 
comes to be understood as the decisive moment in the determination of success 
or failure of Terrorism Studies, as is suggested by Sageman (2012) but which 
also constitutes the point of entry for popular discourse around terrorism. 
Against the tempting simplicity of Sageman’s question, this thesis juxtaposes 
Lisa Stampnitzky’s observation, that a foundational pursuit in Terrorism Studies 
is the idea of fixing the concept of terrorism, so as to depoliticise the definition. 
The idea here lies in the notion, that a purely analytical conceptualisation can 
isolate the academic study of terrorism from having to engage with the morality 
of it. Stampnitzky however emphasises, that even the most analytically pure 
concept [of terrorism] re-enters engagement with the practical realm. The political 
construction of terrorism, through counterterrorism practise, she argues, will 
necessarily act back upon the momentarily de-politicised and analytical concept, 
which experts will introduce. (Stampnitzky, 2015a) It is through this practise that 
inconsistencies surface. Stampnitzky comes to the conclusion, that the fact that 
the problem of the definition of terrorism has not been resolved hints at ‘the 
struggles of the state and public discourse to provide answers to questions at the 
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center [sic.] of the contestation of the definition of terrorism, namely on the identity 
of the enemy, the question of the legitimacy of violence as well as the delineation 
between political and private.’ (Stampnitzky, Forthcoming) 
The thesis follows Stampnitzky’s observation that the contestation of the 
definition of terrorism tells the story of what is central to contemporary politics, 
thus making the key questions for Terrorism Studies to be answered not what 
drives an individual to commit acts of political violence but rather: who is the 
enemy?, when is violence legitimate?, and, what is political? such that it could be 
argued, the essence of terrorism - and therefore the focus of Terrorism Studies - 
ought to be how and why boundaries are being drawn as well as what ‘life looks 
like from the other side of the boundaries.’ (Stampnitzky, Forthcoming) The thesis 
expands on Stampnitzky’s observation by relating these questions to their 
implications for the academic study of terrorism. While Stampnitzky, importantly 
and rightly points out, that the concept of terrorism invokes, what Ugilt (2015) 
terms ‘meaningfulness-in-excess’1, this thesis is driven by a concern, which 
stems from the idea that what becomes meaningful in the social world is the 
analyst’s desire. Zuleika and Douglas (2008, p. 32) argue, that it is this desire, 
which determines what constitutes successful research and what the meaningful 
social reality of terrorism ‘is’. They argue, that implicitly or explicitly, researchers 
and analysts alike, seek to explain why ordinary men engage in acts that the 
public discourse widely perceives and describes as ‘utterly senseless nihilism’. 
(Zuleika, 2008, p. 32) Analysts and researchers thereby mute, that these acts are 
social actions to which normative judgement applies. Recognising that terrorism 
scholars are forced to make a choice when they study terrorism as an object of 
knowledge to stabilise their approach, even when the object of knowledge is 
unbounded and incoherent, it must not be forgotten however, that they also 
embark on a journey, that has crucial political, social and cultural implications. 
The questions scholars chose to ask and answer, serve a normative purpose 
precisely because terrorism operates within existing hegemonic power relations. 
Against this background, the question this thesis wishes to answer is what 
methodological tools Terrorism Studies ought to employ in order to participate 
responsibly in shaping the wider debates that terrorism raises. In addressing this 
question, a key task of this thesis therefore, is to demonstrate, how the 
                                            
1 On the notion of meaningfulness-in-excess see Chapter two. 
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conceptualisation of terrorism and its focus on the instrumentality of violence 
represents a defensible, yet arbitrary choice, which invokes a distinct normative 
position that is, methodologically speaking, never made explicit. This focus has 
been chosen to show Terrorism Studies’ reliance on an unspoken invocation of 
a positivist research methodology. This in turn displays a belief in the possibility 
of objectivity and neutrality in terrorism scholarship. The thesis argues however, 
that such a research methodology cannot provide a framework, which confronts 
the fact that even the most genuinely analytical and neutral conceptualisation of 
terrorism, cannot remain in the exclusive control of its scholarly creator.  
By contrast, the thesis endorses a critical theory approach and contributes to 
the study of terrorism by highlighting the importance of moral reasoning in 
maintaining intellectual and structural barriers to knowledge and subsequently 
demonstrating the potential, which explicit normative theorising entails in 
navigating social, cultural, political and moral inconsistencies that are raised by 
terrorism. The thesis argues, that normative grounding provides the explicit point 
of departure for critical-dialectic reasoning in Terrorism Studies, because as a 
discursive practise, ‘normative argumentation is so very pervasive that we rarely 
stop to consider that it is a rational technique of persuasion.’ (emphasis added, 
Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 239, Habermas, 1973) Explicit normative theorising 
as a methodological tool within Terrorism Studies recognises the persuasive 
appeal of normative reasoning in generating and maintaining taken-for-granted 
social realities. Such a methodological position recognises, that it is the 
unquestioned social realities, which inhibit empathetic perspective-taking and 
with it, the pursuit of emancipatory knowledge. Explicit normative grounding then 
equips critical social science and Terrorism Studies with a methodology, which 
counteracts any unconscious reinforcement of the existing society’s hold over 
thinking and knowledge production. 
Critical self-reflection from an explicitly normative position however, by itself 
has a very limited emancipatory purpose but rather tries to prevent the researcher 
form contributing to dominance by recognising, that the researcher works in an 
ideological-political context where research is embedded in a field of tensions 
between reproducing the existing social order and challenging it. (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg, 2009, p. 166-177) Emancipation then follows from the attempt to 
identify sources of misunderstanding and ideological workings that inhibit 
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empathetic perspective-taking and is achieved through knowledge that provides 
the inspiration for ‘actions aiming at the negation of pseudo-natural constraints’. 
(Habermas, 1972, p. 176) In this context, it is for scholars to utilise a strategic 
position as public intellectuals by orienting their social criticism in such a manner, 
that it provides practically contextualised, empirically informed normative claims 
with concrete political implications (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 318) and it is this 
orientation that this thesis shows to makes a critical theory approach particularly 
suitable for responsible academic expertise on terrorism. 
The central argument of this thesis, follows in the spirit of Critical Terrorism 
Studies in its self-reflective orientation. It posits that Terrorism Studies requires 
an explicit normative framework, from which to exercise its expertise, because it 
needs to confront ethical questions, which lie at the heart of how modern societies 
draw political, social and cultural boundaries when they relate to terrorism. It 
requires a formalised methodological approach, because at a point of (perceived) 
crisis, a normative frame can inject a moment of critical self-reflection, which 
moderates the (perceived) need for action. This position recognises the fact, that 
Terrorism Studies participates in the production of knowledge and serves to 
stabilise hegemonic power relations in civil society. As it follows a critical theory 
approach, it also suggests, that inherent inconsistencies in the object of 
knowledge and the concomitant arbitrary, but ultimately normative choices, 
cannot be bracketed from the knowledge production on terrorism. The thesis 
expands on Critical Terrorism Studies however, by proposing a move of the focus 
in Terrorism Studies from ‘the problem of terrorism’ to ‘the struggle for 
recognition’. By introducing the struggle for recognition, the thesis gives to hand 
an emancipatory framework, which allows to understand ‘terrorism’ as a crucial 
site of political struggle over boundaries and inclusion, at the heart of which lie 
normative questions and values. This framework lends itself for contextual 
application, by encouraging a focus on subjectivity and perspective-taking geared 
towards inclusivity and the recognition of the individual as interested in 
participating as an equal, valued, trusted and reasoning subject in the realisation 
of a shared ‘good life’ of society. 
The thesis therefore, ultimately makes the case that critical social theory 
in the form of the struggle for recognition provides for the methodological tools, 
which enable the identification of cognitive and structural barriers to knowledge, 
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while at the same time, recognising these as providing important moments for 
critical self-reflection and thus moral learning and emancipation. In other words, 
this framework requires Terrorism Studies to participate in, at times, emotion-
driven public discourse and policy making, on the basis of an explicit normative 
foundation and a commitment to critical self-reflection to give concrete ethical 
guidance in addressing the incoherences, which terrorism as an unbounded 
object of knowledge raises. Establishing a normative framework, which offers a 
contextual commitment to the idea of empowerment of individuals and 
emancipation in the form of a struggle for recognition, such a perspective makes 
visible, how these inconsistencies impact on how we relate socially in modern 
societies, where the reality of different social universes disrupts the inevitability 
and stability of our individual social realities. Such a methodological position also 
addresses the difficulty at the heart of the production of neutral knowledge on 
terrorism and therefore makes an important contribution to the knowledge in the 
field.  
This thesis is sympathetic to the idea that multiple realities can be true at the 
same time, and indeed, that one man can be someone’s terrorist and another’s 
freedom fighter. The task of terrorism scholarship as this thesis understands it, is 
to make contextual emancipatory truth claims, which encourage critical self-
reflection in order to navigate the logics and exclusionary practises that underlie 
social inconsistencies and the concomitantly experienced social injustices. For 
the context of the study of terrorism, it is the position of this thesis, that it is the 
task of Terrorism Studies to enable reflexive, critical-dialectic and empathetic 
knowledge of the terrorist actor on the basis of an explicit normative framework 
and that such a framework can be found in the struggle for recognition and the 
commitment to equality and inclusion as its emancipatory basis.  
The original contribution of this thesis therefore, lies its understanding of the 
intellectual task of Terrorism Studies to explicitly confront questions of normative 
significance. This is done by providing a methodological orientation, which gives 
weight to non-empirical, normative claims that go beyond the immediate concern 
with the violent act. Anchoring Terrorism Studies within an explicit normative 
framework, which follows a critical theory approach, provides a position for the 
practically contextualised and empirically informed exercise of its intellectual 
expertise. It moreover, fully and explicitly recognises and addresses the 
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unboundedness of its object of knowledge and the deeper implications its 
expertise can and ought to have for critiquing and shaping self-reflective social 
relationships. Ultimately, this thesis argues, that the collective story of Terrorism 
Studies, is one of critical self-reform that confronts taken-for-granted normative 
positions and boundaries, that serve to mask exclusionary practises by utilising 
incoherence, contradictions and absurdities as springboards for moral learning 
and emancipation. 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter one ‘On the purpose of the study 
of terrorism’ anchors the thesis within Terrorism Studies and critiques the field’s 
positivist orientation, while also positioning itself within Critical Terrorism Studies 
broadly conceived. Driven by the compellingly interesting question of ‘what leads 
a person to participate in political violence’, it demonstrates, that despite the 
emergence of Critical Terrorism Studies and its focus on critique, the dominance 
of positivist research approaches in the field has not been overcome. The chapter 
justifies this position by pointing to the lack of an explicit normative framework, 
which could relate terrorism to wider questions of social, political and cultural 
relevance. The chapter argues, that a contribution to knowledge in Terrorism 
Studies can be made through the application of a critical theory perspective, 
which not only identifies barriers to knowledge and sources of misunderstanding, 
but importantly, also provides for a normative basis from which Terrorism Studies 
can exercise responsible expertise. It is on the basis of such a position, that 
Terrorism Studies can challenge and participate in the culturally sensitive framing 
of terrorism and consequently counterterrorism. This, the thesis argues, puts 
Terrorism Studies in a stronger position to exercise its expertise on terrorism by 
taking seriously its scholarly ability and role in confronting exclusionary practises 
and hegemonic power-relationships beyond the state. It is important that 
Terrorism Studies can take on this role, because in light of a fast-paced, 
emotional, and dynamically evolving coverage of incidents of terrorism, partial 
information, uncertainty and ambiguity have not and cannot provided adequate 
restraint when it comes to the social and cultural framing of terrorism. An explicitly 
normative framework however, allows to engage with terrorism and the limitations 
of expertise and knowledge more generally. It can emphasise the social 
embeddedness of our understanding of terrorism and the implications thereof for 
counterterrorism practises and policy making. 
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 Chapter two ‘Losing sight of subjectivity: Why Terrorism Studies cannot 
and should not tell us what leads a person to turn to political violence’, primarily 
engages with the literature in Terrorism Studies in order to, firstly show that the 
definitional debate of Terrorism Studies stands in place and indeed in the way of 
a clarification of the normative commitment of Terrorism Studies, because in spite 
of pointing at the contestability of the concept, it does not address its inherent 
and reifying power dynamics. By introducing the analogy of the limits of legal 
reasoning, the chapter can show that complexity, ambivalence and subjectivity 
need not be determinants of the limitation of responsible scholarship but rather 
its opposite. The example shows, that it is indeed a recognition of the need for 
self-reflection, restraint and caution that lends both credibility and legitimacy to 
expertise, particularly when expertise is enmeshed in hegemonic power-relations 
backed by the state. Secondly, sketching the debate on the disciplinary home for 
Terrorism Studies, the chapter notes the difficulty of locating Terrorism Studies 
in a disciplinary tradition and concedes that, particularly in relation to the question 
of representation of terrorism and terrorist actors and the notion of agency, 
questions of power relationships are being problematised. However, the chapter 
also observe that violence remains the determinant for locating terrorism within 
an established academic discipline and concomitant research methodology. To 
conclude chapter two, it looks at Terrorism Studies and particularly the role of the 
expert in Terrorism Studies more closely. This is done in order to demonstrate 
that expertise on terrorism is indeed reflective of a positivist research tradition in 
its declared commitment to produce neutral, objective and truthful knowledge 
about terrorism, while at the same time overlooking the implications of its failure 
to explicitly reflect on their own foundational biases which importantly lead to an 
implicit normative leaning that is never made explicit and therefore, prevents 
emancipatory critique.  
Chapter three ‘On the promises of a liberal democracy and the politics of 
counterterrorism’, demonstrates that the implicit normative leaning in Terrorism 
Studies, which has been the focus of chapter two, becomes part of preventative 
counterterrorism approaches in Western societies. Chapter three uses the 
context of the United Kingdom’s PREVENT strategy, to show the contextual 
manifestation of the silence on the implicit normative claims in relation to 
terrorism. The chapter demonstrates not only that this silence leads to a selective 
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focus in preventative counterterrorism approaches, but moreover, that these 
approaches work against the background of wider cultural and political debates 
that reach to the core of communal life and hegemonic power relationships that 
manifest most palpably for minorities in a liberal democracy. Ultimately, the 
chapter shows that, while normative theorising may appear to be of remote 
practical value, the implications of its lack are clearly experienceable in everyday 
life. The chapter concludes, that responsible academic expertise on terrorism 
would be well advised to provide ethical guidance for questions raised by 
terrorism and assist in navigating the wider social and cultural debates, which 
become implied in the debates, and incoherences experienced as injustices, 
around preventative counterterrorism. 
In chapter four ‘On violence and its socio-moral function’, the chapter 
provides an alternative understanding of violence, that moves from its 
instrumentality to its social function and thereby demonstrates that, form the 
perspective of moral psychology, descriptively there is no need to morally 
condemn violence. This move serves as an important step towards de-
exceptionalising violence and terrorism by encouraging empathy with the 
individual actor. This serves as the first step in reorienting the study of terrorism 
because on the one hand, it manages to analytically relegates the question of the 
morality of violence to explicit normative theorising while on the other hand, it also 
draws attention the individual’s commitment to participate in the sustenance of a 
social order which she subjectively understands to be moral and opens up the 
avenue to see violence form the perspective of the individual rather than the state. 
Importantly this chapter allows us to see that the analytical categorisation of 
terrorism as instrumental violence invokes moral intuitions that serve to limit 
methodological empathy with the individual and thereby serve to sustain 
hegemonic power relationships centred on the state. This understanding 
importantly stands in the way of emancipatory self-reflection because moral 
intuitions become taken-for-granted and provide powerful means of persuasion 
in communication of legitimacy. 
Chapter five, ‘On the tragic of moral bubbles and the persistence of 
exclusionary practises’, shows how fallacious cognitive heuristics and social 
practises provide mechanisms that inhibit fully actualised empathetic perspective 
taking by disguising normative choices as taken-for-granted positions that limit 
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the pursuit of emancipatory truth claims. Showing that these mechanisms serve 
to not only selectively disguise violence but moreover shape social reality in a 
manner that serves to sustain exclusionary hegemonic power relationships, the 
chapter not only points to the arising and sustained universal moral bubbles, but 
moreover to difficulty in overcoming them. It is in recognition of this ‘tragedy’ that 
the chapter, in line with the overall argument of the thesis, encourages Terrorism 
Studies to not only account for said tragedy but furthermore to utilise this as the 
basis for injecting reflexivity and the normative claims it should advance, because 
it understands the academic study of terrorism to be entrusted with the 
methodological sensitivity and responsibility to expand moral bubbles through 
emancipatory critique.  
 Chapter six ‘Stretching Moral Bubbles - Existential struggle for recognition 
and emancipatory research’ then carves out a normative position for Terrorism 
Studies with an explicitly normative framework that takes the individual, rather 
than the state, as its focus of concern. The chapter problematises the nexus 
between terrorism expertise and terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge 
and demonstrates the social embeddedness of normative reasoning. It does so 
by demonstrating that different acts of violence are morally indistinguishable. 
Within this framework it is possible to reflexively engage with the terrorist actor in 
spite of, and yet with reasoned recognition of the origins of the moral valence of 
the actor’s violence and the observer’s evaluation. This is the case because the 
moral framing of the motivation that is the actor’s justification for activism within 
the framework of a struggle for recognition, is anchored in the self-understanding 
of the individual activist. Their struggle is moral because the very self-
understanding of violence originates from an appeal to a universalised and 
shared, that is taken-for granted, moral grammar to which the individual can lay 
claim. It is such a framework, which provides Terrorism Studies with a normative 
position that enables it to act as a point of reference to confront the exclusionary 
practises, which hide behind the contestation of terrorism and allows Terrorism 
Studies a claim to emancipatory critique. This provides for the foundation for the 
field’s participation in the confrontation of questions more central to contemporary 
political life, which positivist leaning methodologies problematically remain silent 
on. It is in the identification of the scarcity of explicit normative theorising and the 
consecutive suggestion of a normative framework in the form of a struggle for 
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recognition, where the thesis offers a contribution to Critical Terrorism Studies 
approaches and an original contribution to the knowledge of the field. The thesis 
then is an explicit recognition of the fact, that ethical questions (such as the ones 
raised by Stampnitzky (Forthcoming)) cannot be bracketed from terrorism 
scholarship or policy making, however an explicit engagement with normative 
theory and ethical questions from within Terrorism Studies remains rare.  This of 
course is no surprise, as it is widely acknowledged, that Terrorism Studies is not 
a discipline in its own right2 but rather a collection of researcher that come to the 
topic from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds. This thesis should however 
not be misunderstood as a dismissal of individual contributions, but rather wishes 
to suggest by means of an intervention, that a permeable field that engages with 
a topic as accessible to the public imagination and discourse as terrorism, ought 
to invest further resources in exercising its expertise on the basis of an explicitly 
formulated methodology that enables addressing questions of normative 
concern, so as to provide concrete and measured ethical guidance for 
counterterrorism practitioners, policy makers and everyone who participates in 
the debates and practices triggered and implicated by terrorism. The strength of 
the struggle for recognition as a normative framework for the study of terrorism, 
lies in its potential to navigating the inconsistencies and absurdities of modern 
life, by recognising the barriers to moral learning as well as locating the impetus 
for moral learning within the existing moral order. This position encourages self-
reflection and empathy because it understands the identity formation of the 
individual to be dependent on the experience of being recognised as a valuable 
contributor to shared projects. This framework therefore, can provide ethical 
guidance to confront the questions central to contemporary political, social and 
cultural life that are being raised by terrorism, with the individual and not the state 
as its central concern. With its explicit normative framework, this thesis offers a 
methodological approach so that Terrorism Studies can provide concrete ethical 
guidance to navigate the incoherences of modern political, social and cultural life 
by treating the contestations over terrorism as a site for moral leaning and 
emancipation. 
                                            
2 See for example: (Stampnitzky, 2012); also (Morrison, 2017). 
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1 The purpose of the academic study of terrorism 
Marc Sageman, initially in the wake of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings 
and in the exchange with terrorism researchers in the March 2014 issue of 
Terrorism and Political Violence, attested the stagnation of terrorism research. 
He attests that, ‘despite over a decade of government funding and thousands of 
newcomers to the field of terrorist research, we are no closer to answering the 
simple question of ‘What leads a person to turn to political violence?’’ (Sageman, 
2014b, p. 565) Noting that many researchers have been attracted to the field by 
the availability of government money, rather than a genuine interest in the study 
of terrorism per se, he primarily takes issue with the scarcity of the generation of 
purposeful data and the symptomatic separation of the academic from the 
strategic study of terrorism. It is the over-classification of data available to 
government intelligence practitioners and the restricted access to huge datasets, 
which go widely unutilised by academics with rigorous methodology training, who 
rely on comparatively weak data and secondary sources. The intelligence 
community however, lacks said methodological rigour to generate new insights 
from huge, yet classified datasets. Despite the wave of interest in terrorism 
research triggered by 9/11, Terrorism Studies ‘failed to generate any sort of 
consensus about the process through which people turn to political violence.’ 
(emphasis added Sageman, 2013) Acknowledging practical obstacles of access 
to primary sources, John Horgan and Jessica Stern (2013) in response stress the 
contributions and importance of qualitative and ethnographic studies in 
addressing ‘how, why, and where individuals have turned to terrorism’. They 
concede, that there is indeed no consensus on the question raised by Sageman. 
In turn, they suggest that the large number of disciplines, which contribute to 
terrorism research, is essential to understanding terrorism. Rather than the 
stagnation of terrorism research, they see a gradual accumulation of 
contributions, but note that these approaches would benefit from being made into 
a more formal field of study. (Horgan and Stern, 2013) 
Lisa Stampnitzky (2013) on the other hand thoughtfully problematises the 
discourse of failure in Terrorism Studies and notes the pervasiveness of it as one 
of the key constitutive elements of the discipline of Terrorism Studies. She 
observes, that at the heart of the discourse of failure, lies an ongoing contestation 
of the concept of terrorism, a ‘problem’ that the discipline fails to be able to 
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resolve. Stampnitzky concludes, that terrorism is an unbounded object of 
knowledge. She notes, that at the core of the contestation of the concept of 
terrorism for the discipline of Terrorism Studies, lies a pursuit to ‘fix’ the concept 
in order to arrive at a coherent, analytical and stable definition, that is to de-
politicise the definition3 and thereby remove the accusation of the arbitrariness of 
its application. Stampnitzky (Forthcoming) notes however, that ‘the problem of 
definition’ importantly is not one of the ‘corruption of an otherwise neutral term’ or 
an issue of the selective or hypocritical application of the term. (Illing, 2015) It is 
rather a reflection of the fact, that ‘the political is baked into the concept from the 
start’ because the term becomes meaningful only through interaction with the 
state. Terrorism is encountered in practise through interaction with the state. It is 
the state, who determines what it treats as terrorism and it does this through its 
counterterrorism practises. The inconsistencies of the term do not therefore, stem 
from the reality of these acts or the discourse around them, but from the fact that 
it is not possible to tear away definitions of terrorism from counterterrorism 
practise. In other words, because even the most analytically pure concept [of 
terrorism] re-enters engagement with the practical realm, inconsistencies 
surface, because the political construction of terrorism through counterterrorism 
practise will act back upon the momentarily de-politicised and analytical concepts 
that experts will introduce. (Stampnitzky, 2015a)  
Terrorism then is best approached as an unbounded object of knowledge that 
is characterised by its inconsistencies and shaped through interaction. By 
suggesting, that the core logic of terrorism lies in its inconsistencies, 
understanding terrorism necessitates a perspective in reverse, that is by looking 
at those that are being subjected to practises of counterterrorism (Stampnitzky, 
2015a) and conceptualising terrorism as ‘violence out of place’.4 Looking at 
counterterrorism practises enable the identification of terrorism in reverse. From 
this however importantly follows also that terrorism serves to work back on and 
thereby define, other central aspects to political and cultural life, which determine 
                                            
3 See for example Schmid (2005) who notes that Terrorism Studies has failed at its foundational 
step in providing for a neutral, stable and universally accepted definition of the phenomenon under 
study and this being the key impediment to turning ‘terrorism’ into a useful analytical term. 
4 Stampnitzky (2015a) understands ‘place’ relating primarily to geographical location, but notes 
that ‘place’ invokes a notion of ‘innocence’ or ‘politics’ in determining the expectation as to when 
violence is ‘out of place’. 
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our expectations as to when violence is thought fit or to be out of place 
respectively. (Stampnitzky, Forthcoming) 
This of course raises questions that are by far more central to social and 
political life in general and necessities and engagement with the different 
dialectical logics that not only inform our expectations, but which further serve to 
(re-)politicise even the seemingly most neutral of analytical conceptualisations of 
terrorism. What becomes apparent, is that the inconsistencies that surface in the 
conceptualisation of terrorism and the logic behind it, provide an interesting route 
for exploration by terrorism researchers. 
However, it is against the background of the recurring centrality of the debate 
of the stagnation of Terrorism Studies, the unboundedness of its object of 
knowledge, and in acknowledgement of the overpowering interest and simplicity 
that Sageman’s question of why people turn to political violence has beyond 
academia that the question arises what the purpose of Terrorism Studies should 
be. Especially because we have just seen that inner workings of the incoherences 
in the conceptualisation of terrorism highlight inconsistencies which are central to 
social relationships and raises more fundamental social, political and cultural 
questions. In spite of the intuitive appeal that Sageman’s question undoubtedly 
has, it is in recognition of the inherent inconsistencies of the concept that 
necessarily makes Terrorism Studies intellectually vulnerable, that this thesis 
argues, that the purpose of the study of terrorism actually must lie in the 
confrontation of exclusionary practises that provide for the normative background 
noise against which Terrorism Studies attempts to stabilise the inconsistencies 
inherent but not necessarily visible in the translation of the concept of terrorism 
into the questions it seeks to answer.  
This is not to dismiss approaches particularly from Critical Terrorism Studies 
that have repeatedly criticised (Jackson, 2007b), and consecutively tried to 
address, the state-centricity and problem-solving approach (Jackson, 2016) of 
Terrorism Studies in an attempt to explain how a relatively marginal phenomenon 
generate so much interest and how ‘transformative the terrorism discourse would 
be of society and culture’. (Jackson et al., 2017, p. 197) In spite of the stated 
commitment to ‘transparency about its own values and political standpoints’ and 
’a broadly defined notion of emancipation’ (Smyth et al., 2008, p. 2), Critical 
Terrorism Studies in spite of its head-on confrontation of the status-quo 
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privileging and problem-solving state centricity of which it criticises Orthodox 
Terrorism Studies, has not taken sufficient time to articulate a compelling 
methodology or normative agenda. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to address this shortcoming of (Critical) 
Terrorism Studies in a manner that not only recognised the inherent 
inconsistencies in the conceptualisation of terrorism by demonstrating how 
violence (selectively) comes to be understood as ‘out of place’. The thesis 
suggests that the question of the morality of violence plays a central role in this 
and seeks to provide for an emancipatory framework from which Terrorism 
Studies can exercise its expertise. It is such a framework that can provide for the 
basis for critiquing the subtle practises that flow out of the inherent 
inconsistencies that are baked into the practise of counterterrorism and which are 
subjectively experienced as injustices. This thesis continues in the spirit of Critical 
Terrorism Studies in so far as it is sensitive to status-quo privileging state-
centricity of the study of terrorism. However, it goes beyond the state of the field 
of Critical Terrorism Studies in so far, as it understands emancipation indeed as 
a problem-solving approach, whereby the solution of the problem however lies in 
a normative position based on a critical theory framework from which it confronts 
exclusionary practises, rather than the immediate confrontation of the problem of 
terrorism by means of counterterrorism with the state as its primary point of 
reference. 
1.1 What Terrorism Studies is not telling us: Defining the 
research problem 
The problem that this thesis wishes to address finds its scholarly expression 
in the juxtaposition of the compelling clarity of Sageman’s question. It is this 
juxtaposition which epitomises how Terrorism Studies treats terrorism as an 
analytical object of inquiry against the pervasive complexity that Stampnitzky’s 
observation of terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge entails. Indeed, 
this thesis is sympathetic to the notion of terrorism as an unbounded object of 
knowledge and concerned about the implications of positivist research 
approaches that treat terrorism as a mere object of analytical inquiry. I see the 
compelling simplicity of Sageman’s question as paradigmatic of a failure of 
Terrorism Studies to provide for a methodological framework, which could 
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encourage a more reflexive, and indeed critical approach to terrorism as an 
unbounded object of knowledge.  
What I intend to demonstrate throughout this thesis is, that embedded in 
Sageman’s question, lies a taken-for granted methodological belief in the 
possibility to suspend the inherent inconsistencies of terrorism as an object of 
knowledge in order to enable objective and neutral analysis of terrorism as a 
socio-political phenomenon. In this sense, Sageman’s question embodies all the 
virtues of a positivist research tradition that assumes research to be an objective 
activity, which is dispassionately carried out at the ‘highest level of de-
contextualisation and formalisation’ (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 235) and is able 
to offer a value free position. It is this positivist research tradition that will be 
shown to permeate Terrorism Studies more generally. 
1.1.1 On the dominance of positivist research approaches 
What this belief and research position misses however, is that even the most 
genuine analytical and neutral conceptualisation of terrorism, cannot remain in 
the exclusive control of its scholarly creator. Rather terrorism takes shape against 
the backdrop of the real-life manifestation of a social and/or political phenomenon 
in interaction with the state and its organs to which social, political, legal and/or 
cultural judgement applies. 
In other words, this thesis seeks to confront the dominance of positivist 
research approaches by addressing the methodological silence on the normative 
orientation in Terrorism Studies, based on which the scepticism in relation to 
objectivity and neutrality in the research of terrorism becomes cast as a merely 
preparatory step that can be ‘fixed’ through diligent conceptualisation. I argue that 
based on this understanding, Terrorism Studies loses sight of the subjectivity and 
social embeddedness of its object of inquiry. In doing so, Terrorism Studies 
participates in the production of knowledge that serves to stabilise hegemonic 
power relations in civil society, because it suggests that inherent inconsistencies 
in the object of knowledge and the concomitant arbitrary, but ultimately normative 
choices, could be bracketed out from its knowledge production. This thesis 
ultimately asks, how Terrorism Studies can participate better in the responsible 
production of knowledge on terrorism.  
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1.1.2 And implicit normative positions  
A key task of this thesis is to demonstrate that indeed even the most innocent 
conceptualisation of terrorism represents a defensible, yet arbitrary choice, which 
invokes a distinct normative position that is, methodologically speaking, never 
made explicit.  
I do this in chapter two by tracing the contestation of the definition of terrorism 
as well as the debates surrounding the disciplinary location of Terrorism Studies 
in order to show that, without having made this explicit, the production of 
knowledge in Terrorism Studies serves to locate terrorism within hegemonic 
power relations that are primarily defined by the nation state. This of course is 
already indicative of the fact that the object of knowledge cannot be, strictly 
speaking, neutral. As Terrorism Studies however remains silent on the 
methodological implications of this foundational relationship with the state, I show 
in chapter three that the real-life consequence is that hegemonic power 
relationships facilitate a politics of terrorism that work on a basis of stability and 
predictability of inherently ambiguous, dynamic and contestable social 
relationships, thereby sacrificing self-reflexive dialogue and equal citizenship 
within the nation state. Terrorism Studies thereby surrenders its position as a 
facilitator of self-reflexive critique and a participant in the responsible production 
of emancipatory knowledge by locating its object of knowledge with primary 
reference to the nation state and the political instrumentality of violence. In 
chapter four then I demonstrate that in the way of a more reflexive approach in 
Terrorism Studies stands the pervasive focus on the instrumentality of violence. 
I demonstrate that it is this focus on instrumentality, that necessarily leads to the 
negative normative judgement of any act of violence that is exercised outside the 
state’s monopoly of violence. Emphasising, that violence importantly serves a 
subjective social-moral function in social relationships however, I show how 
violence is ubiquitous in social relationships and does not have to result in 
negative normative judgement. In other words, chapter four demonstrates not 
only the social embeddedness of violence but also that negative normative 
judgement does not necessarily have to follow from the mere utilisation of 
violence. This recognition of the social embeddedness of violence allows us in 
chapter five to look at the dynamics behind the selectivity of negative normative 
judgement and indeed to demonstrate that fallible cognitive heuristics and their 
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collective social manifestation sustain moral bubbles that serve to selectively but 
systematically disguise violence from ourselves. In other words, the chapter 
traces the cognitive and social mechanisms that lead to a moral embubblement5 
which lies at the heart of the selective disguise of inconsistencies and an 
inevitable normative position born out of hegemonic power relationships. These 
privilege social stability and predictability over emancipatory truth claims. Chapter 
six then, not only problematises the inevitability of moral consequentialist 
reasoning by demonstrating that such reasoning is born out of an existential 
struggle for recognition, but further shows how a framework based on the struggle 
for recognition can serve to provide for a normative basis for the critical-reflexively 
engagement with inconsistent social practices that are subjectively experienced 
as misrecognition and thus as an injustice. The chapter does not only provide for 
a framework to conceptualise the struggle to rectify instances of recognition as 
moral, but also provides for a normative-theoretical framework to addresses the 
inherent inconsistencies in the production of knowledge on terrorism that takes 
the individual as its main point of reference. 
In other words, at the core of this thesis lies the suggestion for the need of an 
explicitly reflexive critical-dialectic perspective, that addresses the struggle over 
the inherent inconsistency that terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge 
brings with it and understands Terrorism Studies as a participant in the 
construction of everyday knowledge around terrorism. By establishing a 
normative framework that offers a contextual commitment to the idea of 
empowerment of individuals and emancipation in the form of a struggle for 
recognition, such a perspective makes visible how these inconsistencies impact 
on how we relate socially in modern societies, where the reality of different social 
universes disrupt the inevitability and stability of our individual social realities and 
consequently the possibility for the production of neutral knowledge on terrorism. 
                                            
5 Magnani (2011) introduces the concept of ‘moral embubblement’ to analyse and explain ‘why 
so many kinds of violence behaviour in the world today are treated by observers as if they were 
something else’ and suggest that ‘moral embubblement’ renders invisible and condones both the 
disengaged (or ‘reengaged’) morality and the related violence. The disengagers are entrapped in 
a moral bubble, which systematically disguises their violence to themselves. (…) Lack of 
awareness of our disengagement of morality - or reengagement of another moral framework - is 
very often accompanied by lack of awareness of the deceptive/aggressive character of 
consequent verbal interactions (and behaviours), because the new moral assumptions which 
motivate violence and punishment are rarely seen and acknowledged as actually “violent”.’ (2011, 
p. 178). 
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This thesis, is sympathetic to the idea that multiple realities can be true at the 
same time, and indeed, that one man can be someone’s terrorist and another’s 
freedom fighter. The task of the critical scholars of terrorism as this thesis 
understands it, is to make contextual emancipatory truth claims, which encourage 
self-reflexivity in order to navigate the logics and exclusionary practises that 
underlie social inconsistencies and the concomitantly experienced social 
injustices. For the context of the study of terrorism, it is the position of this thesis 
that it is the task of Terrorism Studies to enable reflexive, critical-dialectic and 
empathetic knowledge of the terrorist actor on the basis of an explicit normative 
framework and that such a framework can be found in the struggle for recognition 
and the commitment to equality and inclusion as its emancipatory basis. 
1.2 And what it should be telling us: Contribution and 
scope 
The overarching task of this thesis and the original contribution to the field of 
Terrorism Studies, lies in the development of a methodological position in the 
form of an explicit normative commitment for Terrorism Studies. Such a 
framework must engage with the barriers to, and nature of, knowledge about 
terrorism in order to enable Terrorism Studies as a responsible site of knowledge 
production. The thesis shows that Terrorism Studies, by and large, relies on a 
positivist methodology whereby normative theorising is at best treated as a 
tangential question without confronting larger ideological implications of the 
research and at worst its significance bracketed from the ‘true’ questions 
Terrorism Studies is meant to confront. 
1.2.1 Explicit normative theorising in Terrorism Studies 
Demonstrating how a normative position that treats terroristic violence a priory 
as morally tainted, becomes implicitly embedded in terrorism research shows that 
Terrorism Studies needs to break with positivistic approaches and make 
normative-theorising the central concern of Terrorism Studies. Such a position 
reflects the unbounded nature of terrorism, and problematises how Terrorism 
Studies becomes embedded in the workings of status-quo hegemonic power 
relationships. Drawing attention to this dilemma, tracing the positivist tendencies 
and their implications throughout the best parts of chapters two till five, is central 
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to this thesis and primarily represent a distinct reading of the existing knowledge 
of the field. The thesis thereby contributes to the knowledge of terrorism 
scholarship by demonstrating and critiquing the implicit normative positioning 
within Terrorism Studies and the consequences this has for preventative 
counterterrorism practises.  
The original contribution of this thesis however lies in the suggestion of a 
reorientation of the actual intellectual task of Terrorism Studies to explicitly 
confront questions of normative significance and thereby to give weight to non-
empirical, normative claims that go beyond the immediate concern with the 
violent act. Chapter six, by drawing on the struggle for recognition as a normative 
framework for Terrorism Studies that understands an individual’s motivations to 
utilise violence with reference to an existential and consequentialist moral 
reasoning, encourages such a reorientation and provides the methodological 
framework for it. Anchoring Terrorism Studies within an explicit normative 
framework which follows a critical theory approach provides a position for the 
practically contextualised and empirically informed exercise of its intellectual 
expertise. Moreover, this framework also fully recognises and addresses the 
unboundedness of its object of knowledge and the deeper implications its 
expertise can and ought to have for critiquing and shaping self-reflexive social 
relationships. It is the hope that this thesis, in bringing together an eclectic 
selection of research approaches consistent with a critical theory methodology, 
can be applied as a frame for Terrorism Studies and thereby contribute to shape 
critical but engaged and empathetic but responsible scholarship that focuses on 
emancipatory social relationships rather than violence.  
Importantly however, this thesis does not argue that a more authentic truth or 
more accurate insights on terrorism as a violent act can be found in normative 
theorising alone, but its purpose is merely to remind the academic scholarship in 
Terrorism Studies that it must afford the time to engage in normative theorising 
in order to produce responsible knowledge as well as self-reflexive social 
criticism, for it is the position of this thesis that the central scholarly concern of 
expertise on terrorism ought not only to be publicly available but oriented towards 
practically contextualised and empirically informed normative claims with political 
implications. (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 318) Ultimately, this thesis follows a 
critical theory approach and takes terrorism as the contextual field to demonstrate 
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how established modes of thought in relation to (political) violence and its moral 
valence contain, reify and maintain contradictions, inherent restrictions and 
irrationalities that inform, restrict and distort how we communicate (Habermas, 
1984) and consecutively relate to one another in modern, post-migration 
societies.  
1.3 Methodology - Critical theory and limitations 
In its orientation, this thesis follows a tradition that is deeply disturbed by the 
simplicity and clarity with which Sageman’s question not only arises in the 
academic debate on the failure and/or stagnation of the study of terrorism, but 
furthermore, the predictable regularity with which experts rise to the occasion to 
answer the question following a terrorist event and a seeming disregard for the 
responsibility that answering the question has real-life implication for the way in 
which individuals, societies and nations interact with one another. While I can, 
and do, recognise the compelling reflex to answer the question, my concrete 
scepticism vis-a-vis its simplicity is born out of the humbling experience of having 
worked on the UK government’s PREVENT strategy with diverse stakeholders, 
ranging from Muslim community representatives to front-line prison and police 
staff. Here I observed first hand that, what I (and some stakeholders) took the 
strategy’s goal to be unproblematically worthwhile, for its declared goal was after 
all to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism (Home Office, 
2011, p. 6), my work and involvement with it was treated with deep suspicion and 
at times outright rejection by others, who felt unfairly targeted by the focus of the 
strategy, a sentiment that was later picked up in the review of the PREVENT 
strategy in 2011. (Home Office, 2011, p. 26) My personal naivety, that working 
with a small Muslim-led consultancy as a declared atheist and white, yet non-
British gay female would be enough to demonstrate my bona fide good intentions, 
my neutrality, my personal commitment to equality and justice in a non-biased 
and fair manner for the purpose of supporting people who are vulnerable to 
radicalisation, even when the work was focused on Muslim youth, woman, 
imams, mosques and community representatives, the opportunistic cynicism with 
which we, as a Muslim-led consultancy, pitched the need for ‘Islam awareness 
training’ was not lost on me. I realised that, in an attempt to declare my neutrality 
vis-a-vis the PREVENT strategy, its implicit bias and unintended consequences, 
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lost to me at the beginning, necessitated for me to take an explicit stance on my 
beliefs, my values, and my subjectivity in order for others to recognise my 
empathy for their humanity because something deeper, more fundamental and 
not immediately accessible from my subject position was taking shape in the 
context of the application and operationalisation of a counterterrorism strategy 
that my association with it represented.  
It is a humility born from my own experienced naivety that informs my 
scepticism of the compelling simplicity that Sageman’s question invokes. Indeed, 
what the reflex to answer the question overlooks, is the fact that terrorism experts 
are active participants in the shaping and creation of social reality through the 
questions it asks, the discourses it participates in, the foci it chooses. These in 
themselves carry values and moral truths, which on the surface appear innocent 
and well-meaning, but which can and do take a disparate shape when 
encountered from a different subject position. Terrorism Studies, as an academic 
discipline and as an intellectual project must go beyond the surface manifestation 
of terrorism as a violent act and must aim at understanding and mediating 
disparate perceptions of the phenomenon, because it is the disparate perceptions 
of it that create and construct subjective reality and motivations to act. But it must 
do so in explicit recognition of its embeddedness and participation in the 
construction of social reality for otherwise the intellectual contribution of Terrorism 
Studies will remain limited. Insisting on the neutrality of positivist research fails to 
recognise that even the most well-meaning researcher is embedded in a social 
world that is constructed through people manipulated by power, whereby 
hegemonic ideology creates blind spots, for researchers and the lay public alike. 
In contrast, this thesis follows a critical theory approach that recognises the 
interactive and iterative nature between values and facts in interpreting and 
understanding the social world that also mediate disparate perceptions of 
terrorism and is committed to ‘emancipatory knowledge’ by trying to identify 
sources of misunderstanding and ideological options to show how ideas, 
perceptions, fantasies exploit psychological barriers that restrict man’s potential 
to reach emancipatory knowledge. (Habermas, 1973) 
1.3.1 Critical theory and the socially embedded researcher 
In its recognition that, despite the aspiration for ‘value-free’ social science, 
value questions have always been central to the research process of social 
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phenomena. This thesis follows an approach that wishes to make normative 
theorising a central concern for the context of the academic study of terrorism. 
From a strictly scientific, that is positivistic epistemology however, normative 
knowledge ‘is not knowledge at all, merely a type of non-rational belief’ (Morrow 
and Brown, 1994, p. 50) precisely because normative theorising does not admit 
to various degrees of rational argumentation. Critical theory in contrast draws 
attention to the political dimension in social research and posits that social 
science cannot maintain neutrality and objectivity in relation to social phenomena, 
not least because researchers, as members of a particular society, can and do 
pass on its fundamental values unconsciously. Central to a research process 
informed by critical theory is self-reflection and the maintenance of restraint in 
order to counter-act the tendency to interpret existing social reality from taken-
for-granted cultural stances. (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 175) 
 Critical theory, critiques and stands in juxtaposition to positivist research 
traditions and is deeply suspicious of the objective observer who carriers out his 
activity ‘at the highest possible level of de-contextualisation and formalisation’ 
(Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 235) in order to reach a value-free position. While 
positivist approaches concede that there are some tangential value questions 
relevant for social research - mainly those relating to the question of research 
ethics understood as the rights of the investigated subject - the larger ideological 
implications of research are by and large excluded from its methodology because 
it follows the basic premise that ‘good research’ in this context cannot be 
combined with value concerns of the researcher. (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 
235) Central then to a research programme informed by critical theory are 
normative questions, solving narrowly defined societal problems without regard 
to wider political ‘meaning contexts’ not only reflects a narrow positivist view of 
science, but also undermines people’s ability to take up an independent political 
or ethical stance. (Habermas, 1972) This is the case because at the heart of 
critical theory lies a specific focus on the substantive problematic of domination 
based on a concern with the ways power pervades and mediates all social 
relationships. (Howell, 2013) Concealed beneath a conception of goal-oriented 
political solutions, not only lies a too narrow means-end-logic but moreover taken-
for-granted systemic constraints imposed by structures of power which have the 
effect of colonising social relationships. (Habermas, 1971)  
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1.3.1.1 Critical Theory and the centrality of power  
At the point of departure, critical theory is concerned with philosophical 
questions about the nature of types of knowledge and the strict logical, that is 
positivist, distinction between empirical and normative questions. While the 
former can be constructed and validated in a scientific way, strictly speaking, the 
latter cannot. Critical theory then is focused on the false separation between 
conceptual knowledge and facts, because it understands the researcher as 
always part of the object under study, an object that is always mediated through 
social relationships and is inextricably linked to values, action, knowledge and 
theory generation. (Howell, 2013) The goal for critical social science is to 
overcome the subjectivist-objectivist split by developing a research programme 
that combines empirical and normative theorising with the ultimate goal of 
identifying the potential for change, through the empowerment of people and a 
challenge to injustices in social relationships through the accumulation of 
knowledge as well as political activity and social transformation. (Howell, 2013) 
In order to analyse the interplay between meaning and structure, a 
methodological approach to social determination is required that focuses on the 
nature of social relations as shaped through and by power and thereby 
overcomes the subjectivist-objectivist polarisation.  
Where positivist approaches would largely ignore questions of power, 
(Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 59) critical theory not only draws attention to the 
relations of power that shape social reality but moreover does this with the explicit 
practical interest in emancipation. Logic, is located and understood dialectically 
and from the perspective of logical practises (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p.230) 
that allows for the possibility to analyse agency and structure as intertwined and 
mutually implicating one another. Logic in this dialectical sense is best 
understood with reference to context-dependent logical, but most importantly not 
universal, criteria. This ‘logic-in-use’ as part of a set of heuristic devices not only 
draws attention to the multiple social realities but precisely to the social 
embeddedness of the critical researcher. 
 Habermas (Habermas, 1984) writes of the lifeworld as those contexts of 
meaning through which people seek to interpret and understand their situations 
and their environment. In order to make sense of their concrete experiences, 
values, norms and language provide for important media for control and 
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coordination, precisely because domination can no longer be reduced to an effect 
of a dominant ideology but because there is an expectation of active legitimation 
through the use of argument. (Forst, 2011, Delanty, 2005) While critical theory 
accepts that power relations infiltrate the communications process, it aims at 
confronting taken for granted assumptions only in so far as it asks whether social 
norms which claim legitimacy are genuinely accepted by those who follow and 
internalise them, or whether they merely stabilise relations of power’. (Likes, 
1982, p. 137 quoted in Alvesson, 2009, p. 152)  
1.3.1.2 Logic-in-use and mediating practises of knowledge 
Critical theory demands an existential reflexivity in the sense that understands 
scientific knowledge to be grounded in lifeworld, common sense and everyday 
life precisely because interpretive skills originate and become possible only 
through our experiences, prejudices and taken-for-granted beliefs which in turn 
informs our ‘logic-in-use’. Acknowledging one’s standpoint, is paramount as a 
resource and claim for any social group that mediating practises of knowledge 
become necessary for a comprehensive understanding of social life across 
existential differences. (Harding, 2004, Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 238) What 
follows is an interpretive character of knowledge which precludes any absolute 
corrects. 
At the same time, however, this recognition of interpretative difference does 
not prevent a fusion of a shared horizon of understanding, albeit a fragmented 
one, which while being inconsistent with a positivist ideal of ahistorical, de-
contextualised and formal social theory reflects the essentially historical 
character of social inquiry that critical theory purports. Indeed, critical inquiry 
supports consensus achieved through communication (Habermas, 1984) 
because this logic-in-use does not admit to various degrees of rational 
argumentation that it can be a central aspect to critique that goes beyond simple 
ideological polemics. From this perspective it is possible to subject questions 
about justice, freedom and equality to critical scrutiny (Morrow and Brown, 1994, 
p. 52) by identifying sources of misunderstanding, structural and unconscious 
sources of social and psychological phenomena that sustain ideas, perceptions, 
fantasies and so on, that sustain psychological barriers and stand in the way of 
‘explanatory understanding’ and emancipatory knowledge. (Habermas, 1973) 
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In summary, critical theory is characterised by an interpretive approach 
combined with a pronounced interest in scrutinising actual, taken-for granted 
social realities and norms and is guided by an emancipatory interest in 
knowledge. However, in recognition of the illusiveness of the ‘neutral, objective 
researcher who follows specified methodological rules for acquiring knowledge 
about limited and testable causalities, with the independent, critical and socially 
and politically committed intellectual’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 145) 
critical theory does so without making its claims from rigid frames of reference. 
However, central to critical social science is not only to distinguish what is socially 
and psychologically invariant from what is, or can be made to be, socially 
changeable, but indeed to concentrate upon the latter in order to call attention to 
contradictions in the way society functions (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 
144) and encourage emancipatory knowledge. Critical theory makes normative 
theorising a more systematic part of its endeavour and the dialectic-interpretative 
approach should be coupled with an explicitly normative framework that thereby 
explicitly discloses what normative or value propositions the researcher purveys 
or reinforces.  
1.3.2 On the role of values in the production of knowledge  
For Habermas, central to critical social theory is its normative foundations 
because he stresses that communicative rationality provides a framework for an 
evaluation with regards to strategic distortion of communication and the interests 
of various forms of control and domination. (Habermas, 1984) Critical theory can 
be understood as a discursive practise in the sense of an explicit normative 
argumentation. Critical theory purports normative theory, because it is troubled 
by that fact, that in the context of practical reasoning, we continuously uphold 
normative or value propositions that seem entirely unproblematic and without 
doubt. But, because critical theory understands knowledge to be inherently 
interested and normative and empirical reasoning to be inevitably intertwined, 
values and normative propositions must be confronted directly rather than 
suggesting abstractly the impossible exclusion of normative questions, a move 
all too familiar as we will see, when it comes to the definition of terrorism. (Morrow 
and Brown, 1994, p. 238) 
Indeed, it is this positioning that I consider particularly useful for the academic 
study of terrorism. Critical theory after all provides a basis to conduct research 
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from an emancipatory cognitive interest which critically interprets various 
empirical phenomena with the stated purpose of stimulating self-reflection and 
overcoming the blockages of established institutions and modes of thought, that 
can be found in institutions, ideologies and identities that are central and often 
assumed to be good, self-evident and neutral, in order to shed light on some of 
the absurdities of contemporary social life. (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 
159) At the same time however, it must be noted that it is difficult to avoid 
reinforcing established social institutions and dominant interests if one concerns 
oneself with socially important issues, because the researcher’s knowledge after 
all is and always remains socially embedded. It is for this reason that critical 
theory holds that normative theorising should be a more systematic part of social 
science programs not only in order to unveil ideological mystifications in social 
relationships but also in order to live up to its own emancipatory commitment. In 
making normative theorising explicit, the researcher attempts to counterbalance 
any tendency to get trapped by the empirical data and an important method in 
critical theory consists in the meticulous examination of existing research in order 
to uncover positivist thinking and taken-for-granted presuppositions. (Alvesson 
and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 176) 
1.3.2.1 On the persuasive appeal of normative reasoning and 
misunderstanding 
Normative grounding provides the explicit point of departure for critical-
dialectic reasoning because as a discursive practise, ‘normative argumentation 
is so very pervasive that we rarely stop to consider that it is a rational technique 
of persuasion.’ (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 239, Habermas, 1973) Explicit 
normative theorising recognises the persuasive appeal of normative reasoning in 
generating and maintaining taken-for-granted social realities, which inhibit 
emancipatory knowledge. This equips critical social science with a methodology 
that counteracts any unconscious reinforcement of the existing society’s hold 
over thinking and knowledge production. 
Critical self-reflection from an explicitly normative position however by itself 
has a very limited emancipatory purpose but rather tries to prevent the researcher 
form contributing to dominance by recognising that the researcher works in an 
ideological-political context where research is embedded in a field of tensions 
between reproducing the existing social order and challenging it. (Alvesson and 
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Sköldberg, 2009, p. 166-177) Emancipation then follows from the attempt to 
identify sources of misunderstanding and ideological workings that inhibit 
cognitive interests and is achieved through knowledge that provides the 
inspiration for ‘actions aiming at the negation of pseudo-natural constraints’. 
(Habermas, 1972, p. 176) In this context, it is for academics to utilise a strategic 
position as public intellectuals by orienting their social criticism in such a manner 
that it provides practically contextualised, empirically informed normative claims 
with concrete political implications (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 318) and it is this 
orientation that I believe makes a critical theory approach particularly pertinent 
for responsible academic expertise on terrorism. 
1.3.3 Approach and limitations 
This thesis follows an approach that can securely be anchored in critical 
theory methodological techniques, not least so because it has regularly been 
noted that its methods are eclectic. Rather than suggesting a set of methods, 
Morrow emphasises that critical theory is best characterised by its  
‘methodological pragmatism coupled with an explicit research 
programme whose critical realist ontology sets an agenda and 
priorities with respect to research problems that do tend to privilege 
some methods over others as part of the research process.’ (Morrow 
and Brown, 1994, p. 228) 
In its problem-solving orientation - importantly, however broadly 
understood as solving the problem of identifying and overcoming the 
circumstances that enslave humans (Horkheimer, 1993) - methods and theory 
are chosen with regards to their effectiveness and choices about linking theories 
and methods are an ongoing process that is contextually bound rather than a 
technical decision that can be taken for granted through reference to the ‘logic of 
science’.  
Central to the unique methodological approach in critical theory is its 
reflexive and dialectical character based on an agent-structure dialectic and the 
interpretative structural approach to historical explanation. This means of course 
that critical theory suggest a reflexive sociology that involves meta-theoretical 
reflections as a form of inquiry in its own right and reflexivity as an applied practice 
in the overall research process. (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 228-229) 
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1.3.3.1 On cognitive skills and dialectic reflexivity 
Appropriate methods include approaches that bring to the foreground 
background features that can be understood to make possible and thereby 
constitute the existential essence and workings of a particular social 
phenomenon or political practise. Methods in critical theory focus primarily on the 
development and application of cognitive skills pertinent to the production and 
evaluation of research and their being made explicit as rational procedures of 
scientific research. (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 231) It is for this reason that 
non-empirical methods form a central pillar of critical theory which, of course, 
follows from the dialectic reflexivity that critical theory encourages. As the basic 
premise of critical theory is an interest in the processes that lead us to adopt 
particular ideas and take things for granted, it also enables an essentially open 
attitude towards empirical material and theoretical approaches. 
For the context of this thesis this means that I have indeed eclectically 
selected a wide array of theoretical and disciplinary approaches for the purpose 
of identifying firstly that normative claims pervade all aspects of the study of 
terrorism without being made explicit. This approach is entirely consistent with 
critical theory which refuses to situate itself within arbitrary and conventional 
disciplinary boundaries but rather stresses the interconnections between 
disciplines. (Morrow and Brown, 1994) I have done this to show that the move to 
bracket out normative questions encourages a silence on the normative 
orientation of the study of terrorism has the important consequence that wider 
questions central to social, political and cultural life of societies are 
unproblematically being implicated in, and polarised through, the combination of 
security and ‘value debates’. In essence, I not only draw attention to the origins 
of the background workings of the taken-for-granted moral condemnation of 
terrorism, but moreover am interested in its implications, because I consider this, 
in the spirit of critical theory, to be the problem to be addressed via a more self-
reflexive understanding of the oppression sustained by positivist research 
approaches that unwittingly reproduce social power relationships.  
1.3.3.2 Cognitive fallacies, consequentialist moralising, and moral bubbles  
This thesis investigates the processes though which the negative moral 
valence of terrorism becomes taken-for-granted, both in the academic study of 
terrorism as well as in the vernacular and political discourse and relies primarily 
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on non-empirical methods and is then focused on the development of a meta-
theoretical position for Terrorism Studies. With this goal in mind, the thesis utilises 
insights from political philosophy and social and moral psychology notably in 
chapters four and five in order to show universal psychological and social 
mechanism and cognitive fallacies at the level of the individual, group and society 
that explain the tragic of the maintenance of moral bubbles that strategically 
prevent individuals and groups from seeing their own violent actions as morally 
tainted or objectionable. This perspective and the recognition of the tragedy 
herein sensitises the researcher to the necessarily consequentialist moral 
reasoning in relation to violence and the inherent contradictions in the normative 
condemnation of terrorism. This holds particularly true as the thesis, in the spirit 
of critical theory persistently will point to how the notion of morality is utilised to 
structure social relationships in a manner that privilege the maintenance of 
hegemonic power relationships and indeed to demonstrate the absurdities of the 
contemporary perspective on terrorism. 
1.4 Contribution to (Critical) Terrorism Studies 
It is in the identification of the silence of the normative dimension of the 
construction of terrorism, and the consecutive suggestion of a normative 
framework in the form of a struggle for recognition, where I see my most apparent 
contribution to Critical Terrorism Studies approaches and my original contribution 
to the knowledge of the field. While I indeed acknowledge that critical theory 
under-utilises the potential of empirical material, particularly through placing an 
exaggerated importance on the critical element, and there is ‘the risk of being 
caught in the negative binding to the targets of critique and that ‘the usual 
suspects’ are accused, assessed and condemned without open-minded inquiry’ 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 167) this thesis is by no means an exception 
to this. I suggest however also, that Critical Terrorism Studies, while certainly 
reorienting the reading of empirical material, falls into this trap of negative binding 
’the usual suspects’, while not engaging enough with the provision of an explicit 
normative basis for its critique and thereby closing interesting avenues of inquiry, 
an avenue that this thesis explores. 
While I would love to argue that this thesis has arrived at a conscious use 
of non-empirical methods, I must acknowledge that this approach is no less the 
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result of a pragmatic turn half-way through this project. While I would have loved 
to engage empirically with the lived experiences and contextual workings of 
terrorism and counterterrorism discourses in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of logics-in-use, particularly in relation to the conceptualisation 
and justification of violent acts as well as the contextual perception and workings 
behind counterterrorism measures, practical and monetary concerns 
necessitated a more abstract, removed and isolated approach, whereby 
reflexivity was primarily encouraged through insights from unrelated research-
projects, personal conversations and work experiences. While it was these 
circumstances that provided the impetus for self-reflexivity and a challenge to my 
taken for granted world view, values and perceptions, these experiences were 
incidental, cursory and unstructured rather than a conscious attempt of achieving 
greater reflexivity, they did however provide for the ruptures to my own social 
realities that prove to be very useful in encouraging the taking of different 
standpoints and perspectives and taken-for-granted worldview.  
Moreover, this thesis cannot escape the limitation inherent to a critical 
theory approach and the criticism that critical theories of society are closely 
related with ideologies, precisely because it emphasises subjectivity, normatively 
in context and the limitations to the objective knowability of social phenomena. 
However, the task for critical theory is not to defend some kind of abstract 
objectivity but rather ‘to affirm the basic autonomy required for any intellectual 
enterprise’ (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 54) and to identify the potential for 
transformative practise. I must however also acknowledge the limited practical 
relevance of this thesis to contribute to said transformative practise, precisely 
because my limited public engagement thus far, has prevented me from 
participating in public debates around the construction and power relations 
inherent in terrorism and I must concede to the charge that my particular 
utilisation of critical theory indeed may appear elitist and removed form immediate 
practical relevance. However, within the confines of this thesis the purpose is 
precisely not to argue that a more authentic understanding of terrorism can be 
achieved via normative theorising or abstract philosophising but rather, that 
hidden behind the workings of terrorism expertise, that is in well-conducted, 
innovative and informative research on terrorism, lie meta-theoretical questions 
and hegemonic power relationships that are much more central to public social, 
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political and cultural life which, while viscerally experienced, have not become a 
key concern in Terrorism Studies. It argues that any responsible debate around 
terrorism must take these meta-theoretical workings more seriously in order to 
navigate terrorism as an object of study as well as a mediator of social, cultural 
and political life. 
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2 Losing sight of subjectivity: Why Terrorism Studies 
cannot (and ought not) tell us what leads a person to 
turn to political violence 
In this chapter, I want to show that a crucial gap in Terrorism Studies lies in 
the failure to explicitly address the intellectual impasse, which the centrality of the 
demand of an answer to Sageman’s question produces. This is the case because 
stabilising the study of terrorism through consensus - initially on a definition as 
the very first step to facilitate a comprehensive framework of study – in order to 
attempt to answer Sageman’s question6 marginalises an understanding of 
terrorism as meaningful, and most importantly multifaceted social action to which 
judgement applies. 
The conceptual contestation of terrorism with a concomitant demand for 
clarity however, is merely illustrative of a more general and central contestation 
of boundaries in contemporary political and cultural life. (Stampnitzky, 2016) This 
becomes apparent when considering that terrorism, as an object of knowledge 
has been situated, defined, and studied in the context of amongst many others 
crime, war, politics, propaganda, and religion (Schmid, 2004) but generally not in 
a civil society context. 
At the same time, terrorism expertise as a site of knowledge production exists 
on the boundaries where academia, the media, the state and civil society meet 
and could legitimately be conceptualised in a civil society context. According to 
Stampnitzky, the ‘rhetoric of failure’ or stagnation in Terrorism Studies, ought to 
be understood as a symptom of an ‘intellectual production that does not fit the 
expectations of traditional boundedness’ of more established academic fields, 
because rather than ‘being a purely political or purely analytical concept, expert 
discourse on terrorism exists between the realm of politics and science.’ 
(Emphasis added Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 16)  
                                            
6 The superficial simplicity of the question of course is acknowledged by Sageman (2014a) himself 
despite his hope for an ‘elegant and cogent explanation of why individuals take up political 
violence; I therefore do not wish to suggest that Sageman’s approach to terrorism is simplistic in 
any way but rather that his approach to understand terrorism is primarily geared to provide useful 
and efficient advise to enable ‘good’ counterterrorism approaches. See in Sageman (2017); For 
a critique of the simplicity however, see for example: (Stern, 2014).  
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In other words, I argue that the ultimate purpose of Terrorism Studies must 
be epistemological because demanding a stabilisation of the study of terrorism 
through consensus in form of a neutral definition, or ‘a unified, systematic, and 
comprehensive framework within which to combine these studies [on terrorism] 
in a way that can integrate the individual, the group, and the society together in a 
research context’ (Vallis et al. quoted in Ranstrop, 2009, p. 22) in an attempt to 
answer Sageman’s question merely highlights, yet does not overcome, the 
crucial intellectual impasse of Terrorism Studies. Of course, Sageman’s question 
naturally drives the study of terrorism, however without explicitly acknowledging, 
indeed cautioning against the concomitantly suggested simplicity of an answer, 
Sageman himself suggests that few creative and new insights are to be gained. 
Instead ‘the same old tiresome and irrelevant arguments’ are rehashed. 
(Sageman, 2013) However, where Sageman locates the stagnation in Terrorism 
Studies in the insurmountable barrier between the intelligence community and 
academia due to the restriction of access to available data, I suggest the impasse 
to lie in the fact that, Terrorism Studies marginalises normative theorising of 
terrorism as meaningful social action. In doing so, it fails to address the challenge 
of responsible knowledge production beyond in an area where the expectations 
of traditional academic boundedness do not apply.  
I broadly base my observation on Stampnitzky’s (Stampnitzky, 2013) position 
that Terrorism Studies as an academic discipline struggles with its own 
unboundedness and location between academia, policy, the media, and indeed 
public perceptions of terrorism, making the ‘discourse of failure’ a key constitutive 
element of Terrorism Studies. Building on this position, in this chapter I wish to 
show that its attempts to come to terms with this intersitial position through 
stabilisation and consensus, Terrorism Studies fails at its inception to understand 
terrorism as anything but exceptional, for the limited consensus of terrorism as 
an incarnation of political violence delineates, and creates a boundary, between 
terrorism and other non-exceptional, meaningful social action. However, the 
‘problem of definition’ will be argued to open an avenue to explore terrorism as 
meaningful social action, because it highlights exactly the contestation of 
boundaries that contemporary politics and cultural life is consistently confronted 
with. Stampnitzky for example argues that  
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the fact that the problem of the definition of terrorism has not been 
resolved hints at ‘the struggles of the state and public discourse to 
provide answers to questions at the center [sic.] of the contestation of 
the definition of terrorism, namely on the identity of the enemy, the 
question of the legitimacy of violence as well as the delineation 
between political and private. (Stampnitzky, Forthcoming)   
I have great sympathy for this position and will draw and build on this through 
this thesis. As the contestation of the definition tells the story of what is central to 
contemporary politics, thus making the central questions for terrorism studies to 
be answered not what drives an individual to commit acts of political violence but 
rather: who is the enemy?, when is violence legitimate?, and, what is political? 
such that it could be argued, the essence of terrorism - and therefore the focus 
of terrorism studies - ought to be how and why boundaries are being drawn as 
well as what ‘life looks like from the other side of the boundaries’ (Stampnitzky, 
Forthcoming)  
Ugilt (2015) makes a similar point and argues that ‘terrorism’ as a concept is 
overloaded with meaning (‘meaningfulness-as-excess’) and making concepts of 
terror crucial sites of political struggle. And at the heart these political struggles 
over boundaries lie normative questions and values, even if not made explicit. 
This chapter will engage with the current state of Terrorism Studies and will 
take the debate on the definition of terrorism as a starting point to highlight the 
fields attempt to stabilise its objects of knowledge. In doing so, it will be suggested 
that such attempts of stabilisation presuppose a boundedness of the academic 
study of terrorism and reflects a positivist research tradition. Such a position 
however, is untenable due to the permeability of the claim to terrorism expertise, 
as well as the fundamental contestation of the concept of terrorism. Where more 
traditionally bounded fields are in a position to exercise caution and consider 
wider implications of their expertise, only through the characterisation of terrorism 
as exceptional or unique can Terrorism Studies currently manoeuvre its interstitial 
space between multiple academic fields and spheres of interest. This then finds 
translation in the multiple typologies of political violence and contextual studies, 
that are generally characterised by a focus on the dependent variable, that is the 
contexts in which terroristic violence has been employed. Ultimately, what is 
missing in the contemporary study of terrorism is a normative framework with an 
explicit point of reference that allows emancipatory truth claims. This thesis aims 
to address this lacuna by proposing a moral consequentialist position from which 
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Terrorism Studies can provide its expertise. It is such a framework that allows for 
the academic study of terrorism to go deeper and thereby aid in the provision of 
a more responsible understanding of terrorism as an unbounded object of 
knowledge. This implies that, rather than searching for greater understanding in 
ever-more contextual analysis - in a search for a generalisable core grand 
narrative that merely covers a lack of coherence - Terrorism Studies initially 
needs to make an epistemological claim to an abstract universalism that accounts 
for contextuality and universalism at the same time. In other words, Terrorism 
Studies must explicitly and responsibly be able to account for that fact that 
terrorism as an unbounded site of contestation is overloaded with meaning and 
raises normative questions of social, political and cultural relevance, that, while 
having implications for national security also shape contemporary social and 
cultural life which forms the backdrop for the individual and her subjective 
narrative and motivation. Ultimately, Terrorism Studies must build on its 
disciplinary unboundedness in order to create a responsible position for 
addressing contestation and the concomitant uncertainty, ambiguity and 
subjectivity. While the floating nature of the study of terrorism can be argued to 
be a key weakness for the traditional and formal development of the field, it will 
be argued to open the ‘field’ for a shift in the study of terrorism that both, 
adequately understands and incorporates the exceptionalism and concomitant 
boundedness of Terrorism Studies, and, as Stampnitzky argues, ‘ought to 
expand our vision to incorporate the many arenas of expertise that occupy 
interstitial spaces, moving and travelling between multiple fields.’ (Stampnitzky, 
2010, p. 17) And in doing so provides an important context and opportunity for 
critical theory approaches. 
It will be shown that there is a significant need for an epistemological 
grounding of the study of terrorism to provide anchorage and address the 
unboundedness in an academically viable manner, which will need to be 
supported by a methodology that accounts for that unboundedness and 
permeability of the field’s object of knowledge and its production. It will be 
suggested that such anchoring needs to start with an epistemology that enables 
an empathetic commitment to the moral subjectivity of the actor and that such a 
perspective necessitates a departure from positivist research approaches in the 
form of explicit normative theorising. 
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2.1 Terrorism Studies  
Conceptually, terrorism as an object of academic inquiry began to take shape 
in the early 19070s. According to Stampnitzky, it is then, when a shift occurred 
away from understanding acts of political violence primarily through a discourse 
of insurgency to understanding terrorism beyond the warfare paradigms that 
dominated the research on insurgencies. While prior to this shift, political violence 
could generally be understood as rational, purposeful and even justifiable, with 
the conceptual shift towards terrorism, attempts to understand the meanings and 
motivations of those labelled terrorists at the discursive level were marginalised. 
As an academic discipline, Stampnitzky notes that ideally, Terrorism Studies 
ought to be apolitical as well as amoral, that is, it should apply a neutral definition 
and only then make value judgements about different cases and would avoid, 
taking a top-down perspective, which looks at the phenomenon ‘from the 
perspective of the power-holder’. (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 134) 
Terrorism Studies, a field that has not taken shape as an ideal-typical 
academic discipline, has been criticised for its reliance on relatively weak 
research methods and data, with an over-reliance on qualitative and journalistic 
approaches (Silke, 2004b), often of occasional or peripheral contributors (Horgan 
and Stern, 2013) with ‘a rather mercenary interest in the field’. (Sageman, 2014b, 
p. 5) Stampnitzky (2010) shares this sentiment and observes that there are - at 
least compared to other academic fields - few barriers to entry and notes the high 
proportion of one-time authors with no significant background in the field amongst 
peer-reviewed journal contributors as well as authors of monographs as 
indicative of the fields permeability. However, as the ‘problem of terrorism’ took a 
focus on a ‘terrorist identity’ not only made it necessary to establish distance 
between the expert and the ‘object of expertise’, but required of the researcher to 
take a moral stance for ‘the credibility of experts on terrorism is dependent on 
their taking a moral stance against the very object they study, and maintaining a 
critical distance from it’. (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 191) 
Others have critically noted the a-historicity of the study of terrorism (English, 
2009, Silke, 2005), which is but another example of the opportunism as well as 
unboundedness that the terrorist event enables. Indeed, it is observations like 
these that are the basis for accusations of the event-driven nature of Terrorism 
Studies. (Ranstrop, 2009) In the main, it can be argued that it is the terroristic 
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event - or the threat thereof - that lies at the very core, which prompts the 
questions of ‘what leads a person to turn to political violence’ around which 
‘knowledge’ on the subject is organised. Insights and findings of neighbouring, 
more traditionally organised fields and disciplines, then provide the explanatory 
framework within which the ad-hoc explanation, or indeed answer to Sageman’s 
question is couched and the event made sense of. 
At the same time, terrorism being not merely an object of academic knowledge 
but a phenomenon that plays out in political, media and vernacular perception 
and discourse, expert analysis of the context of the terroristic event caters to all 
these various audiences. Rather than being a problem to be made coherent by 
or for academic analysis the urgency of diagnosis in the light of an event and 
clarity of response expected to a terroristic event works to undermine an 
opportunity for academic terrorism experts to exercise, let alone consolidate 
control over the production of genuine expertise and knowledge on their subject 
in an academic field. The public focus on the terroristic event and concomitantly 
the focus on the terrorist actor and their violence then functions as the glue that 
crudely connects Terrorism Studies to more formally organised academic fields. 
Additionally, the perceived political and public urgency for response that 
comes with the terroristic event keeps its analysis from the rigour of the academic 
field. It is the perceived urgency of the event augmented by the fast-paced 
turnaround of the 24/7 news cycle, that leads to a need to tolerate opportunistic 
or unscrutinised expertise flaring up as and when events demand. (O’Laughlin, 
2017, Awan et al., 2011) By mirroring as well as not curbing a degree of 
exceptionalism prevalent in media and government accounts of terrorism, 
Terrorism Studies fails to carve out a more traditional bounded space within which 
to rigorously and methodologically develop into a formal academic field because 
it is (prematurely) forced into participating in a public discourse.  
Despite this observed unboundedness, however Jarvis contends that 
Terrorism Studies is primarily concerned with three issues that are indeed 
reflective of what Stampnitzky observes as the sites of contestation contained in 
the problem of defining terrorism. These are the definitional debate, the question 
of causation, and the question of how to do counterterrorism. While Jarvis points 
at these three issues to serve as his organising principle and the foundation for 
his critique of what then becomes Orthodox Terrorism Studies, he takes particular 
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issue with the fact that the orthodox study of terrorism is characterised by a 
problem-solving approach as a preparatory step for successful counterterrorism 
(Jarvis, 2009) which has since been taken up as one of the key points of critique 
by Critical Terrorism Studies. Jarvis’ critique, while commendable in motive 
introduces a moment of reflection on the politicisation of the outputs of terrorism 
research. It however merely introduces yet another facet of the core contestation 
already presents in the ’problem of definition’ leading to a rather unhelpful 
polarisation of the study of terrorism through the introduction of an Orthodox 
versus Critical Terrorism Studies debate. It does however not address the 
underlying issue of ‘unboundedness’ and misses an important opportunity to for 
emancipatory critique.  
2.1.1 Definitional debates 
At the core of Terrorism Studies lies the ongoing debate on the definition of 
terrorism. Even within academic circles, that fully recognise the fact that the way 
a concept is defined has profound implication for and determines what kind of 
data is deemed relevant for collection and analysis (Stern, 1999, p. 12) and 
further for responsible theory building, terrorism remains an essentially contested 
concept. (Sinai, 2008, p. 9) The difficulty to agree on a definition of terrorism 
continues to pose a foundational obstacle to achieving a common conceptual 
framework for and has, so it is argued by some (for example: Schmid, 2011b, 
Schmid 2005, Silke, 2004, Crenshaw, 2000, p. 406) hindered, not only analysis 
of - but also and very strikingly, the response to - the phenomenon since the 
inception of the study of terrorism in the 1970s.  
In spite of over 200 definitions of terrorism from which scholars and 
practitioners can chose, and Schmid et al.’s (Schmid, 2011, Schmid, 2005, 
Schmid, 2004, Schmid and Jongman, 1988, Schmid and Jongman, 1984) 
ongoing work in relation to an academic consensus definition of terrorism, while 
widely received and debated, their consensus definitions do not manage to 
overcome continued contestation of the concept. Indeed, Weinberg et al. (2011) 
accumulated 73 definitions of terrorism in use in academic research, and thereby 
confirmed that scholars preferred to use their own definition over that of others in 
the field. 
In spite of this diversity, Weinberg at al. (2011, p. 84) contend that it is possible 
to discern a certain degree of consensus amongst those who study terrorism in 
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so far as terrorism is understood as ‘a politically motivated tactic involving the 
threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant 
role.’ While such a broad definition has raised objections,7 they maintain the 
appropriateness of this broadly aggregated consensus definition, precisely with 
reference to the fact that it bears ‘relatively strong resemblance to the way states, 
and law enforcement agencies, in particular, regard the phenomenon.’ (Weinberg 
et al., 2011, p. 84)  
2.1.1.1 Academic neutrality and responsible theory building 
Against Weinberg’s et al. suggested appropriateness of the definition of 
terrorism due to its convergence with legal and political conceptualisations it 
must be noted however that the aim of academic attempts at the definition of 
terrorism and indeed the very core of much of the contestation of definitions 
of terrorism, is the perceived academic imperative to depoliticise the concept 
through a commitment to neutrality, universality (Crenshaw, 1990, Crenshaw, 
1995), and stability (Bryan, 2012). This foundational epistemological commitment 
to neutrality, universality and stability is seen as interconnected and each 
necessary for the other not only to proceed to the analytical study of terrorism 
(Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 11) but further in an attempt to remove terrorism from the 
realm of subjectivity (Wilkinson, 2006; Halliday, 2002, p. 47) and clearly 
reflects a positivist research paradigm. 
Amongst others, Crenshaw argues for the importance of a neutral definition 
that ‘transforms ‘terrorism’ into a useful analytical term rather than a polemical 
tool’ (Crenshaw, 1995, p.7). Similarly, Schmid et al. (1988, p.3) argue for a 
definition that is universally applicable, and therefore, one which enables the 
development and use of typologies of political violence to define the parameters 
of study and then look at the ‘borderline’ cases to test their robustness. (Horgan 
and Boyle, 2008, p. 57) Without isolating the definition of terrorism from other 
forms of (political) violence, there can be no uniform data collection and no 
responsible theory building. (Schmid et al., 1988, p. 3) Too broad a consensus, 
                                            
7 On the argument to reserve the label terrorism exclusively for violence against civilians 
because this finds a foundation in international law see for example (Goodwin, 2009, 392, 
Richardson, 2006, Ganor, 1998,). Held (2004) however points out that it is unpersuasive to 
make the deliberate targeting of civilians a defining feature of terrorism, while Schmid (2011a) 
describes the limited analytical suitability of such a broad definition for the inclusion of too many 
diverse practitioners of violence. 
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Schmid warns ‘turns more practitioners of violence into terrorists’ and 
summarises ‘myriad forms of violence’ that are ‘neither a causally nor 
ontologically coherent phenomenon.’ (Schmid, 2011a, p. 94). It is of course 
here, where we can once again see how deeply positivist research 
methodologies are embedded in the academic study of terrorism. 
2.1.1.2 Security threat and the illusion of academic neutrality  
In the real world, terrorism is by its nature, first and foremost experienced as 
a security threat8, which since 9/11 has emerged as the single most important 
national security issue. (Jackson, 2007) Declaring, that is defining something as 
terrorism in the real world, has tangible consequences (Shanahan, 2010), so 
much so that Staun (2010) argues that the declaration of something as terrorism 
is a performative utterance that lifts an act out of the normal criminal sphere into 
the national security context, which of course has further implications for the types 
of actions deemed acceptable to confront the threat.9 From this follows that 
terrorism is not an objective phenomenon, that is an objective threat to national 
security, nor something subjective, which can be done by everyone. Instead, what 
terrorism is, cannot be detached from the question of who the defining agent is, 
or to which purpose the concept is being put. Indeed, those acts that are labelled 
terrorism are those that are ‘out of place’. In other words, terrorism is neither 
something objective nor something subjective (a matter of individual perception), 
but something that is inter-subjectively constituted and inherently institutionalised 
(Staun, 2010) both politically and academically. 
This means that terrorism is terrorism only within the context of power 
relations, and those are being provided primarily by the state. Indeed, 
successfully applying the term terrorism to an act not only defines the action as 
‘out of place’ but also suggests a moral judgement backed by hegemonic power. 
While the basis for this moral judgement is hardly made explicit, it is the 
persuasive appeal of this normative reasoning that functions to reinforce 
hegemonic power relationships because some groups have a greater ability to 
construct reality for less influential groups, and the former tend to control the 
process by which (social) meanings are assigned. (Greisman, 1977, p. 303) 
                                            
8 On the understanding of terrorism as a security threat in International Relations see eg: (Booth, 
2008, Schmid, 2011, Horgan and Braddock, 2011).  
9 See for example the notion of ‘supreme emergency’ for the context of terrorism in: Coady (2004).  
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Indeed, when Weinberg et al. observe that it is possible to discern consensus 
among those who study terrorism and emphasise the strong resemblance with 
law enforcement agencies’ conceptualisation of the phenomenon as indicative of 
this consensus, they in fact render useless the principle of neutrality, to lend 
greater credibility (and thus stability) to their conceptualisation of terrorism but in 
fact demonstrates carelessness at best. At worst, like the TTSRL, a research 
consortium initiated and funded by the European Commission, which 
prepared a study that ‘should serve as an overview of how people, states and 
international organisations define terrorism’ miss entirely how the production 
of knowledge is enmeshed in hegemonic power relationships when they note 
‘common attributes that scholars ascribe to terrorism’ but then emphasise that 
‘academic discourse is important for our understanding of terrorism and for 
imbedding it in the theory (…) academia reflects, but does not constitute 
reality. (TTSRL, 2008, p. 5-6) 
Acknowledging that practitioners of counterterrorism need to confront and 
contain the dangers of terrorism not only acknowledges the need to 
operationalisation the concept. Furthermore, such operationalisation takes place 
in concrete contexts - and indeed in lived realities and power relationships - 
confirming Schmid’s observation that terrorism has been defined as crime, war, 
politics, propaganda, and religion which highlights that each of these context 
provides for the utilisation of a specific (epistemological and analytical) framework 
which not only exposes, but also cloaks aspects of the phenomenon. (Schmid, 
2004) It is no surprise that Pillar observes that for the context of US foreign policy,  
‘good policy on terrorism does not require hand-wringing about how 
exactly to define it. For the great majority of counterterrorist activities, 
the late Justice Potter Stewart’s approach toward pornography will 
suffice: that it is unnecessary to go to great lengths to define it, 
because one knows it when one sees it.’ (Pillar, 2001, p. 16-7)  
What these examples illustrate is the more general implications of 
unboundedness and permeability, whereby academic research, explicitly or 
implicitly, lends credibility to policy making by imbedding understanding in 
theory, while theory building takes place on the basis of contested, yet 
conventionally agreed upon conceptualisations of terrorism. Despite the 
awareness of academic responsibility and indeed the intersitial position of 
Terrorism Studies, the debates on the contestability of the concept of terrorism 
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do not only allude to the dangers of a slippery complicity in the operationalisation 
of theory but indeed the relationship between the production of knowledge and 
hegemonic power relationships.  
It is with attention to the implications that static and illusionary objective 
definition of terrorism entails, that Staun cautions against studying terrorism 
as having a fixed and stable content, independent of the observing and 
defining researcher and the use to which the concept of terrorism is put. 
(Staun, 2010, p. 405) This is very much reflective of proponents of Critical 
Terrorism Studies, where Jarvis concludes that (Orthodox) Terrorism Studies is 
being constituted around the pursuit to ‘solve the problem of terrorism’ (Jarvis, 
2009a, p. 7). According to him, the recurring and unsettled question of the 
definition of terrorism is indicative of ‘an unambiguous desire for ontological 
certainty and policy relevance’. (Jarvis, 2009a, p. 8) He suggests that in order to 
overcome the analytical limitations of Terrorism Studies, it is paramount to 
engage with the meaning of terrorism to rethink the politics of violence. This, he 
suggests can happen via a definitional expansion of the study of terrorism to 
include state actors and further by employing an interpretivist approach focusing 
on terrorism as performance that reflect on the enabling and disciplinary functions 
performed by constructions of this behaviour, identity and threat. (Jarvis, 2009a, 
p. 7) Jarvis, in advocating for a more critical and indeed reflexive study of 
terrorism, suggests substituting attempts at a more accurate definition of 
terrorism with an exploration into the construction, representation, and 
performance of terror so as to address the normative and analytical limitations of 
(Orthodox) Terrorism Studies. (Jarvis, 2009a, p. 18) 
2.1.2 Extraordinary political violence and the banality of terror 
The definitional debate then is revisited by orthodox and critical scholars of 
terrorism alike.10 While both camps vary in the stated purpose and scope of their 
                                            
10 Incorporating the abundance of literature discussing the definition of terrorism would go beyond 
the scope of this thesis, by means of example see in alphabetical order to illustrate the variety of 
disciplinary origins and orientations found in the debate: Appleby, 2010, Bakker, 2007, Bjørgo, 
2005, Booth, 2008, Bryan, 2012, Crenshaw, 2000, Fletcher, 2006, Fullinwider, 2003, Ganor, 
1998, Gibbs, 1989, Goodwin, 2009, Greisman 1977, Held, 2004, Jackson et al. 2009, Jackson, 
2011, Jarvis, 2009a, Jenkins, 1980, Juergensmeyer, 2003, Moskalenko, 2009, Oliverio, 1997, 
Ranstrop, 2009, Raphael, 2009, Rapin, 2009, Schmid 1984, Schmid 2011a, Schmid, 2013, 
Shanahan, 2010, Silke, 2001, Sinai, 2008, Sorel, 2003, Staun, 2010, Stern, 1999, Stump, 2013, 
Weinberg et al., 2011, Whittaker, 2007, Wilkinson, 2006, Wolfendale, 2006.  
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definitions, even as broad a conceptualisation as Booth (2008, p.73) suggest, 
reifies ‘terrorism as an extraordinary and violent event’ (Stump, 2013, p. 219). 
Here, Stump attests Orthodox Terrorism Studies as well as Critical Terrorism 
Studies a limited ‘empirical and explanatory scope’ (Stump, 2013, p. 219) since 
both do not ultimately differ in their reifying effect. In other words, the definitional 
debate continues the field’s doomed attempts to stabilise its foundational concept 
and thereby fails to move on to investigate how ‘debates over ‘terrorism’ define 
other central aspects of political and cultural life’ and continue to operate within 
the confines of hegemonic power-relations and fall short of truly emancipatory 
critique.  
For example, Jackson, in order to  
 ‘find a middle way between dualist and monist approaches to the 
study of terrorism tentatively suggests a set of definitional anchorages’ 
that allow a definition that ‘charts a course between the extremes of 
ontological essentialism (…) and radical contingency’ (Jackson, 2013, 
p. 225) and suggest to redefine terrorism as ‘violence or its threat 
intended as a symbolically communicative act in which direct victims 
of the action are instrumentalized as a means to creating a 
psychological effect of intimidation and fear in a target audience for a 
political objective.’ (Jackson, 2011, p. 118).  
Stump (2013, p. 220) however takes issue with the fact that this definition 
‘reif[ies] terrorism as a particular type of violence’ as it follows a similar, albeit 
expansive ontological understanding, as do the 200 odd other more or less 
orthodox definitions of terrorism.  
Indeed, the argument put forward with this project follows Stump in that the 
definitional debate around terrorism stands in place of or maybe even in the way 
of an overdue clarification of an epistemological commitment, which thus far has 
not come to fruition in either Critical Terrorism Studies or Orthodox Terrorism 
Studies. What remains central in the debate around the definition of terrorism is 
the focus on terrorism as a particular type of violence. This perspective assumes 
that some modes of violence are terrorism, rather than initially problematising the 
notion of violence. This we will see in chapter four, closes down areas of study 
and explanation that must at least be open for exploration. It is in fact, and so 
Stump argues, the definitional exclusion of ‘the many empirical examples of 
nonviolent, ordinary terrorism that constitute the flow of everyday life’ (Stump, 
2013, p. 220) that is problematic, because it certainly excludes from the analytical 
focus the subjective experience and concomitant evaluation of violence and 
  54 
thereby exceptionalises terroristic violence and implicitly suggests other than 
ordinary explanations and motivations.11  
In this vein then, salient and very ordinary examples of non-violent everyday 
‘terrorism’ and counterterrorism are missed, which is all the more problematic 
since ‘the meanings given to the observable characteristics of terrorist violence 
are the product of a particular social scientific and broader historical-cultural 
context’ that will never capture all cases in a single category. (Stump, 2013, p. 
221) A reified definition of terrorism however makes invisible the contingency and 
excludes alternative, equally possible understandings of the event. (Jarvis, 
2009a) 
Stump then suggests that understanding  
‘[T]errorism as a practice entails that researchers withhold making 
claims about what counts as ‘real’ descriptions and characteristics of 
terrors, and, instead, closely and systematically examine the 
empirically available practices through which some community of 
people concretely build up and sustain the danger of terrorism and the 
various identities and security policies associated with that 
construction of danger. Treating terrorism as a practice enables 
researchers to avoid reification and, simultaneously, to systematically 
study how the practice of terrorism works.’ (Stump, 2013, p.222).  
Revisiting then the suggested need for a ‘coherent and consensual definition 
as essential foundation for better understanding (…) specific acts’, an attempt 
often criticised by in the Critical Terrorism Studies camp (Jarvis, 2009, p. 7-8) 
would not only remove terrorism from the realm of subjectivity. This criticism has 
been voiced against the so-called Orthodox Terrorism Studies definitional debate 
- but would indeed undermine the understanding of terrorism through the 
exclusion of non-extraordinary, non-violent practices that constitute everyday-life 
experiences. Moreover, analytically, it would miss benign, banal, and ‘innocent’ 
practises that nonetheless give meaning to terrorism as social action, or practice 
as Stump suggests, performed by individuals and communities. 
What is needed then is an examination of ‘the empirically available practices 
through which some community of people concretely build up and sustain the 
danger of terrorism and the various identities and security policies associated 
with threat construction of danger’. (Stump, 2013, p. 222) Going even further than 
Stump, Magnani (2011) argues, that our own moral embubblement prevents us 
                                            
11 A very recent shift in this can be seen in the expansion of focus and the inclusion everyday and 
intimate partner violence in: Critical Studies on Terrorism (2015) Volume 8, Issue 3.  
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from seeing our own violence, it is the position of this project that there is a need 
for an epistemological commitment that enables empathetic perspective-taking 
and to include ordinary practices in order to understand terrorism as a meaningful 
social practice. This must allow for the subjective perspective of an actor that is 
rational, reasonable and morally responsible and chapters four and five will focus 
on this perspective in particular. It is the task of Terrorism Studies, to not only 
inject subjectivity in the debates over terrorism against the various reifying 
disciplinary dynamics that marginalise if not exceptionalises terrorism and 
provide for the normative counterweight to balance and indeed guide the 
implication these dynamics have on defining other central aspects of political and 
cultural life.  
At the heart of the problem of definition are attempts to stabilise the analysis 
of terrorism as an academic object of knowledge by removing the phenomenon 
from the realm of subjectivity. (Wilkinson, 2006, Halliday, 2002) Stabilising the 
concept through academic consensus however has not been achieved, so much 
so that some emphasises that trying to define terrorism was indeed pointless 
since the only general characteristic of terrorism generally agreed upon is that 
terrorism ‘involves violence and the threat of violence’. However, in the pursuit of 
responsible theory building the problem of definition continues, not because 
terrorism cannot be defined, but rather because the problem of definition is 
paradigmatic of on the one hand the disciplinary unboundedness of Terrorism 
Studies but on the other hand stands in lieu of a contestation of the hegemonic 
power-relationships that permeate civil society that only a normative orientation 
can attempt to address. 
The academic attempt to remove Terrorism Studies from an unbounded 
subjectivity in a struggle to stabilise it as an academic discipline aims however to 
control the production of knowledge akin to more traditionally bounded academic 
fields. What this dynamic embodies indeed appears to be a genuine academic 
commitment to responsible theory building and understanding of terrorism as a 
phenomenon from within positivist research paradigms. However, struggling with 
the intersitial position of Terrorism Studies between academic, public policy, 
national security, social, cultural and vernacular discourse, even conceptualising 
terrorism in an academic context falls prey to the permeability of its academic 
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boundaries and the lack of control over its knowledge production and the purpose 
to which knowledge is put.  
2.1.2.1 Terrorism expertise  
Terrorism then must be represented and approached methodologically as 
a product of socially constructed realities. Any rhetoric of objectivity, 
inevitability and certainty thereby denies not only the complexity of the 
problem, but moreover preserves the institutional authority of the security 
actor and importantly misses the problematic manifestations of power that 
sustain hegemonic social and political relationships. Rather than being merely 
a reflection of a ‘lively debate appreciating the fluidity of the concept’  as 
Horgan and Boyle (2008) would like to see it, but it engenders much more, 
namely the insistence of an unsustainable, for illusionary objectivity of defining 
terrorism as independent of the defining researcher or the use to which the 
concept is put, and the unproblematic perpetuation of positivist methodologies, 
which necessarily fail to responsibly account for the fact, that concepts do not 
merely reflect but in fact shape how reality is made sense of. Moreover, as Jarvis 
points out that an unduly objective and essentialist framework, ‘neglects the 
process of terrorism’s construction’ and ‘reduces the space available for 
discussing the (il)legitimacy of particular violences.’ (Jarvis, 2009, p. 15)  
What starts off as a scholarly debate on the most appropriate 
conceptualisation of terrorism for the purpose of analytical stability, comparability 
and objective research cannot, and does not, remain bounded within the 
academic realm. The conceptual unboundedness is exacerbated by the way 
expertise is organised when it comes to terrorism. In mapping clusters of 
terrorism expertise, Reid and Chen (Reid and Chen, 2007, p. 53), note that the 
intellectual structure of contemporary terrorism research points towards the 
existence of several subfields of research, which reflects the influence of several 
social science disciplines. They attest further that terrorism research has mainly 
attracted attention from a very narrow section of the social science disciplines. In 
addition, Stampnitzky confirms that terrorism expertise emerges from ‘vastly 
different sorts of individuals, with varying training and differing institutional bases.’ 
(Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 16) A situation that Ranstrop (2009, p. 31) ascribes to the 
relative lack of barriers of entry and professionalism of Terrorism Studies, where 
a significant proportion of those publishing on the topic are one-time authors that 
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lack background in the topic, a situation which leads to a high degree of a-
historicity12 and exceptionalism (Toros, 2009) of the study of terrorism. To some 
degree, this can be seen as captured by the debate on ‘new’ versus ‘old’ 
terrorism13, and the ease with which the notion of ‘new terrorism’ has entered not 
only mainstream political discourse but also academia and teaching, especially 
in International Relations. (Baylis, 2011)  
Indeed, as Stampnitzky (2010, p. 6-7) observes, ‘there is little regulation of 
who may become an expert, as the key audience for terrorism expertise is not an 
ideal-typical scientific community, but rather the public and the state’. She notes 
further, that it is not unusual for terrorism experts to have hybrid careers in 
between government and academia, whereby privileged access to government 
information may confer legitimacy in the academic realm. (Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 
16) Moreover, Silke (2004, p. 9) for example, remarks the shortage of 
experienced researchers, particularly in relation to actor-based research. He 
observes that actor-based research is largely left to ‘a handful of individuals who 
encounter the terrorists as part of their professional work’ whose ‘research is both 
a peripheral and generally sporadic activity’.14  
Where the shorthand of ‘I know it when I see it’ in the context of a Supreme 
Court judge’s opinion can fall back on the pedigree of the Supreme Court judge 
within the legal profession and further evokes a degree of legitimacy and authority 
through the court’s broader ability to generate agreement backed by state power, 
no such vetting and indeed recognition of backing by state power occurs for 
Terrorism Studies scholars, while practitioners of counterterrorism or experts with 
the privilege of classified access may indeed benefit from leaning on state power.  
Where the judge in Jacobellis (1964) can openly acknowledge the limits of 
legal reasoning and the difficulty of capturing a complex reality in legal rules and 
definitions, where he communicates that pornography is something that produces 
a certain direct and immediate effect in its audience that is knowable through an 
                                            
12 On the critique of the generation of expertise in Terrorism Studies see for example: (Silke, 
2004a, Silke 2004b, Silke, 2005, Smyth, 2007, Jackson et al. 2009, Jackson et al. 2008). 
13 While there is very little understanding what should actually constitute the novelty of the ‘new’ 
terrorism, the notion is easily adopted as necessitating ‘new’ responses and thus contributes to 
the observation of the a-historicity of the study of terrorism; for examples of the adoption of notion 
of ‘new terrorism’ see: (Baylis et al. 2011, Crenshaw, 2011, Hoffman, 2006, Laqueur, 2003, 
Wilkinson, 2006, Kaldor, 2006). 
14 Horgan and Stern (2013) emphasise the value, yet by and large sporadic exceptions, of 
insightful first-hand contextual and actor-based research approaches and thereby recognise 
testament to the difficulty of gaining access to actors and thus generating useful or novel data. 
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automatic process that equates sight and knowledge, he at the same time 
acknowledges, yes makes explicit, complexity, ambivalence, and subjectivity. 
(Gewirtz, 1996, p. 1041-1042) With this recognition the judge exercises caution 
in light of the responsibility to persuasively safeguard constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms from limitations imposed if he were to determine objective boundaries 
that are backed (and thus enforceable) by state power. The judge’s position and 
the basis for his argument, follow from a recognition that his authority flows from 
the power and legitimacy invested in him by the state; he becomes a 
representative of hegemonic power-relations. What distinguishes Judge 
Steward’s opinion, which equates what we know with what we see, from experts 
of terrorism, is not only the accumulated scholarly wisdom and its institutional 
anchoring, but further the legal practitioner’s awareness, reflexivity, and explicit 
caution in relation to the real-life social implications and consequences, as well 
as institutional commitment of his expressed legal opinion. In other words, the 
judge - in not stabilising the concept of pornography - recognises the fact that his 
position of authority backed by the power of the state has the power of shaping, 
and indeed determining, the reality of pornography in civil society relations, albeit 
be it here merely for the context of obscenity laws. 
Discussing the process of legal reasoning in Jacobellis (1964), Gewirtz (1996, 
p. 1044) observes critically that the legal academy nowadays is characterised by 
an excessive rationalism, based on ‘extravagantly unreal assumptions’ about the 
degree to which individual human action is based upon rational calculation as 
well as an  excessive abstraction from real law made in real institutions; He notes 
that ‘judicial opinions, gain in persuasiveness from self-criticism, or from an 
admission of uncertainty, or even from an acknowledgement of limited authority’ 
(Gewirtz, 1996, p. 1042) because realities are more messy than are predictable 
via law making. 
In a similar vein, terrorism expertise is constantly confronted with critique 
which oscillates between academic analysis and operationalisation; it exists in 
between politics and science and constitutes an unbounded intellectual field 
oriented between and towards multiple arenas of knowledge production, 
consumption, and legitimation, including academia, the media, and the state. 
(Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 3) However, what is underdeveloped in Terrorism Studies 
is the epistemological translation of a comparable degree of caution, indeed 
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recognition of responsibility, in relation to the real life implications of terrorism 
expertise, that only the admission of uncertainty and limited authority backed by 
rigorous methodologies and an explicit responsibility and commitment to 
something akin to constitutionally guaranteed freedoms can counter-balance 
which follows from the adherence to positivist research methodologies. 
When Booth (2008, p. 73) argues for a broad conceptualisation of terrorism, 
and counters the claim that, too broad a definition of terrorism would encompass 
anything from ‘a suicide bomber to a Trident missile’, a conceptualisation, that 
Schmid (2011a, p. 94) argues turns more practitioners of violence into 
terrorists’ and summarises ‘myriad forms of violence’ that are ‘neither a 
causally nor ontologically coherent phenomenon’, this approach is indeed 
Booth attempting to account for reflexivity. This can be seen as an implicit 
attempt at confronting the continuing struggle with the unboundedness of 
Terrorism Studies. As academics, he argues, ‘we must understand ourselves 
as historically and socially situated, we should recognize that the distance 
between the subject and the researcher is closer than first appears.’ (Booth, 
2008, p. 73) Yet, he states that terrorism is a real thing (even when imagined); 
we are talking about specific strategies and a specific form of political violence, 
and specific human feelings. ‘Acts of terror will not go away if we abolish the word 
‘terrorist’’ however, scholars must be sensitive to the ‘politics of naming’ while 
avoiding having the meaning sucked out of highly charged but necessary words. 
(Booth, 2008, p. 72)  
It is here, where we observe a parallel with judge Steward’s acknowledgement 
of the limits of legal reasoning in capturing complex realities. Through the 
introduction of what Stampnitzky calls a ‘rhetoric of failure’ (Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 
17), academics studying terrorism introduce and make explicit a process of 
reflexivity in an attempt to negotiate a struggle over the nature of terrorism 
expertise. This provides for an illustration of the ‘linkage between forming the 
object of terrorism and the production of Terrorism Studies’. (Stampnitzky, 2010, 
p. 11-12) Terrorism Studies however lacks a position akin to a constitution that 
works as a normative backdrop from which to make responsible for authoritative 
claims to knowledge and expertise, which is cautious and cognisant of the 
implications and consequences of participating in the wider media and policy 
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discourse around terrorism. This, we will see in the next chapter however 
becomes most relevant for the context of preventative counterterrorism. 
2.1.2.2 Disciplinary boundaries 
The persistence with which terrorism has been organised around the concept 
of political violence has lead academics to suggest that International Relations 
was uniquely suited as the natural home for Terrorism Studies due to its 
foundational relationship with the study of political violence. (Booth, 2008, p. 68) 
At the same time, the definitional debate has demonstrated that the field has not 
been able to stabilise the definition of terrorism and by extension, the production 
of barriers to enter a claim to expertise of terrorism. In fact, what the definitional 
debate demonstrates is a diffuse and at times, opportunistic practise that caters 
to many audiences. In the attempt to capture the scope of inquiry - the object of 
knowledge so to speak - Terrorism Studies is caught up between a commitment 
to positivist academic standards of neutrality, universality, and stability on the one 
hand, with the problematic exclusionary implication that conceptual reification 
brings with it, but that cannot at the same time rely on the backing of its expertise 
and authority by the state or a commitment to principles akin to constitutional 
principles. And all this in a context where the state and its apparatuses’ need to 
operationalise a multi-faceted and politicised concept. In other words, Terrorism 
Studies struggles to reconcile the need to be recognised as a responsible - rather 
than opportunistic - academic discipline while it cannot generate the stability and 
boundedness that terrorism as an object of knowledge would appear to demand 
to curb said opportunism. 
When Stampnitzky (2010, p. 16) argues that terrorism expertise allows us to 
observe how objects of knowledge and claims to expertise are constituted at the 
boundary between scientific expertise and the state, she does in fact 
problematise an issue that goes beyond Terrorism Studies. For social 
phenomena, expert discourse exists in between the realms of politics, the media, 
and science and cannot be confined to neat academic disciplines or 
social/political spheres. In fact, she argues that terrorism more than anything else 
defines other central aspects of political and cultural life, by raising questions of 
the identity and location of the enemy, the legitimacy of violence and the 
boundaries between that which is political and that which is private. As the 
observation on the caution on legal reasoning in Jacobellis (1964) indicates 
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however, Terrorism Studies is not unique in this position. With Stampnitzky (2010, 
p. 17) we can conclude therefore, that ‘we ought to expand our vision to 
incorporate the many arenas of expertise that occupy interstitial spaces, moving 
and travelling between multiple fields’. 
2.1.2.3 Disciplinary fragmentation  
In spite of this, Booth has made a case for the suitability of International 
Relations as the natural home for Terrorism Studies, precisely because he 
emphasises the uniquely interdisciplinary nature of International Relations. 
(Booth, 2008) Crenshaw has consistently described early the study of terrorism 
as being organised around three dominating questions: why terrorism occurs, 
how the process of terrorism works, and what its social and political effects are. 
(Crenshaw, 1981, Crenshaw, 1990, Crenshaw, 1995, Crenshaw, 2000, 
Crenshaw, 2011) Acknowledging these foci, she moreover called for an 
integration of the study of terrorism within the wider context of political violence 
in order for the discipline to gain greater theoretical scope. (Crenshaw, 1995) 
From the very early stages when it comes to the study of terrorism, academics 
have attempted to anchor the study of terrorism within the wider academic context 
of political violence in an attempt to define boundaries and delineate terrorism 
from related phenomena. Crenshaw for example, has been advocating an 
approach to the study of terrorism as a form of political behaviour resulting from 
the deliberate choice of basically a rational actor (Crenshaw, 2011, Crenshaw, 
1981) with a focus on the formation and considerations of the terrorist 
organisation. This approach, she argued ‘must also take into account the 
environment in which terrorism occur and address the question of whether broad 
political, social, and economic conditions make terrorism more likely in some 
contexts than in others’ and requires a consideration of ‘the psychological 
variables that may encourage or inhibit individual participation in terrorist actions’. 
In other words, she suggests a rational actor model that captures the decision-
making process of individuals as well as organisation in light of their personal, 
strategic and political environment and thus aims ultimately at providing a 
framework for processes that analysts can approximate. (Crenshaw 2012, p. 100; 
Crenshaw, 2011) It is however not strictly focused on the motivations of the 
individual actor and their behaviour but still reflects her understanding of terrorism 
that focuses on sub-state actors operating within the opportunities and limitations 
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provided by the state. Such a framework heavily relies on typologies of political 
violence, which delineates terrorism from other types of political violence on the 
one hand, and provides the framework for an analytical approach for terrorism on 
the other hand.  
Masden and Schmid then, in their overview of typologies of terrorism point out 
however, that ‘there is great variety both in the approaches and the conceptual 
lenses utilised’ and argue that this is due to ‘the range of contexts in which 
terrorism occurs’. (Schmid, 2011b, p. 191) In an attempt to systematise these 
typologies on terrorism they identify four frameworks around which typologies of 
terrorism can be arranged. These frameworks attempt to conceptualise and 
provide for an analytical framework of the motivation (why do terrorists act), the 
location (where do terrorists operate), the dynamics of the phenomenon (when 
does terrorism change), and the operational question (how does terrorism 
operate). Overall, they note however, particularly with regards to a review of the 
literature on the motivations of terrorists, that the identification of variables and 
the concomitant possible thoroughness may make it unwieldy for analysts. 
(Schmid, 2011b, p. 179) Ultimately, Schmid’s (2011b, p. 191) call for a ‘layered 
approach allowing the exploration of different levels of analysis within a unified 
framework of hypothesised causes and justifications for terrorism’ may be unduly 
optimistic in light of the ongoing fragmentation in research foci and often 
contradictory and/or ambiguous findings. (Vallis et al, 2007; Crenshaw 2004)  
In fact, it appears that attempts to delineate terrorism from other types of 
political violence is merely another starting point in an attempt to bring order into 
the myriad of studies that look into ‘terrorism’. Moreover, in spite of this 
fragmentation, Schmid (2011b, p. 162) who sees the fluidity in typologies as 
academically disturbing, does not fail to note its usefulness ‘given the interaction 
of uses and users of terrorism in a dynamic real-world context.’ It must be 
cautiously observed however, that not only does such a fluidity reveal and/or 
emphasise and consequently downplay particular aspects of a phenomenon 
(Schmid, 2004), but the real-life utility of the fluidity introduces specific sets of 
biases, particularly in aiding policy makers to determine what is causally 
significant and what can be downplayed. 
Yet, emphasising the training in peace and conflict studies that particularly 
critical terrorism scholars have undergone, Toros and Tellidis (2013) investigate 
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the crossroads between terrorism and peace and conflict studies. They point 
towards the key epistemological and ontological questions on terrorism and 
political violence, such as an (not undisputed) understanding of terrorism as an 
aberration, rather than a particular form of conflict, that cannot be investigated 
using conflict analysis frames; with this comes, so they argue a (not universal) 
scholarly refusal to engage with conflict management, negotiation and resolution 
frameworks to investigate responses to terrorism; overall, a cross-fertilisation 
between Terrorism Studies and Peace and Conflict Studies, particularly with an 
eye on the role of power-asymmetries is understood to provide for beneficial 
insights, frameworks and exchange between terrorism and Peace and Conflict 
Studies. This integration on the one hand is interesting because it attempts to 
widen the understanding of terrorism, albeit with the particular interest in 
providing more creative and/or effective approaches to counterterrorism. On the 
other hand, however, the integration into peace and conflict studies continues 
with terrorism being positioned within war/conflict, that is within a more orthodox 
understanding of conflict as political. It is the position of this thesis however, that 
terrorism tells us more about civil society relations and the power relations as 
experienced by individual more generally and an even wider approach to couch 
Terrorism Studies appears to be more appropriate. 
Horgan and Taylor (2001) then, make the case for couching the study of 
terrorism in behavioural psychology. Horgan’s work more generally suggests that 
a useful starting point for the research into the motivation of individuals engaged 
in terrorism is the assumption that terrorists are ordinary people who make 
meaningful choices in the contexts in which they find themselves. Horgan’s 
research within behavioural psychology (Horgan, 2005, Taylor and Horgan 2011) 
builds on a rational actor model that explicitly challenges characterisations and 
common misconception of terrorists as evil, monstrous and/or emotionally 
disturbed; (Ruby, 2002) They emphasise the need to acknowledge that the 
individual involved has the opportunity (and capacity) to make the choice to 
engage in terrorist behaviour and acknowledge that understanding the motivation 
of a person that becomes involved in terrorism is ‘central to addressing the 
problem of terrorism’. (Taylor and Horgan, 2011, p. 133) While this agenda, with 
its focus on the individual continues to provide important insights into his or her 
concrete behaviour and motivation (Williams, 2015, Gill, 2015, Gill, 2014), it does 
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not even attempt to integrate its approach into anything beyond and 
understanding of terrorism as something that people do, and widely ignores the 
dynamics and politics of terrorism and its construction within existing, hegemonic 
power relations.  
When the focus on rational actors and terrorist organisations is criticised for 
its relative disregard of social and political conditions (Raphael, 2009, p. 60), 
which sustain both, the static conception of capabilities of non-state actors in 
conflicts (Findley and Edwards, 2007), the relative disregarding the social, as 
opposed to political utility of terrorism, and the failure to include the values and 
incentive structures of actors (Davis and Cragin, 2009), we see other disciplines 
and research frameworks to be appropriated and applied to the context of the 
understanding of terrorism. This means that for the purpose of understanding 
terrorism, it needs to be both contextually posited in a framework that allows for 
terrorism as a particular form of social conflict, as well as an agent-centred 
understanding of terrorism as a specific form of social action. 
However, the punctuality and breadth of interest, rather than contributing to 
an accumulation of knowledge and a move towards systematising and uniting 
different approaches into a comprehensive framework contributes to a 
fragmentation of Terrorism Studies without confronting the intellectual impasse 
that the positivist leaning inclination of Terrorism Studies implicates. We observe 
that it is not possible to bring together different studies in a way that can integrate 
the individual, the group, and the society together in a research context, precisely 
because no such bounded context exists to start with. The move towards 
integrating Terrorism Studies, as exemplified by Torros and Tellidis’ discussion on 
the integration with peace and conflict studies, demonstrates the need to revisit 
the key methodological issue that has already been highlighted with reference to 
the debate on the definition of terrorism. Indeed, a focus on the actor, as 
exemplified by the accounts of Horgan, currently comes with a different 
ontological, epistemological and methodological focus than an understanding of 
terrorism as an aberration within a conflict yet delivers very helpful insights into 
an actor’s behaviour and motivation even when they tend to follow positivist 
paradigms. 
The diversity in research agendas and disciplines within which the various 
studies on terrorism are couched, are once again reflective of the 
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unboundedness of the field and its ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological implications. As Schmid and Marsden point out, there is an 
ongoing circularity because,  
‘in the absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism and 
with the lack of a general theory of terrorism, typology construction can 
nevertheless be a useful instrument to advance our understanding of 
terrorism – provided it is embedded in a framework that looks at the 
conflict behaviour of the opponents of the terrorists as well and takes 
into account additional contextual factors. Theoretical progress in the 
field of Terrorism Studies will have to be based on typological 
progress, which, in turn, is based on conceptual progress.’ (Schmid, 
2011b, p. 193)  
What this assessment misses however, is the fact that terrorism expertise, 
despite the contestation over the object of knowledge and the very humble claims 
from within the field, operates within existing hegemonic power-relations that. 
Because Terrorism Studies lacks a clear normative position from which it can 
argue and make reliable claims to expertise in the form of emancipatory truth 
claims, it cannot confront irresponsible, that is exclusionary, voices from 
participation in the ‘expert’ political discourse that shapes the vernacular 
understanding of terrorism and concrete counterterrorism policies and this has, 
as we will see in the next chapter, detrimental implications for how societies relate 
not only to the (real) threat of terrorism but further to each other.  
2.1.3 The Terrorism Studies Agenda  
Reflective of the need for an encompassing study of the micro-, meso- and 
macro processes in order to explain why individuals turn to political violence the 
study of terrorism encompasses foci from individual to group to societal, 
biographic to historic, strategic to tactical, state to non-state, contextual to global 
covering all academic disciplines. (e.g. Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010) Jarvis notes that 
despite the lack of a stable definition, the question of causation has remained 
central to Terrorism Studies and is indicative of a ‘remarkably coherent research 
agenda.’ However, he also critically observes that the engagement with ‘root 
causes’ and the question why individuals turn to political violence are merely a 
preparatory move in order to develop effective responses to the threat posed by 
terrorism. He concludes, that the agenda of Terrorism Studies is to provide policy-
relevant research that offers very limited space for reflecting on the historical and 
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social processes through which identity, behaviour or threat has been constituted. 
(Jarvis, 2009a, p. 11-14)  
Indeed, even a cursory look at the concluding sections of academic journal 
articles on terrorism, a counterterrorism or policy focus is more often than not 
explicitly acknowledged15 even when the initial orientation of the article would 
suggest otherwise and thereby locates Terrorism Studies within state power 
relationships. This tendency is not lost and from a definitional perspective, a 
major bone of contention remains the conventional exclusion of state violence 
from the definition and remit of the research agenda. Bittner is very explicitly 
critical of this and points to the fact that ‘[S]tates do not use terrorist means - mind 
you, not thanks to their virtue, but thanks to [the] concepts: state terrorism is, on 
my understanding of the word, a square circle’; (Bittner, 2005, p. 207) While some 
have pointed to the necessity to allow for the logical possibility of states engaging 
in terrorism (Shanahan, 2010, p.186) others insist that ‘by definition terrorism is 
the behaviour of sub-state groups.’ (Richardson, 2006, p. 50). Here we are well 
advised to recall Schmid who emphasises that there is no analytical gain in 
summarising myriad forms of violence that are neither causally nor ontologically 
coherent and thereby turning more practitioners of violence into terrorists. 
(Schmid, 2011a, p. 94) 
However, what happens here then is the abstraction, indeed isolation of 
terrorism from its wider contexts and a zeroing in on terrorism as a particular form 
of political violence, namely sub-state violence. In applying such a restrictive 
conception of terrorism, the analyst pre-determines what can count to be causally 
or ontologically coherent and indeed presupposes a specific normative 
constellation. This determinism of course fails to account for the terrorist act being 
a performative event whose symbolic meaning is dependent on its perception by 
both, actor and observer. It must be remembered that the perception we privilege 
has implications for our ability to understand terrorism. The power and meaning 
of the act after all is rooted in social reality and the laws and customs that stand 
behind it. (Juergensmeyer, 2003) Terrorism as a national security threat to be 
confronted by counterterrorism measures of course takes shape against a very 
                                            
15 see for example: (Abrahams, 2008, Davis and Cragin, 2009, Spencer, 2006, Stern, 1999, 
Schmid, 2011a); for a critique of this focus see: (Appleby, 2010, Booth, 2008, Jackson, 2007b, 
Jarvis, 2009b, Richmond, 2009, Shanahan, 2010, Smyth, 2007, Stephens, 2009, Wolfendale, 
2006). 
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particular reading of the phenomenon and its social context, namely that of 
national security and only that social context gives credibility to the act, (Bourdieu 
and Thompson, 1991) for it provides the framework that makes attainable the 
threat. Violence however, we must not forget, ‘exists in a complex political and 
historical context and in a landscape of meaning’. (Bryan, 2012, p. 23) 
What becomes meaningful in the social world is the analyst’s desire that has 
in large parts shaped the research agenda in Terrorism Studies and determines 
what constitutes as successful research and tells us what the meaningful social 
reality of terrorism ‘is’. Implicitly or explicitly, researchers and analysts alike, seek 
to explain why ordinary men engage in acts that the public discourse widely 
perceives and describes as ‘utterly senseless nihilism’ (Zuleika, 2008, p. 32) and 
thereby mute that these acts are social actions to which normative judgement 
apply. 
2.1.3.1 Desire and meaningfulness in excess 
The desire to explain the extraordinary, the unspeakable, the horror, and 
erotics of terrorism epitomised by Sageman’s question lies at the heart of the 
inability to adequately understand terrorism, because it divorces explanations of 
terrorism from the mundane and ordinary features and experiences of social life 
as it relies on a conceptualisation of terrorism that originates from the context of 
national security. The actor and her motivations feature in terms, that confirm the 
observer’s desire; this observer is not merely an academic observer but a 
researcher that caters to the intersitial place of his object of knowledge, by 
translating questions of subjective motivations into questions of generalisable 
motivation and causality with the, often merely implicit, focus on providing insights 
for counterterrorism approaches. 
Yet, whatever is subjectively enacted by the terrorists is, and remains, 
inaccessible. (Zuleika and Douglass, 2008) It is exactly because the 
motivations from the perspective of the individual terrorist do either not feature 
at all in the general discourse around terrorism, or in deterministic terminology 
that ‘our’ own desires supplant and socially reconstruct the terrorists’ 
subjectivity. It is for this reason that positivist research approaches that do not 
incorporate the subjectivity of the terrorist actor, render Terrorism Studies 
intellectually vulnerable. The terrorist as the ‘perpetrator’ does only feature 
through representation, that is through a lens that applies - without making 
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explicit - its own agenda, an agenda which is born out of the conceptualisation 
of terrorism that originates in the national security, rather than civil society 
context. For example, Schmid argues that ideally, the scientific literature of 
terrorism should be apolitical and amoral. (Schmid, 2011b, p. 466) Aiming to 
produce neutral, objective, and truthful knowledge about terrorism. Ironically 
however, earlier in the same volume, he points out that ‘most terrorists are normal 
in a clinical sense (albeit not in a moral one)’ (Schmid, 2011b, p. 191) and thereby 
injecting, inadvertently and in passing, a normative position that would of course 
need justification via the application of a particular moral theory, rather than a 
mere, albeit understandable, gut-feeling, and thereby laying bare that positivist 
research methodologies cannot but fail to generate knowledge which is sensible 
to its own inherent biases.  
While Schmid makes a case for the need to produce objective knowledge, the 
claim to such is illusionary. Not because terrorism experts with security 
clearances necessarily have a political agenda due to state influence on 
academics, but rather because a foundational conceptual bias in the study of 
terrorism invokes positivist research paradigms and is not problematised. Schmid 
is unusual in explicitly mentioning, albeit in passing, the amorality of terrorists, 
while he fails to see and engage with the inherent bias and foundation of this 
claim. It is inconsistent and indeed fallacious to require an amoral and apolitical 
production of knowledge on terrorism if at the same time the notion of immorality 
is invoked, precisely because the object of knowledge is located in between 
academic analysis and political realities, with neither able to neutrally 
conceptualise terrorism. In passing, Schmid falls prey to the implications of the 
ontological fluidity of the object of knowledge, by incorporating a taken-for-
granted moral judgement into his basic understanding of the actor while arguing 
at the same time for the need of neutrality and objectivity. Indeed, as we will see 
in chapter five, it is psychologically speaking quite normal to engage in such 
automated moralising, for individuals generally engage in post-hoc, that is 
consequentialist, moralising which is based on pre-existing moral learning and 
intuition but cannot necessarily express the grounds for their moral intuitions. It 
is this consequentialist moral reasoning that will be demonstrated in chapter six 
to constitute a universal feature of social life and must form part of the normative 
position from which Terrorism Studies exercises its expertise.  
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In this context, it is interesting to consider Ugilt’s observation of terrorism as 
meaningfulness-in-excess. He suggests that terrorism is an empty signifier and 
that by ’using this concept in discourse one is effectively applying zero meaning’. 
(Ugilt, 2012, p. 84) By this, he is not implying that terrorism does not have a 
meaning, rather that invoking the term terrorism always implies ‘a more’ that is 
never made explicit and that this more is ‘at work’. Taking both observations 
together he stresses that ‘by producing zero meaning, one is effectively doing 
something excessive’ because one is making sense of something beyond the 
sense that can be expressed. He suggested that when we are not-saying 
something, ‘we are marking out an empty spot in language, where something 
could have been clearly said, but was not. This is precisely what characterizes 
the signifier ‘terror’.’ (Ugilt, 2012, p. 85) The reason why this observation is 
interesting and indeed important is because it has practical implications for 
terrorism researchers. 
Terrorism scholars are forced to make a choice when they study terrorism as 
an object of knowledge to stabilise their approach even when the object of 
knowledge is unbounded and incoherent. Making this choice it must be clearly 
stated however, is also embarking on a journey that has crucial political 
implications and serves a political and moral purpose precisely because the 
signifier terrorism has zero-meaning but operates within existing hegemonic 
power relations and produces meaningfulness-in-excess, an excess which is 
open and can be filled by the individual perceiver, with their subjective desire (and 
power interests) as well as the discourses, representations and opinions readily 
available via media and public discourse.  
From both observations, Schmid’s scholarly call for objective research and 
Ugilt’s caution of terrorism as an empty signifier that produces excessive 
meaning, a meaning which by and of itself renders impossible the claim of 
neutrality, objectivity and stability we need to conclude that expert discourse on 
terrorism represents a particular choice for the purpose of analysis that 
manoeuvres an interstitial space between the realms of politics and science. By 
making this choice, alternative but initially equally valid choices, other choices are 
not made and excluded from focus. This has significant consequences for the 
sorts of expert discourses that tend to be produced and disseminated. Those who 
would address terrorism as a rational object, subject to scientific analysis and 
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manipulation, produce and contribute to a discourse which they are unable to 
control, precisely because terrorism as an empty signifier produces 
meaningfulness in excess, an excess that rest itself in the inconsistencies of lived 
experiences and contradictions of modern life. Such attempts at a stabilising 
scientific discourse are continually incorporated into the taken-for-granted 
normative discourse of the public sphere by calling upon experts to explain 
contemporary events in which terrorism is conceived as a problem of evil and 
pathology. (Stampnitzky, 2008, p. 3). As has been seen, not even seasoned and 
generally thoughtful and cautious academics are immune to the uncritical 
adaptation of a moralising perspective on the topic that perpetuate arbitrary but 
taken-for-granted normative positions and hegemonic power-relationships. 
2.1.3.2 Implicit moral judgements, social realities and problem solving  
What becomes crucial then, is initially the recognition that the use of the 
term terrorism invokes excessive meaning that, among many other things, 
invokes and implies a moral judgement and functions a means of persuasion of 
the moral point of view of the side that successfully applies the label. (Jenkins, 
1980) However, while various authors point to the moral valence of terrorism,16 it 
also is very clear that the moral status of terrorism refers primarily to kinds of acts 
(of violence) about whose moral permissibility people can - and do - reasonably 
disagree. (Shanahan, 2010, p. 185) So much so that Baumann (2013) argues 
that understanding terrorism first and foremost, necessitates a focus on the ethics 
invoked from the perspective of the one that utilises violence, that regulates, limits 
and permits particular kinds of (terroristic) violence. This is an ethics that invokes 
a duty to provide reasons for specific acts of violence, for he concludes that any 
act of violence de facto becomes justifiable.17 Arriving at the conclusion that an 
act of terrorism in particular or terrorism in general is morally wrong however, first 
and foremost needs to derive from the application of a specific moral theory. In 
                                            
16 See for example: (Baumann, 2013, Coady, 2004; Devji, 2005, Held, 2008, Stampnitzky, 2013). 
17 This follows from Baumann’s (2013) very clear emphasis on the moral redundancy of the 
notion of the victim and his critique of the primacy of taking the perspective of the victim. He 
argues that, analytically and ethically speaking, everyone is a victim at some point in the 
analysis and therefore there no longer is a perpetrator. Moreover, he argues that maintaining 
the notion of ‘the victim’ merely serves the purpose to sustain collective memory; Baumann 
reaches this conclusion because he points out that, differentiating between legitimate, 
illegitimate and particularly through the notion of ‘collateral damage’ even the doctrine of 
just-war merely offers a framework to justify any act of violence and thus, a priori there 
cannot be a moral difference between different kinds of ‘killing’ and violence.  
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other words, it needs to follow from a theory which makes explicit a particular 
understanding of rights and wrongs rather than from the very meaning - and be 
it through the workings of the excess of meaning - of the concept itself. Indeed, 
the application of a different moral theory might yield the same or even a different 
moral conclusion, (Shanahan 2010, p. 184) yet must not be foregone because of 
the conceptual categorisation of an act as terrorism. Greisman (1977, p. 311) 
points out that when ‘people identify with the victim of a terrorist act the act 
becomes terrorist. If they identify with the perpetrator, it becomes something 
more justified, plausible, or praiseworthy.’  
If however, social reality is constructed in such a manner as to marginalise 
the perpetrator, through a process founded upon a constructed clarity of 
immorality, certainty of threat and objectivity in definition, the validity of 
conclusions that are being drawn from the explanations need to be questioned or 
at least consumed with caution and consideration of their social impact and a 
recognition of the hegemonic power relations embedded in the social reality, thus 
constructed. Indeed,Horgan and Taylor question whether the non-state political 
instrumentality, which is so crucial in identifying one of the qualities of terrorism, 
actually comes before an engagement in terrorism as a distinct feature of terrorist 
violence as opposed to the instrumental value of ‘ordinary’ violence. (Taylor and 
Horgan, 2011, p. 133) However, as Jarvis (2009a, p. 14) remarks, the 
predominant conceptualisation of terrorism as a coherent object of knowledge 
leads to an unfortunate essentialist orthodoxy by ‘attributing terrorism an 
objective existence’ with limited space for a reflection on ‘historical and social 
processes through which this identity, behaviour or threat has been constituted.’ 
This renders the explanatory value of studies of the causes of terrorism not only 
incomplete but also intellectually vulnerable because they do not capture the 
epistemological question raised by Horgan and Taylor. In this context, Gunning’s 
criticism that Terrorism Studies has primarily functioned as a problem solving 
pursuit (Gunning, 2007), that takes the world as it finds it, in order to provide 
policy-relevant research (Jarvis, 2009a) becomes relevant. Gunning, following 
Cox posits that this approach accepts the current  
‘social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are 
organised, as the given framework for action’ with ‘the general aim of 
… make[ing] these relationships and institutions work smoothly by 
dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble.’ (Cox and Sinclair, 
1996, p.88)  
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Silke remarks, that in spite of, or arguably maybe precisely because of these 
manifold efforts to identify the causes of terrorism, the field of Terrorism Studies 
so far failed to develop a matured and critical explanatory framework (Silke, 
2004b) let alone carved out a normative position from which it can develop and 
assess responsible expertise. 
It is through an exploration of the construction, representation and 
performance of terrorism, that Jarvis then suggest that analytical and normative 
shortcomings of Terrorism Studies could be overcome. (Jarvis, 2009a) Rather 
than a focus on the national security threat posed by terrorism and an endeavour 
to understand terrorism for the purpose of confronting a security threat more 
effectively, the study of terrorism needs to address exclusionary practices that 
underlie discourse, knowledge and representation (Jackson, 2007b), albeit not 
exclusively. Engaging with the definition or causes of terrorism primarily for their 
strategic logic, posits an understanding of the terrorist as a rational actor but at 
the same time underestimates the significance of terrorism as an unbounded 
phenomenon. By taking into account the discursive, interpretive, and symbolic 
processes of the creation of terrorism and the manner in which these originate, 
not only can social judgement, if not avoided so at least made explicit (Sorel, 
2003, p. 370) and further can the causes of terrorism and its definition be looked 
at in conjunction with the process of its socio-moral construction and the 
inherently embodied power relations therein. 
However, when for example Jarvis (2009) critiques the orthodox academic 
scholarship on terrorism for its perceived focus on solving the problem of 
terrorism and an obsession with security from the perspective of the nation state 
as the main motivation for the study of terrorism and suggest that a more mature 
understanding of terrorism necessitates an engagement with exclusionary 
practises and institutionalised power-imbalances, they also and unnecessarily 
polarise the study of terrorism. This polarity once again is indicative of an attempt 
to come to grips with the fact that Terrorism Studies is caught up and ‘becomes 
real’ in the interchange between (scholarly-) philosophical and (scholarly-) 
practical debate. Indeed, for the time being, it appears to be the multifaceted 
social construction of terrorism and the various avenues of engagement 
therewith, ranging from an explicit focus on counterterrorism to the engagement 
with exclusionary practises that leads to a multipolar claim to scholarly authority 
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or mature comprehension. In this context we can argue once again that the 
unboundedness of the object of knowledge, and indeed its dependence on the 
interaction between the research agenda of academics and practitioners, rather 
than a claim to authority, maturity, or comprehensiveness by one or the other, 
constitutes the field of Terrorism Studies, but at the same time highlights a crucial 
lacuna in the field in not declaring a normative commitment. This lacuna crucially 
needs to be filled because it perpetuates polarities, particularly in a civil society 
context, as will become clear in the next chapter. This project proposes, that a 
crucial exclusionary practise is to be found in the automatic moral valence of 
(political) violence generally and of terrorist violence specifically and goes on to 
propose a more critical, epistemological stance on morality and violence that 
enables a normative position for Terrorism Studies as a point to argue from and 
develop responsible expertise and guidance for counterterrorism policy, as well 
as civil society relations. 
What is in fact needed, is an explicit engagement with the understanding 
of rights and wrong - that is the ethics of violence - from the perspective of 
those that chose terrorism as their modus operandi, which in turn necessitates 
an approach from within Terrorism Studies that facilitates such an ethics and 
this needs to be based on a methodology that encourages self-reflexivity and 
explicit normative claims. At the same time, this is what remains problematic 
in Terrorism Studies, because ‘a great deal of the recent discussion of 
terrorism is that terrorism is so morally unacceptable as a means that we do 
not need to even consider the political objectives of those who engage in 
terrorism’. (Held, 2008, p. 68) 
Indeed, because the construction of realities reflects hegemonic power 
relationships, groups at the margins enjoy little control over the process by 
which social meanings - and particularly those of right and wrong - are 
assigned. In other words, those at the margins who are the ones utilising 
violence against the hegemony of the state are also the ones who subjectively 
and contextually perceived their action as moral, because it is entirely 
consistent to subjectively perceive morality. The ethics of violence equips the 
actor with their own set of social meaning of their violence - and indeed of the 
violence of others - this social meaning is not isolated but rather woven into, 
reflective and at times derived in opposition to hegemonic realities. At all 
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times however, hegemonic realities feature in shaping the meaning of the 
(violent) action for they provide the framework and indeed categories within 
which subjectively perceived reality is being made sense of socially. It is in 
recognition of this social subjectivity that Terrorism Studies must develop a 
normative position from which it can develop its expertise that allows on the 
one hand for the subjectivity of the individual actor but is further receptive to 
their social and political embeddedness. 
2.1.3.3 Social realities, representations and alternative voices 
In an attempt to make explicit hegemonic power relationships and the 
manner in which the meaning of violent action is being made sense of socially, 
two interesting research foci should be noted here as exemplifying that 
indeed, terrorism does bring to the fore and accentuates questions of far wider 
cultural and political importance. While generally relatively little research on 
terrorism focussed on the representation of the individual actor and the context 
from which they originate, two interesting exception to this can be noted. Firstly, 
we can see a relative interest in the representation and participation of women in 
terrorism and secondly, ethnic and religious minorities implicated in questions 
surrounding radicalisation and preventative (counter-)terrorism approaches in a 
Western context. 
2.1.3.4 Homogenisation and marginalisation 
While Sylvester and Parashar (2009, p. 181) note that women are ‘nearly 
absent from investigations of terrorist participation and where visible are 
marginalised from agency’, they observe that women are everywhere in the terror 
moment in international relations not only in appointed gender roles but also roles 
that counter social norms. They criticise however, that their voices rarely feature 
in Terrorism Studies. 
On the other hand, Appleby observes that ‘the Muslim community’ features 
prominently, particularly in the counterterrorism discourse. His analysis in the 
context of the United Kingdom shows that rather than creating its own neutral 
discourse and referring to people who conduct acts of violence without the use of 
labels or religious affiliation, the literature and particularly ‘research inspired’ 
policy papers, in multiple instances links the terrorist label to Islam. (Appleby, 
2010, p. 431-2) The strategy and discourse thereby throws together a diverse 
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group of people under the single banner of ‘Muslim community’ and moreover 
identifies a problem of political extremism and terrorism as originating from within 
that group’. (Appleby, 2010, p. 431-2) Similarly, Staun shows that the discourse 
amongst the Danish security and intelligence elite and the Ministry of Integration, 
lead to conflating issues of integration and a perceived lack of Danish identity 
with concerns relating home-grown terrorism and radicalisation. (Staun, 2010) He 
argues that this is symptomatic of a securitisation strategy that necessitates a 
referent object that make it a collective that is distinct from other collectives. 
(Staun, 2010, p. 143) The heightened levels of discourses surrounding 
community cohesion and so-called mainstream British values in the context of 
the United Kingdom’s PREVENT Strategy seem to be emblematic of Staun’s 
description. 
2.1.3.5 Prevailing frames of representing women in terrorism  
At the same time, however, for feminists, women’s role in violence in general 
and as participants in terrorism in particular, has been difficult to conceptualise. 
Even amongst proclaimed feminists, there has been a tendency to revert to a 
stereotypical characterisation of women as ‘peace loving’ and consequently 
primarily as victims of political violence or actors that have been driven towards 
violence due to their emotional ties to a male activist (Morgan, 2001), or because 
socio-cultural and religious circumstances did not allow for an alternative 
manifestation of their activism (Bloom, 2005, Bloom, 2010, Bloom, 2011) or 
alternatively because the considerations of specific terrorist organisations 
appreciated the tactical and/or strategic advantage or necessity of the use of 
female terrorists. (Gentry, 2012, Hamilton, 2007, Gentry, 2003) 
A critical contribution to the understanding of the representation of women in 
violence has been made by Sjoberg and Gentry (2011). They show that, rather 
than recognising women’s participation as a significant demonstration of their 
political agency, discourses of violent women replicate gendered identities and 
ultimately, replicate hegemonic power relationships. Their exploration of violent 
women uncovers the use of ‘mother’, ‘monster’, and ‘whore’ frames as 
predominant modes of the representation of their violent activism and by 
extension provided predominantly for an explanation of their (political) violence. 
Furthermore, Ahall (2011) identifies ‘heroine’, ‘monster’, and ‘victim’ frames as 
well as the ‘myth of motherhood’ as central frames in the representation of female 
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participation in political violence. Ahall thereby affirms Sjoberg and Gentry’s 
observation regarding the frames of representation and agency accepted in the 
engagement with female political violence that share the characterisation of 
‘violent women as having been incapable of choosing their violence, and imply 
that, had they a choice, women would not have chosen the violence’. (Sjoberg 
and Gentry, 2007, p. 190) 
The persistence of these representational frames leads Sjoberg and Gentry 
to conclude that terrorism is inherently gendered as both, terrorist organisations 
as well as governments operationalise gender. (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007, p. 
136) They posit that, because discursive paradigms consists of intersubjective 
systems of representations and representation-producing practice, discourses 
are a feature of reality both in a constitutive and a representative sense and 
reiterate that it needs to be appreciated that ‘discourse exists not in egalitarian 
community but in hierarchical competition’ (emphasis added: Sjoberg, 2007, p. 
56) and ignoring this leads to an incomplete, if not incorrect, understanding of 
terrorism. At the same time, however, through the focus on questions of agency 
as the tool to achieve meaningful political participation and action, an enquiry into 
how terrorism as a tool is contextually and socially meaningful to the individual 
activist becomes marginalised. 
2.1.3.6 Agency but not subjectivity 
While the question of the nature of agency of the individual (female) activist 
ought to be problematised, this should not be done to the exclusion of the 
meaning that terrorism has for the individual subject in different socio-political and 
cultural contexts. A mature understanding of terrorism necessitates an inquiry into 
the meaning of terrorism, that pays attention to the question of agency and 
representation and the gendering that is taking place in this context. However, it 
should not primarily focus on how much choice individuals exercise in their 
decision but look into the question of how terrorism becomes meaningful for the 
individual female activist.  
Where agency however remains the attribute that marks entrance into the 
legitimate political community it reduces subjectivities to their political practices. 
Following Butler, Auchter suggest that ‘only by considering the notion of an open 
subject enacted through performativity can we begin to engage in a debate over 
what an open conception of agency might look like’. (Auchter, 2012, p. 121-5) 
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Certainly, the bone of contention in this context is a critique of foundationalist 
notions of agency. Hereby those who write about women terrorists are crafting a 
narrative of agency to explain their behaviour, inscribing in their behaviour a 
larger context of agency in the face of exclusion from that agent status ‘agents’ 
are not crafting their own narratives. (Auchter, 2012, p. 131) Indeed, this is what 
lies at the core of the feminist critique of the notion of agency and furthermore 
points towards a more general contestation regarding the notion of ‘the political’ 
and hegemonic power-relationships. 
It is possible to explore the motivations of female terrorists not in an attempt 
to ‘restore’ their agency by arguing that they are coerced into violence or that their 
agency is to be found in their violence, but rather in an attempt to understand the 
actions themselves. (Auchter, 2012, p. 134) By positing a performative 
conception of subjectivity, can we begin to re-situate and redefine the subject 
independent from being behind the deed and account for the fact that  women’s 
violence is not any different than that of men in terms of terrorist recruitment, 
motivation, fervour and brutality, (Nacos, 2005, 436) rather it is the social context 
and gendered discourses in which they operate that differs and affects how we 
conceive of them and how they conceive of themselves.  
Hereby some facts are there. They take shape against a background of 
threats and fear that then become constitutive of the events themselves. All of 
this points to the rhetorical dimension of terrorism discourse, a dimension that we 
shall see in chapter six, is crucial in making accessible the notion of reason in 
Islamist discourse. It furthermore constitutes the link between actions and goals, 
which are mediated by interpretations and the desire of the observer. (Zuleika 
and Douglass, 2008, p. 29) 
The ‘women’ question serves to exemplify not only how we think and write 
about women, but more generally of the terrorist subject. Where Auchter remarks 
that ‘voices of women should be contextualized and historicized as the 
experiences and iterations of their subjectivities’, the same needs to hold true for 
the terrorist subject more generally. For the context of female terrorists Auchter 
point out that ‘we must examine the ways in which we attribute subjectivity to 
them. It becomes impossible to speak of universal motivations for all women 
terrorists, in the same way as it is impossible to speak of universal motivations 
for all male terrorists or all terrorists in general.’ (Auchter, 2012, p. 135) 
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In researching terrorism, we necessarily make certain assumptions about 
subjectivities and need to recognise, that in our research we participate in their 
performative creation. Indeed, it appears that at the heart of dealing with the 
unboundedness of Terrorism Studies lies performative creation, where Zuleika 
cautions that desire fills the gaps in our analysis (Zuleika and Douglass, 2008) 
and Auchter suggest that ‘we must avoid filling the openness with definitive 
content by avoiding the presumption that certain characteristics are associated 
with clearly defined categories such as woman and terrorist’ (Auchter, 2012, p. 
135-6) or morality, that must, but currently does not, generously allow for the fact 
that our cognitive heuristics function so as to embed ourselves in perceptive and 
moral bubbles that disguise our own biases from ourselves. 
The plethora of definitional issues surrounding terrorism, but also a 
research agenda that does not explicitly problematise but leaves a gap to be 
filled by ‘desire’ specifically with reference to the immorality of terrorism, but 
relies on a rhetoric of certainty, inevitability and claimed objectivity that does 
not do justice to the subjectivity of terrorism. Consequently, such an agenda 
fails to account for the ambivalence of terrorism by suggesting a determinism 
that does not take the inherent injustice and inequality in the construction of 
realities into account. Indeed, responsible research into terrorism needs to 
account for both, how people impact on global politics, for the impact of narratives 
others construct for and about them (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007) and seek to 
understand how terrorism plays a role in the size and type of influence a persona 
perceives to have on their social and political life and how they and others 
perceive to be able to relate to one another in society.  
2.1.4 Critical Terrorism Studies or the critical study of terrorism 
The Critical Terrorism Studies project then, which developed out of a 
dissatisfaction with, and scepticism of what became to be seen as Orthodox 
Terrorism Studies was primarily a response to what Smyth at al. (2008) identified 
as the key shortcomings in the contemporary study of terrorism. In launching the 
Critical Studies on Terrorism Journal those dissatisfied wanted ‘to foster a more 
self-reflective, critical approach to the study of terrorism.’ The editors posit, that  
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Critical Terrorism Studies is understood as a research orientation that 
is willing to challenge dominant knowledge and understandings of 
terrorism, is sensitive to the politics of labelling in the terrorism field, is 
transparent about its own values and political standpoints, adheres to 
a set or responsible research ethics, and is committed to a broadly 
defined notion of emancipation. (Smyth et al., 2008, p. 2)  
Yet, Jackson (2015b) acknowledges that the failure to develop and the lack of an 
explicit normative framework for (Critical) Terrorism Studies remains a problem 
for a truly emancipatory research framework. 
Critical Terrorism Studies in its foundational orientation makes an attempt to 
explicitly confront political as well as ideological bias in favour of Western States 
and intends to provide a welcoming environment for scholarly discontent with 
terrorism research. (Heath-Kelly, 2010, p. 236) On its surface, this orientation of 
the study of terrorism proclaims to explicitly address the inherent danger in the 
study of terrorism that is that the naming of an event as terroristic, orienting 
concomitant research accordingly defines it as such, while its contingency is - if 
not disregarded - at least marginalised from an equally possible understanding of 
events. (Jarvis, 2009a)  
Booth notes that he expects the study of terrorism to best flourish in the 
context of academic International Relations, seeing ‘the logic of the situation, 
given the globalized manifestations of terror and counter-terror in the present 
historical era, and the uniquely global remit of International Relations. Moreover, 
he notes that International Relations’, albeit not unique in academic disciplines, 
has a synergistic relationship between study/reality, interpreting the 
world/changing it, theory/practise, and has the advantage of its foundational 
relationship with the study of political violence. (Booth, 2008, p.68) Noting that 
‘the most fundamental questions that confront us are political’ anchoring Critical 
Terrorism Studies in International Relations was to allow for an approach to 
terrorism that engages ‘with the particular dynamics of the political world, and 
especially the condition of anarchy with defines the international dimension.’ 
(Booth, 2008, p. 70) 
While Critical Terrorism Studies demonstrates a commitment to marginalised, 
‘other’ understandings of events, MacGinty (2013, p. 2) aptly comments that the 
Critical Terrorism Studies paradigm risks becoming complicit in a wider discourse 
and highly politicised - and thereby polarising - epistemology because even 
though the ultimate referent for the proposed emancipatory project is the security 
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of human beings rather than the state, it continues to operate within a framework 
of security that posits terrorism in the sphere of national security politics and ties 
Terrorism Studies in a framework that is dominated by paradigms, definitions, 
research questions, and frameworks with an explicitly political, rather than civil 
society orientation. It is not surprising, that in such a framework, a focus on the 
individual is credited with limited benefit only, in so far as the individual is not first 
and foremost conceptualised with reference to their political agency. It is 
worthwhile remembering the feminist objection in relation to the focus on agency 
as the tool for crafting one’s own narrative and the contestation of the 
demarcation between what is understood to be political.  
Indeed, what we can see exemplified by Booth, and indeed then by the Critical 
Terrorism Studies project in its political-science incarnation, is an attempt to 
capture intersubjective, fluid, and multi-focused research in a framework, that 
while allowing for easier penetration due to its international and interdisciplinary 
hospitality, does not adequately account for, and deal with, the unbounded nature 
of the object of knowledge. At the same time however, what boils below the 
surface, is aptly expressed by Booth when he states that the death wish is less 
significant politically than the apparent endless human willingness to fight for a 
better life. (Booth, 2008, p. 70)  
It remains to be argued that such a willingness to fight for a better life may not 
necessarily be primarily political - narrowly understood - or at least not so much 
so, as to justify anchoring the study of terrorism within the premises of the 
anarchic International System, its research paradigms, foci and methodologies. 
As Zuleika and Douglas (2008, p. 30) point out, dialectics of reality and threat are 
a key ingredient of terrorism discourse and performance and the very meaning of 
the act that constitutes the threat is entwined with perceptions of it. 
Such a perspective however, requires that we take the terrorist subject herself 
as a primary and autonomous subject investigation, one that shapes and is 
shaped by their social environment and whose actions are understood as 
meaningful social action, rather than primarily for its political instrumentality. It is 
because the contemporary Critical Terrorism Studies orientation, albeit welcome 
in its critical stance particularly in relation to challenging the privilege of the 
perception of the victim’s audience in determining the meaning of the terrorist act 
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and a commitment towards emancipation18, fails to provide for an explicit 
normative commitment that takes into account the terrorist moral subjectivity that 
it cannot provide for the ultimate framework within which a deeper understanding 
of terrorism is possible that accounts for the unbounded nature of terrorism.  
In other words, what we see replicated in the Critical Terrorism Studies project 
is an attempt, albeit with the intent of widening and broadening of the research 
agenda, to firstly navigate the interstitial space of Terrorism Studies, and secondly 
to problematise the research agenda of Terrorism Studies by embedding a 
critique of the purpose of the research and demanding open and reflexive 
methodologies. At the same time however in order to escape its political 
instrumentalism, the study of terrorism must try to conceptualise it as meaningful, 
moral and social action and enable a concern with wider questions around the 
‘pursuit of the good life’ (Heath-Kelly, 2010, p .239) that moves beyond critique 
(Toros and Gunning, 2009, p.92) and contributes to a normative framework that 
offers alternative explanations and thereby can make emancipatory truth claims 
from a position that provides responsible expertise yet, it is precisely these latter 
two aspect that both Orthodox as well as Critical Terrorism Studies remain silent. 
2.2 Taking a normative stance in Terrorism Studies 
This chapter, in sketching the key constitutive debates within the field of 
Terrorism Studies has demonstrated that, the academic study of terrorism does 
not manage to carve out a stable position from which it can provide responsible 
expertise, that is reflective of the recognition of the unbounded nature of terrorism 
as an object of knowledge and its interstitial position. The lacuna in Terrorism 
Studies is not necessarily one of substance strictly speaking, but rather one of 
essence. We see this lacuna manifest itself in the exchange following Sageman’s 
declaration of the stagnation of Terrorism Studies and the various responses that, 
rightly, emphasise the valuable individual contributions to knowledge in the field 
of Terrorism Studies. It is not the purpose of this thesis to challenge the value of 
contributions by scholars that provide in-depth analysis and insights into specific 
instances and actors of terroristic violence, conflict dynamics, communicative 
strategies, ideologies, quantitative datasets and distributions and many more. It 
                                            
18 Albeit vaguely defined, see: (Jackson, 2016, McDonald, 2007).  
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is also not the intention of this thesis to suggest that a more authentic truth in 
understanding terrorism is to be found in abstract normative arguments rather 
than ethnographic first-hand accounts or anthropological fieldwork. Rather, when 
speaking of essence, the lacuna that this thesis wishes to address is essence 
understood as the very working of incoherence at the heart of terrorism research 
and the need to emphasise how this incoherence stands in the way of 
emancipatory and more responsible expertise. For this purpose, we have seen 
in this chapter how terrorism research is quick to challenge the prevailing wisdom 
on definitions, typologies, motivations, representations and the likes by offering, 
a generally more academically-neutral and inclusive, bona fide alternative. 
However, we have also seen that academic neutrality is illusive because even a 
more inclusive alternative merely represents another, legitimately challengeable 
choice19, which emphasises a particular aspect that another choice might not 
have revealed. While such a mosaic of choice does indeed contribute to a richer 
picture when it comes to understanding terrorism, it does so in the context of very 
diverse research contexts, yet generally on the back of positivist research 
paradigms.  
The consequence of the necessity to choose however remains unarticulated, 
because terrorism is an unbounded object of knowledge which takes shape in a 
discourse in which academics are but one (and not necessarily trusted or 
powerful) participant. And this choice, as uninterested and detached it may be 
presented, is but an arbitrary choice in need of justification, and this justification 
does not take place merely within an academic ivory tower. While this thesis does 
by no means wish to argue that terrorism studies ought to detach itself from the 
‘real world out there’, it does want to highlight that as long as Terrorism Studies 
cannot carve out a space from which to utilise the incoherence at the heart of its 
expertise, academics will not be able to responsibly navigate the vernacular 
discourse that necessarily follows from the unboundedness of terrorism.  
For the purpose of the research of terrorism, understanding essence means 
more than understanding the underlying motivations that lie behind the articulated 
first-hand accounts of individuals that participate in terrorism and giving the actor 
space to articulate her ‘authentic voice’, but further essence refers to the 
inarticulable incoherences that both, the actor as well as the researcher 
                                            
19 Not all choices are equally defensible; see for critique (Kahl, 2017). 
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experiences, because terrorism takes shape in an intersitial and inherently 
contestable space. Terrorism researchers must recognise the responsibility that 
and how terrorism shapes civil society relations beyond an immediate national 
security context and establish a position, from which to contribute and navigate 
an informed and responsible approach to terrorism, which does confront, rather 
than build on or worse foster exclusionary practises.  
A critical research agenda that builds on an explicit normative framework and 
starts with the possibility to understand terrorist means as an attempt to construct 
an alternative discourse reflective of the individual’s own morality and social 
relationships yields promising results because it appreciates the personal 
decision to engage in such violence as a route worthy for the exploration of the 
actor’s desire as well as their recognition of their moral and social embeddedness 
rather than as an individual that exercises mere political agency. It starts form the 
premise that the desire to ‘eschew survival in order to realise a higher goal’ is not 
only culturally conditioned but subjectively performative and not necessarily 
amoral. Moreover, as will become clear particularly in chapter four and five, 
understanding terrorist means as on the one hand an attempt to bring to the fore 
an alternative discourse that invokes an existential dimension that can be 
understood with reference to a struggle for recognition wherein moral 
consequentialist justifications are central and on the other hand as meaningful 
social, moral action can provide for an epistemological starting point that equips 
Terrorism Studies with an emancipatory conceptual framework that is currently 
lacking. It is this framework that will accommodate the need to explicitly and 
emotively evoke normative force to legitimate emancipatory concerns (Heath-
Kelly, 2010, p. 251), because the relative advantages of the academic study of 
terrorism over other forms of enquiry is that tactical questions ‘are best answered 
by experts in face-to-face confrontations.’  
Academics however are relatively better placed to try to understand the most 
fundamental question of why a fellow human being would want to commit an act 
of terrorism in the first place and consider this question with the referent of our 
common humanity in mind. (Booth, 2008, p. 73) Taking an explicit normative 
stance moreover mitigates the exclusionary practices that the suggestion of an 
uninterested, neutral and amoral imply because it forces a conversation on those 
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aspects of social, political and cultural life that the discourse on the failure of the 
definition of terrorism so decidedly shapes and defines.  
In order to understand the subjectively symbolic meaning of the act -  and the 
motivations behind it - and do so with the referent of our common humanity in 
mind, Terrorism Studies must be able to rely on a responsible approach that 
comes to terms with the unbounded nature of the object of knowledge and the 
very real implications thereof for everyday social, political and cultural life. And 
because research into terrorism must recognise that the object of knowledge is 
unbounded and invokes meaningfulness in excess - particularly when it comes 
to questions of morality - Terrorism Studies cannot afford to remain silent on 
questions that go beyond its object of knowledge and claim a universal, 
normatively detached amoral perspective for its production of knowledge but 
must actively seek to engage with the fact that debates over terrorism replicate  
and reify exclusionary practises and define other central aspects of political and 
cultural life, such as questions as to the identity of the enemy, the nature of the 
division between what is public and what is private as well as questions as to the 
nature of violence. Failing to explicitly engage with these questions that are so 
central to lived social realities and social relationships not only continues 
disciplinary fragmentation but further perpetuates exclusionary practises that 
prevent asking more fundamental and emancipatory questions. In other words, 
the attempt to answer the question ‘what leads a person to turn to political 
violence’ that has been declared so central to the study of terrorism, perpetuates 
a research agenda that attempts to locate the ‘root causes’ of terrorism in ‘special’ 
explanations and that not only dismisses the possibility that terrorism may have 
its origins in relatively mundane, every day and seemingly unrelated activities and 
practises that are however more central, and indeed existential in shaping 
political and cultural life and the individual’s position therein, than the focus on 
the decision to ‘take up political violence’ but further that it might be social 
relationships rather than violence that is central to terrorism. First and foremost, 
this chapter has shown that Terrorism Studies lacks a position from which to 
responsibly carve out legitimacy and authority for its expertise. Because, as has 
been further shown in this chapter, terrorism moreover invokes representations 
and assumptions even within the academic study of terrorism, this crucially 
leaves a space to be filled by fantasy and desire without the checks provided by 
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emancipatory truth claims. Terrorism Studies must develop a normative position. 
It is this position that carves out a responsible space to not only develop expertise 
on terrorism but moreover to manoeuvre the unbounded public and political 
discourse that necessarily follows from terrorism as a crucial frame that shapes 
how we relate to one another in diverse, modern societies. Terrorism Studies 
must give recognition to the fact that terrorism functions as a frame to relate to 
these wider issues. Thus far, it does not recognise the subjectivity and 
implications of the unboundedness of the object of knowledge and the real-life 
implications that counterterrorism policies have on individuals caught up in the 
dynamics, which ambiguity, subjectivity and unboundedness facilitate. Terrorism 
Studies must offer its expertise from a normative position on the basis of 
emancipatory truth claims because it is this perspective that can provide for the 
anchor point to confront exclusionary practises that are tragically but intimately 
implicated in terrorism and the manner in which societies relate to these core 
questions. It is these questions that are important to the individuals who make up 
societies, rather than the immediate relationship of terrorism with the state.   
I argue that it must be the responsibility of Terrorism Studies to take on this 
task of normative guidance through the incoherencies and ruptures of modern 
life because, as we will see in the next chapter, the discourse around preventative 
counterterrorism not only relies on academic expertise but crucially relies on an 
invocation of values that lead to the persistence of exclusionary practises. It is 
this context that the next chapter will focus on.  
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3 On the promises of a liberal democracy and the 
politics of counterterrorism 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that the conceptual contestation of 
terrorism and the attempts to delineate terrorism as a bounded object of 
knowledge prevents Terrorism Studies from more responsibly, for explicitly, 
engaging with the questions raised by terrorism. I have argued that the 
conceptualisations thus far preclude an explicit recognition of terrorism as moral 
and meaningful social action. This is the case because the study of terrorism is 
located in the realm of national security and international conflict within 
hegemonic power-relationships delineated by the state as its main point of 
reference. The inability to locate terrorism academically within civil society and 
social relations precludes a more empathetic understanding of the terrorist actor 
as socially embedded. In other words, as terrorism is conceptually always 
implicitly understood within the national security context, terrorist violence 
becomes conceptualised as politically instrumental. This in turn invokes notions 
of an infringement of the state’s monopoly to legitimate violence and is 
considered implicitly morally wrong. It is my contention that this orientation taints 
the analytical ability to empathetically understand an individual’s decision to 
engage in terrorism, because the choice to participate in political violence is a 
choice to engage in something implicitly morally wrong and in opposition to the 
state’s monopoly to force. We have seen however, that the moral status of the 
act is contestable for it is indeed always determined utilising a consequentialist 
reasoning. Due to the unbounded nature of terrorism however, the academic 
inability to understand terrorism as moral and meaningful social action and 
central to the individual’s ability to relate to others socially, moreover precludes 
an empathetic understanding of the actor beyond the confines of academic 
analysis. Epistemologically, Terrorism Studies has yet to redress this moral 
dimension of the unboundedness of its object of knowledge. This need becomes 
particularly striking when looking at preventative counterterrorism approaches 
that heavily rely on civil society for its success.  
Where we have seen that conceptual clarity, neutrality and impartiality 
remains posited as paramount for the analytical study of terrorism (and ultimately 
for understanding motivations of individual actors), this chapter intends to 
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demonstrate how contextually and politically such distinctions cannot be 
maintained. This is precisely because terrorism is an unbounded object of 
knowledge that can and does define how other central aspects of political and 
cultural life take shape. It is precisely because terrorism defines how other 
aspects of political and cultural life take shape, and indeed what values are at 
stake, that this chapter seeks to highlight, with reference to how in Europe, the 
question of radicalisation is seen in the context of the broader social problem of 
integrating Muslim communities and indeed debates on the place of Islam in 
Western nations, It is within the context of this analysis that an argument can be 
made, that it is academically irresponsible and indeed unethical to claim an 
uninterested and neutral analytical position. It is necessary for Terrorism Studies, 
to explicitly embrace the conceptual moral ambiguity and unboundedness of its 
object of knowledge while at the same time contributing to providing ethical aids 
and a moral compass that help in the empathetic understanding of subjectivities, 
In doing so, Terrorism Studies can proactively shape those wider debates that 
terrorism raises and ultimately explicitly confront those wider practises that 
exclude individuals from full and responsible participation in ‘the good life’ of 
society. Such is the moral responsibility of Terrorism Studies that recognises its 
own limitations and reflects such recognition of its unbounded object of 
knowledge in its epistemological commitment and public engagement in the form 
of an explicit normative framework as the position to argue from. 
Nowhere does the impossibility of the claim to uninterested analytical 
neutrality become more apparent than in the context of counterterrorism, for it is 
here where the concept not only becomes operationalised, but moreover where 
academic research lends an air of credibility to policy making. This holds 
particularly true in times where uncertainty has become the new security 
paradigm. (Prins, 2008) Jackson (2015a) for examples contemplates an 
epistemological crisis at the centre of counterterrorism which de Goede (de 
Goede, 2011, p. 9) suggests to drive the imperative that ‘uncertainty and lack of 
knowledge can no longer be regarded as an excuse for inaction in the face of a 
potentially catastrophic threat’ meaning that ‘the counterterrorist must instead act 
upon what is unknown as projected through imagination and fantasy’ (emphasis 
added Jackson, 2015, p. 36) making pre-emption and prevention central pillars 
of counterterrorism policy. 
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While the importance of imagination and fantasy in projecting what is 
unknown will be the focus of the next two chapters, which look at moral 
psychology in general and social psychology mechanisms and cognitive 
heuristics in particular, in an attempt to recognise the limitations in understanding 
another’s motivations and intentions, this chapter takes the example of UK 
counterterrorism in general, and the debates around the PREVENT strand with 
its focus on radicalisation in particular, to demonstrate that the preventative logic 
in counterterrorism practise significantly contributes to wider questions of ‘values’ 
and morality to become central to the manner in which wider society relates to 
the threat of terrorism. It is the intention of this chapter to show that the insistence 
on analytical clarity within Terrorism Studies leaves a space in the imagination of 
the counterterrorism practitioner, politician and citizen which is filled by the 
dynamics of the preventative logic of counterterrorism - and imagination and 
fantasy - that ultimately contributes to (the maintenance of) exclusionary 
practises. Here it will be important to investigate the challenges that so called 
‘home-grown terrorists’ pose, because the issue highlights how the 
understanding that the ’ideology of extremism lies at the root of terrorism’ and is 
‘the centre of gravity of jihadist and radical Islamist movements’ (Rabasa, 2015, 
p. 170-173; p. 28) serves for Europe to see radicalisation and terrorism in the 
context of the broader social problem of the integration of Muslim communities. 
(Rabasa and Benard, 2015, p. 1) Despite having seen in the previous chapter 
that Terrorism Studies does generally not locate terrorism in the context of civil 
society, preventative counterterrorism policy approaches do. This appears to 
miss an important dimension of how societies relate to terrorism in general and 
provides for the impetus to appeal to Terrorism Studies to play an active role in 
normatively guiding societies as engaged social researchers. 
With the focus of preventative counterterrorism practises on the process 
of radicalisation, the notion of extremism and on ideology, it will be shown that 
terrorism does indeed serve to shape how wider questions of cultural and political 
life are being framed and importantly, where and how boundaries are defined and 
contextually experienced. Because there is an inherent tension between the 
necessarily bounded preventative logic of counterterrorism policy that relies on 
relative knowability and the concretely lived experiences of citizens, it is 
individuals who inadvertently, yet negligently, get caught up in the exclusionary 
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tension that lies at the very heart of the preventative counterterrorism approach, 
which is recognised to crucially rely on, indeed its success to depend on, trust, 
openness and dialogue. Concrete policy making needs a fundamental 
awareness, as well as recognition of the core exclusionary tension, which 
preventative counterterrorism policy evokes. The position that this thesis wishes 
to advance is that, it if for the academic field of Terrorism Studies to provide for 
the normative and ethical guidance to responsibly manoeuvre this tension. In 
order to do so, it must provide for a basis, which empathetically recognises the 
essentially unbounded nature of terrorism and thus the contestable, for subjective 
values at the core of the debates and policies on terrorism. 
3.1 The politics of (counter-) terrorism and the need for 
action 
Ugilt argues that terrorism works because it is at its base is about 
potentiality. Terrorism as an empty signifier works  
‘when every train and every airplane and every public gathering is 
experienced as a potential terrorist attack, which is not-occurring’ 
because ‘what concerns us about terrorism are never the actual 
attacks that have already happened, but rather the potential future 
ones.’ (Ugilt, 2012, p. 63, p. 88)  
In other words, the manner, in which we relate to terrorism is always by 
invoking the potential danger of the next attack rather than the actuality of the 
event that has already taken place. The politics of potentiality that follow from the 
perceived need for preventative action in light of the anticipate actualisation of a 
future terrorist event, then becomes the vehicle for relating to the threat (of 
terrorism), for terrorism as an empty signifier after all always marks out ‘an empty 
spot in language where something could have been clearly said, but was not’. 
(Ugilt, 2012, p. 85)  
The politics of potentiality however, are not about reality being confronted 
and an event of reasonable certainty, but about action. Crucial in the logic of 
prevention is that, because of the futurity of the threat, these degrees of certainty 
are entirely manageable. As Ugilt (2012) makes clear, the epistemological 
condition of prevention is one of knowability, in other words, threats that can be 
known, albeit they not need to be known with absolute certainty. The logic of 
prevention is propelled by a notion of relative knowability, which suggests that it 
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is possible to identify and indeed anticipate what constitutes the (non-) 
actualisation of a threat and prevent the actualisation of the event, because 
terrorism precisely marks ‘something that could have been clearly said, but was 
not.’ (Ugilt, 2012, p. 54) When relying on the logic of prevention, the crucial aspect 
then is the manageability of the potential future threat. Albeit not with absolute 
certainty, it becomes about the knowability with relative certainty of future 
potentialities, potentialities that could actualise but may just as well not actualise 
or alternatively even actualise by not taking place. Ugilt concludes, that 
potentiality in this context is ‘never about reality being confronted, but merely 
about (preventative) action filled by imagination.’ (Ugilt, 2012, p. 57) 
Where Ugilt arrives at his conclusion from a metaphysical and indeed 
ontological angle, Jackson (2015a) looks at counterterrorism practices and 
observes analogously an epistemological crisis in counterterrorism that in 
addition to flowing from uncertainty as the new security paradigm - effectively 
mirroring Ugilt’s treatise on the politics of potentiality and relative certainty as its 
concomitant epistemological condition - moreover emphasises the silence on the 
‘gaps in knowledge about the production of terrorism’ (Heath-Kelly, 2012, p. 70) 
and indeed, the ‘politics of anti-knowledge’. (Nichols, 2017, Stampnitzky, 2013, 
p. 194) Jackson points out, that following from the epistemological crisis at the 
centre of counterterrorism most poignantly, is the imperative that ‘uncertainty and 
lack of knowledge can no longer be regarded as an excuse for inaction in the 
face of a potentially catastrophic threat’ (de Goede, 2011, p. 9) meaning that ‘the 
counterterrorist must instead act upon what is unknown as projected through 
imagination and fantasy’ (emphasis added Jackson, 2015, p. 36) making pre-
emption and prevention central pillars of counterterrorism policy. 
The problem however, lies in the fact that the actor and their motivation 
can merely feature in terms that build on taken-for-granted beliefs and confirm 
the observer’s desire and (unconscious) biases, who in himself also reflects 
hegemonic power relationships. Because the terrorist actor engages in an 
activity that appears to lack the immanent feedback whatever is subjectively 
enacted by the terrorists is inaccessible (Zuleika and Douglass, 2008) and 
leaves the gaps to be filled by our - that is the observer’s - imagination and 
fantasy. As the construction of this reality however also reflects hegemonic 
power relationships whereby groups at the margins enjoy little control over 
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the process by which social meanings are assigned, the politics of potentiality 
serve to reify taken-for-granted and privilege, status-quo narratives on 
morality and values, causation and objectivity that contribute to an ever more 
closing public discursive space particularly in an epistemological climate 
where not knowing, rather than encouraging caution or deferral to expertise, 
encourages action. 
It is a further purpose of this chapter, to show how these projections driven 
by imagination and fantasy build on and augment pre-existing exclusionary 
dynamics of hegemonic power relationships that betray the very promises and 
values that become so central in genuinely well-meaning counterterrorism 
discourses and policies. It is this unintended consequence that highlights that 
terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge does indeed contextually 
contribute to the establishment of boundaries and the inadvertent betrayal of the 
promises of the dignity and value of the individual and serves to exemplify how 
counterterrorism policy raises questions more foundational to the identity of 
Western democracies than the apparent questions of national security. Primarily 
however, it is the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate how the preventative 
logic of counterterrorism not only constitutes an unjust, for exclusionary, practise, 
but that it in fact follows from the unbounded nature of terrorism and on untenable 
positivist research methodology. Concrete preventative counterterrorism 
practises contextually show, where and how the boundaries that are defined and 
shaped by terrorism are being drawn and the (counterproductive for exclusionary 
and thus perceptually unjust) experienced consequences this can have. 
3.2 Relating to the threat of terrorism and ‘radicalisation’ 
 Ugilt (2012, p. 53) notes that when acting preventatively, it is the possible 
future formation of a threat that is being acted upon. When terrorism essentially 
becomes about the potentiality of a future event, which may or may not actualise, 
it is no surprise that the notion of radicalisation - as disputed as its utility and 
causal relationship to terrorism may be20 - has received a great deal of attention 
and traction, both in academia and policy circles in an attempt to lend credibility 
and direct preventative counterterrorism efforts. 
                                            
20 see for example (Gill and Horgan, 2014, Horgan, 2012, Horgan 2008). 
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According to Neumann, radicalisation entered the study of terrorism following 
9/11, when it became increasingly difficult to talk about ‘the roots of terrorism’ as 
this was perceived to ‘excuse and justify the killing of innocent civilians.’ (ICSR, 
2008, p. 4) Popularly described, radicalisation is what happens before the bomb 
goes off and is of particular interest for preventative counterterrorism measures, 
because it suggests the knowability and manageability of the origin of the 
actualisation of a terrorist threat.  
However, radicalisation in fact is as contested a concept as terrorism. 
Conceptually, Sedgwick traces the confusion to three distinct yet overlapping 
contexts within which the notion of radicalisation is encountered, namely: national 
security, immigration, and foreign policy. (Sedgwick, 2010) Even though 
thoughtful analysis emphasises, that in the course of history, ‘radicalism’ as a 
concept has changed much of its meaning21 and Pisoiu for example notes that  
‘[...] by looking at the historical emergence and use of radicalism, it 
appears that for a significant period of time, radicalism was very much 
part of ‘regular’ political life. What is more, more often than not, radical 
movements militated for democracy and democratic principles rather 
than against them. Radical ideas referred, among others, to the 
progress and liberation of humankind, based on the principles of 
human rights and democracy’ (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 13-14) 
a more static, status-quo defending understanding has become dominant. 
Sedgwick (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 482) demonstrates that this understanding 
appears to be particularly relevant for policy contexts where ‘mainstream 
political/religious/cultural values’ are being constructed as fixed and the notion of 
extremism has become part of the radicalisation discourse. Extremism is 
distinguished from radicalism in its relative sense by its ideological fixation and 
orientation towards rigid, dogmatic ideological tenets aimed at homogenisation, 
however virtually indistinguishable from radicalism in its absolute sense. It 
becomes clear however, that extremism necessitates an understanding of the 
individual mind-set, a mind-set which crucially however, is inaccessible bar 
deductible by a normative evaluation of a designated relevant activity based on 
goals and means employed. As Schmid (2013, p. 10) suggests, ‘extremists 
generally tend to have inflexible ‘closed minds’, adhering to a simplified mono-
causal interpretation of the world where you are either with them or against them, 
                                            
21 For more in depth perspective of the radicalisation process see: (McCauley and Moskalenko, 
2017, Schmid, 2013, Pisoiu, 2012, Sedgwick 2010, Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009)  
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part of the problem or part of the solution.’ Schmid, after extensively engaging 
with the literature on radicalisation and radicalism for example suggests that  
‘[A]dvocating sweeping political change, based on a conviction that the 
status quo is unacceptable while at the same time a fundamentally 
different alternative appears to be available to the radical; The means 
advocated to bring about the system-transforming radical solution for 
government and society can be non-violent and democratic (through 
persuasion and reform) or violent and non-democratic (through 
coercion and revolution).’ (Schmid, 2013, p. 8)  
Importantly, Rabasa and Benard (2015) observe that Europe see 
radicalisation and (home-grown) terrorism in the context of the broader social 
problem of the integration of Muslim communities. To illustrate this dynamic, this 
chapter will focus - albeit not exclusively for the preventative logic of (counter-) 
terrorism indeed is epistemic - on the context of terrorism in the United Kingdom 
where the concern in relation to the radicalisation of co-citizens in particular 
highlights the exclusionary consequences that the lack of normative commitment 
allows in the light of unboundedness of the object of knowledge. This has 
contributed to a blurred understanding of terrorism as a social problem as well as 
a national-security issue, whereby the ideology of ‘extremism lies at the root of 
terrorism’ and is ‘the centre of gravity of jihadists and radical Islamist movements’. 
(Rabasa, 2015, p. 170-173; p. 28) 
3.2.1 Home-grown terrorists and policy challenges 
This section sketches how relating to the threat of terrorism has 
increasingly become problematically embedded in civil society with the 
conception of the ‘home-grown’ terrorist in a post-9/11 security climate. While the 
event narrative evoked by 9/11 could coherently and persuasively externalise the 
threat as the individuals responsible were Saudi, UAE, Lebanese and Egyptian 
citizens and indeed, as Jackson notes, through the employment of vaguely 
defined and culturally loaded labels and ‘dramatic oppositional binaries such as 
the West versus the Islamic world, extremists versus moderates (…).’ (Jackson, 
2007a, p. 401) no such geographical and compelling externalisation is available 
if the acts of terrorism are perpetrated by co-citizens or those that live amongst 
us. 
 Since the July 7 London underground and bus bombings and the foiled 
liquid bomb plot in 2005 it has been second-generation British Muslims of 
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Pakistani origin that are responsible for the majority of terrorist attacks and foiled 
terrorist plots in Great Britain. All three of the British-born July 7 London 
underground and bus bombers, as well as the transatlantic aircraft liquid bombing 
plot suspects moreover appear to have been well integrated into British society.22 
(Rabasa and Benard, 2015) And the same appears to hold true for the most 
recent perpetrators in of terrorist attacks in London and Manchester respectively. 
(Evans, 2017, BBC, 2017) The individuals responsible were co-citizens and 
constitutive parts of the fabric of a multicultural Britain and similar observations 
can be made across Europe. This is what leads Rabasa and Benard (2015) to 
conclude, that terrorism in Europe is an issue that takes shape within a broader 
context of social policy and integration, while others argue, that it is a too tolerant 
multiculturalism that provides for a safe-haven for violent extremists. (May, 2015, 
Phillips, 2006) 
Indeed, grappling with instances of home-grown terrorism and the inability 
to externalise the threat, have led to a convolution of national security with social 
policy measures, not only in Britain but across Europe.23 Terrorist activity by co-
citizens poses a politically different problem for policy makers as the response 
cannot remain driven by an outward looking foreign policy and increased border 
security as a means to enhance national security. In fact, in an increasingly 
mobile and globalised world, such attempts at externalisation become more and 
more elusive. Oppositional discursive binaries, which made their way into 
academia and policy circles post 9/11, most notably in the notion of ‘Islamic 
terrorism’ (Jackson, 2007a), require much more nuance in a context of a ‘threat 
from within’. With moments of home-grown terrorism, responses to terrorism 
become about the need of precautionary risk-management and the identification 
of potential (future) terrorists (Hörnqvist and Flyghed, 2012) at home. 
As Ugilt (2012) points out, terrorism is about potentiality and prevention 
relies on the manageability of the potential future threat that needs to be 
identifiable with relative certainty. He importantly however cautions, that 
potentiality finds its best expression in being inactive, that is, in the terrorist event 
that is not taking place. It is here, where the threat does not disappear but remains 
                                            
22 For comprehensive profiles of the individuals involved in instances of terrorist plots where 
second-generation British Muslim have been (allegedly) involved see (Rabasa, 2015). 
23 For example, see generally: (El Difranou and Uhlmann, 2015, Hamid, 2015); for the 
Netherlands: (Mondon, 2016, Fowler, 2010, AIVD, 2006). 
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lingering in the background for it always could actualise  - every forgotten 
backpack, raises suspicion, or as Hickman notes, ‘the possibility of a terror attack 
lies in the background everyday reinforced every time someone walks through 
detecting gates.’ (Hickman et al., 2012, p.102) Where Ugilt then comes to 
conclude, that ontologically terror is meaningfulness-in excess, because the word 
or event invokes a nothingness (the potential of a future attack) that actually does 
something (for example, raises suspicion). Importantly however, as long as 
terrorism is conducted by a well-defined enemy, it leaves ordinary lines of 
orientation, and with it knowability as driving the logic of prevention, intact. This 
allows for the manageability of the potential future threat with relative certainty. 
However, with the inability to geographically externalise the threat of 
home-grown terrorism, where the profiles of the individuals responsible give clues 
to these individuals being precisely ‘one of us’ our ordinary, taken-for-granted 
lines of orientation, which have thus far served to relate to or distance from the 
threat of terrorism, deteriorate and new lines of orientation need to be drawn for 
this is the logic behind precautionary risk-management. As Ugilt (2012) 
demonstrates, preventative counterterrorism necessitates that vagueness and 
uncertainty must give way to relative knowability so as to enable precautionary 
risk-management. In the attempt to re-establish lines of orientation, and indeed 
in a move resembling the externalisation of the threat, what can be observed then 
is an acceleration of the move away from multiculturalist approaches24 and a 
renewed confidence in the insistence on our ‘way of life’ as well as a solidification 
of our ‘self-indulgent belief in our own moral, legal and political superiority’ (Ugilt, 
2012, p. 151) towards integrationist-assimilationist policies not only in the United 
Kingdom but across Europe and ‘the West’ more generally with an explicit focus 
on the ideological foundation that is said to lay at the root of violent extremism 
and the process of radicalisation towards terrorism.25 Irresponsible political 
rhetoric then expands the threat to ‘Islamic radicalisation’ leading to terrorist 
violence from a momentary strategic danger to an existential threat to values, 
freedom, and the British/European/Western way of life (Lynch, 2013, Gad, 
2012b), while in the public sphere, terrorism, radicalism and extremism become 
                                            
24 See for example: (BBC. 2011). 
25 See: (May, 2015), and for the lack of evidentiary base regarding the link between ideology can 
radicalisation see for example: (Kundnani, 2015, Horgan, 2015); also critical of the connection 
are (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014). 
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entangled with notions of integration, segregation and multiculturalism. (Lynch, 
2013, p. 2-3) 
The focus on foundational national/Western values on the one hand and  
extremist ideology on the other come to serve as approximations of ‘what goes 
and what doesn’t go in a liberal democracy’ (May, 2015) that provide for a new 
orientation for relative knowability and the suggestion of certainty and 
predictability that once again rests on the construction and drawing of 
boundaries, binaries, clear-cut social, political and religious identities and 
loyalties that have been drawn public authorities and the media, (Awan, 2016a, 
Hickman et al., 2012, p. 102-3) and that have come to form the core of the 
preventative approach of the UK government’s PREVENT counterterrorism 
strand. These crude lines of orientation, as we will see in the next chapter, more 
often than not however rely on cognitive heuristics and unconscious biases that 
rear themselves in the context of the concrete government policy and 
exclusionary practises that remain systematically disguised, which importantly 
are however perceivable from a different standpoint and demonstrate the 
arbitrariness of taken-for-granted values and boundaries. 
3.2.2 Radicalisation and the logic of preventing terrorism 
This section looks at the UK government’s specific emphasis on the pre-
emption and radicalisation and its PREVENT counterterrorism strand. It should 
be noted however, that the UK government is neither in its approach nor in its 
rhetoric unique.26 Rather, the policy-move towards pre-emption rests on a specific 
reading of the academic understanding of the radicalisation process and its 
causal link to terrorism as well as, at its core, the political translation of the notion 
of potentiality at work.  
While the radicalisation process is poorly understood and academically 
highly contested,27 pre-emptive policy approaches are based on supposed 
mechanisms that lead individuals to engage in violent extremist activity where the 
ideological component is crucial. In the current security climate this identifies the 
primary threat to national security stemming from international terrorism (MI5, 
2017), which is understood to be primarily inspired by an ill-reading of Islam. 
                                            
26 See for example Gad (2012b). 
27 See for example: (Horgan, 2012, Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010, Githens-Mazer, 2009, 
Horgan, 2008).  
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(Kundnani, 2015) Central to this policy understanding are models of radicalisation 
that see ideology as a key element in turning people into terrorists as for example 
expressed by the Home Office that holds that  
‘preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremists (and non-
violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology. Prevent will also 
mean intervening to try to stop people moving from extremist groups 
or extremism into terrorist-related activity.’ (Home Office, 2011, p. 23) 
The aim of the PREVENT strategy is clearly preventative in its declared 
goal to ‘stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’ (Home Office, 
2011, p. 6) and forms an integral part of the Government’s four-pronged 
CONTEST counterterrorism strategy. PREVENT ‘draws on counterterrorism 
funding, legislation and on counterterrorism resources’ (Home Office, 2011, p. 24) 
and more recently requires certain statutory bodies to have ‘due regard to the 
need prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’28. The Home Office also 
makes clear that while  
‘Prevent will address all forms of terrorism’ it would also ‘continue to 
prioritise according to the threat they pose to our national security. At 
present, the majority of our resources and efforts will be devote to 
preventing people from joining or supporting Al Qa’ida, its affiliates and 
related groups’ (Office, 2011) and in light of a continuing high threat 
level and the risk posed by individuals who have travelled to areas 
such as Iraq or Syria to ‘stop people travelling overseas to fight for 
terrorist organisations or engage in terrorism-related activity and 
subsequently returning to the UK’ in an attempt to ‘combat the 
underlying ideology that supports terrorism.’(Home Office, 2011, p. 24) 
PREVENT in principle clearly acknowledges the broad ideological 
spectrum of underlying ideologies, which support terrorism. Indeed, it has been 
noted that one third of PREVENT referrals relate to far-right extremism. (Dodd, 
2017) As controversial and indeed complex the link between ideology and 
terrorism might actually be29,  there remains an explicit focus, declaredly driven 
by and reflective of the threat assessment of the independent Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Centre, on ‘Islamist extremism’. This is understood to be the ideology 
that drives Al Qa’ida and its affiliates and is thought to be the cornerstone of its 
recruitment and plays a key role in the radicalisation process. (Home Office, 
2011) The global rise of violent Islamist extremism, most notably observable in 
                                            
28 See: Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 - Part 5. 
29 See for example: (Sageman, 2017, Qureshi, 2017, McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017, 
McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011). 
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the violence of Al Qa’ida and its affiliates and more recently by Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) clearly shapes the government’s framing of its national 
security priority, while the focus on ideology triggers a move away from 
observable violent behavioural characteristics to a more thought and value-based 
approach. 
This value-focused approach manifests in a commitment to ‘counter non-
violent extremism’ and the ‘underlying problem of segregate and isolated 
communities that can provide an environment in which extremism can take root, 
and allow the continuance of illegal violence, cultural practices such as FGM’. 
(National Security Council, 2015, p. 17) Countering violent and non-violent 
extremism is understood as directly linked to countering the terrorist threat the 
UK faces, because even though the government recognises that  
‘[T]here is no single model of radicalisation: the process is unique for 
each individual’ it develops its counter-extremism strategy based on 
an understanding that in general terms three elements present: ’a 
vulnerable person will be introduced to an extremist ideology by a 
radicalising influencer (typically an extremist individual) who in the 
absence of protective factors, such as a supportive network of family 
and friends, or a fulfilling job, draws the vulnerable individual even 
closer to extremism.’ (National Security Council, 2015, p. 21)  
Importantly, the strategy is very clear in its presupposition that 
 ‘Islamist extremists are driven by a core ideological need to overthrow 
the foundations of modern society and rid it of what they perceive to 
be un-Islamic elements, not only non-Muslims, but also Muslims who 
do not conform to their warped interpretation of Islam. There is a clear 
distinction between Islam – a religion followed peacefully by millions – 
and the ideology promoted by Islamist extremists. In order to 
understand and therefore defeat the ideology of Islamist extremists, it 
is important to understand how it draws on and distorts particular 
elements of Islamist thinking.’ (National Security Council, 2015, p. 21)  
The government spends the best part of its counter-extremisms strategy 
elaborating on the Islamist extremism and its ‘warped interpretation of Islam’, and 
while not failing to mention that  
‘extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups use their ideologies to drive 
a core hatred of minorities or to promote Islamophobic or antisemitic 
views’ which can be traced back to ‘ideologies that are typically based 
not the superiority of one racial and religious group to the detriment of 
all others’ (National Security Council, 2015, p. 22)  
this observation lacks in clarity in relation to the establishment of a link 
between the ideology and its incompatibility with Western liberal values such as 
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democracy, the rule of law and equality, which is explicitly acknowledged in 
relation to Islamist extremism. (National Security Council, 2015)  
If we were to phrase this in Ugilt’s terms, it is in the PREVENT policy’s 
understanding of radicalisation where we can observe the logic of prevention and 
relative knowability manifest itself. It is the idea that we can identify ‘drivers of 
radicalisation, the characteristics of people who have been radicalised and who 
have joined terrorist groups, and the specific pathways to support for, and 
participation in, terrorist acts’ (Home Office, 2011, p. 17) Moreover, the belief that 
radicalisation  
‘in this country - is driven by: an ideology that sets Muslims against 
non-Muslims, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim 
community and which both obliges and legitimises violence in its 
defence; (…) and by specific personal vulnerabilities and local factors 
which make the ideology seem both attractive and compelling.’ (Home 
Office, 2011, p. 18)  
While the idea that radicalisation causes violence is highly contested30 and 
John Horgan goes so far as to argue that it is one of the greatest myths in 
terrorism research (quoted by Knefel, 2013), the logic of prevention and relative 
knowability identifies fixtures as starting points to provide lines of orientation in 
the form of radicalising extremist ideologies, spurious processes of radicalisation 
or individual and/or group vulnerabilities upon which a policy of prevention comes 
to rest. Most importantly however, in the focus on Islamist extremist ideology that 
flows from a misreading of the ‘peaceful religion of Islam’, as the environment 
conducive for radicalisation and ultimately terrorism and the recurring invocation 
of British or liberal values in relation to counterterrorism strategies and policy, the 
government fills the empty spot left that is necessarily left by uncertainty as the 
central security paradigm in spite of a recognition that radicalisation is an 
individual process and suggest that it can make knowable, via conformity with 
those abstract values and indeed usually by means of examples of non-
conformity, that which it itself recognises as ubiquitous. 
‘In assessing drivers of and pathways to radicalisation, the line 
between extremism and terrorism is often blurred. Terrorist groups of 
all kinds very often draw upon ideologies which have been developed, 
                                            
30 See for example: (Pisoiu, 2013); for a systematic analysis of processes of radicalisation see: 
McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017, McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014, McCauley and Moskalenko, 
2011, McCauley and Moskalenko); For the ubiquity of the term radicalisation and thus conceptual 
lack of clarity leading to poor analytical categories see: (Sedgwick, 2010). 
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disseminated and popularised by extremist organisation that appear to 
be non-violent (such as groups which neither use violence nor 
specifically and openly endorse its use by others).’ (Home Office, 
2011, p. 19) 
 
Building on this understanding however, and in blurring the line between 
(non-) violent extremism and terrorism and the centrality of ideology understood 
to ’draw on and misrepresents theology’ (Home Office, 2011, p. 20), where a 
‘search for identity, meaning and belonging’ (Home Office, 2011, p. 17) 
corroborated by the 2010 Citizenship survey, leads the Home Office to conclude 
that successful Prevent work depends on developing a ‘sense of belonging to this 
country and on a perception of the importance and legitimacy and integration’, 
(Emphasis added Home Office, 2011, p. 18) the government outlines where it 
draws the line and makes clear that ‘not everything goes’. As much as the 
government reiterates Britain's ‘increasingly inclusive identity’ and points out that 
it is not attempting to securitise the integration strategy, it is explicitly noted that 
PREVENT depends on a successful integration strategy (Home Office, 2011, p. 
24) and it must be noted that, in spite of acknowledging the danger of far-right 
extremism and/or terrorism, the importance of fostering a ‘sense of belonging’ via 
British or liberal values clearly invokes connotations of national identity, which is 
not as inclusive as it makes itself out to be, and which at least fuels the subtext 
that gives credibility to the perception to run counter the inclusion of all types of 
extremism. 
At the same time, it simplifies the complexity of the role of ideology to 
introduce and operationalise binary identity categories and simplistic 
proscriptions of actions and thereby excludes from its understanding a notion that 
ideology may give post-hoc and therefore, consequentialist coherence to a group 
of individuals who already engage in terrorism. As della Porta (2009, 2008) 
argues, radicalisation is a relational and constructed process that is not only 
about beliefs and actions of opposing groups but also about states and their 
responses. Kundnani (2015) emphasises that, religious ideology provides a 
vocabulary and a cohering identity but politics provides the impetus, a possibility 
that is, while not ignored, necessarily omitted from the administrative logic of the 
politics of prevention.  
Problematically, the concept of radicalisation is being employed in three 
different, yet overlapping contexts: the security context, the integration context, 
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and the foreign-policy context. (Sedgwick, 2010) However, the relative 
knowability necessitated by the logic of prevention, requires the complexities and 
nuances for each of these contexts to make way for the relative clarity that the 
concept seems to enable. By providing what appears to be clarity, we have 
politically provided orientation with a focus on abstract conceptions of values, a 
sense of belonging, and national identity that is thought to foster cohesive 
communities where extremism cannot gain hold. By thus providing an interaction 
between taken-for-granted grand social narratives propped by the notion of 
British values and specific analyses of terrorism and terrorist radicalisation, as for 
example the misreading of a peaceful religion, ‘radicalisation becomes a cultural 
construct with an administrative logic’ that ‘focuses on opinions, views and ideas 
which could lead to terrorism.’ (emphasis added Hörnqvist and Flyghed, 2012, p. 
320-321) 
What cannot and does not feature in this logic, for obvious reasons of 
complexity, are the contradictions and ambiguities of modern life that play out in 
the lived realities of actual individual or group of individuals who negotiate their 
identity, subjectivity and sense of belonging with the knowledge (and experience) 
of the workings of the logic of prevention, that relies on oppositional binaries and 
an administrative, yet seemingly clear, understanding of core values to mitigate 
for uncertainty and vagueness of the ‘known unknowns.’ However, this 
administratively suggested relative knowability of who is at risk of being 
radicalised by extremists to commit acts of terrorism, in practise cannot translate 
into anything tangible, for processes of radicalisation are individual, relational and 
multiple and thus far, hardly understood. Administrative front-line staff and the 
public are left to guess, and fill uncertainty with imagination and unconscious 
biases, merely oriented by the unproblematically taken-for-granted clarity of 
shared British values who poses a risk and who does not. While not attempting 
to securitise integration, combining questions of national security with integration 
however, scrutinises differences and inadvertently serves to construct some 
communities as suspect. (Hickman et al., 2012, p. 102) This of course helps the 
state and its policy and security wings to demarcate, or establish lines of 
orientation to identify ‘the enemy’, and serves the important tactical purpose of 
boundary maintenance (Cherney and Murphy, 2016, p. 163) which operates on 
the basis of hegemonic power relationships and exclusionary practises.  
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Such a process of ‘suspectification'31, built upon a preventative logic of 
relative knowability and orientation provided by a preventative policy based on 
‘our’ values, operates with a notion of ‘bounded communities’. In a post 7 July 
2005 climate, where home-grown international terrorism inspired by Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates is identified as the top priority for national security and a renewed 
focus on Islamist extremism in the context of ISIS, this policy discourse serves to 
make knowable and at the same time externalise, via the understanding that what 
makes us ‘us’ is the agreement on our shared values, which of course means that 
those that do not agree on these values, are not ‘us’. 
At the same time, however it reduces individually experienced processes 
of dynamic identity formation and subjectivity to static and implicit grand social 
narratives centred around national security and thereby excludes and/or 
marginalises challenges on the meaning, interpretation and in fact lived 
implementation of abstract values particularly by minorities that do not share or 
share differently, the hegemonic understanding of abstractly defined national 
values. 
In a thus securitised climate, where a general circulation of discourses of 
suspicion is sustained by other social structures and processes in particular the 
media (Cherney and Murphy, 2016, Gillespie, 2016, Hickman et al., 2012, 
Pantazis and Pemberton, 2012, Hickman et al., 2011, Pantazis and Pemberton, 
2009), difference becomes to be viewed with suspicion and a (perceived) lack of 
allegiance to British values and creates a cultural narrative in which extremism is 
thought to be more likely. It is a climate where multiculturalism and questions of 
values and identity are linked to social division and a one-sided demand to 
assimilate to ill-defined British values as a matter of national security. (Kundnani, 
2015, Kundnani, 2009) PREVENT contributes to an atmosphere, where radical 
criticism of political issues and challenges to the hegemonic distribution of power 
have become suspect, (Kundnani, 2009, p. 23) or at least, where this is perceived 
to be the case. (Breen-Smyth, 2014, Lynch, 2013, Mcdonald, 2011) 
Because we can observe how the notion of radicalisation and (non-) 
violent extremism are employed to invoke values and thereby touch upon 
                                            
31 Hickman (2012, p. 93) introduces the concept of ‘suspectification’ to refer to the process of ‘the 
full range of everyday encounters in which an individual might become aware of being 
‘suspected’. See also: (Hickman, 2011). 
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fundamental issues of identity, meaning and a sense of belonging cast as a 
matter of national security and at the same time explicitly refraining from making 
integration the focus of its preventative counterterrorism approach, the 
government appears at best confused, and at worst hypocritical in its preventative 
approach. Integration, via the detour of shared values and their worrisome, for 
deemed security relevant, incompatibility with those espoused via the ideology of 
Islamist extremism becomes, de facto linked to national security. (Vermeulen, 
2014, Extremism Taskforce, 2013, Gad, 2012a) And because values are so very 
central in this preventative counterterrorism approach, the focus on belonging is, 
as will shortly become apparent, at least subjectively perceived as unjust by those 
that bring to the table values that are different from the hegemonic ones already 
available but who nonetheless rely on the promise to equal citizenship 
guaranteed by the open liberal society. 
Overall then, the UK government’s strategies to prevent people from being 
drawn into terrorism in both of its iterations, the PREVENT strategy as well as the 
Counter-Extremism strategy, tie together - via a loosely understood process of 
radicalisation - the national security context with the civil society context of 
integration, which each make different promises to the individual. Thereby 
preventative counterterrorism serves to orient and indeed scrutinise through the 
conformity with abstract values, the individual’s sense of belonging as well as 
complex identity and meaning-giving processes as a matter of national security. 
Paradoxically in this bounded (and indeed hegemonic) understanding of values, 
identity and belonging, is the explicit recognition that any successful preventative 
counterterrorism approach relies on inclusivity (openness), shared values and 
equal partnership, a contradiction that cannot easily be overcome unless 
introspection and self-reflexivity are explicitly encouraged as part of a moral 
learning process. 
3.2.3 Shared values and partnership 
Thus far, we have seen that, as a policy built on the logic of prevention, 
the United Kingdom’s PREVENT strategy, as part of its counterterrorism 
approach, communicates relative knowability via the establishment of lines of 
orientation focused on values in an attempt to identify those on the path towards 
becoming a terrorist, even though the academic and empirical base for this 
communicated knowledge remains spurious and disputed, so much so that 
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Sageman (2013) declared the failure of Terrorism Studies precisely because it 
had made no authoritative progress in answering what leads a person to become 
take up political violence. The academic study of terrorism remains acutely aware 
that there is no singular profile for a terrorist.  The role of ideology as well as 
religion in terrorism remains disputed,32 and the manner in which a person choses 
to become a terrorist is best understood as relational, contextual, and individual. 
Arguably, it is much less coherently expressible than the logic that underlies the 
United Kingdom’s PREVENT strategy, with its focus on a misguided reading of 
theology and its utilisation as a mobilisation tool for terrorist activity, suggests. 
Rather, the attempt to focus on ideology and a misreading of theology scrutinised 
by its compatibility with ‘our shared values’ merely works to suggests that we are 
in a position to distinguish between those that pose a threat to our security and 
those that are respected as equal citizens in spite of their difference and in fact 
demonstrates the driving momentum of potentiality and relative knowability in the 
politics of prevention and counterterrorism which Ugilt describes. 
Not only however, does this reading rest on a tension in between the clarity 
of the identifiability of those that do not share our values and pose a national 
security threat and the ambiguity of identity processes shaped by individualised 
or communal readings of values, but further is it difficult to neatly map and 
disentangle lived experiences of individuals that fall onto the boundaries where 
national security and civil society in the form of the demands placed on integration 
via shared values meet and play out in the course of everyday life.  
Counterterrorism in general, but PREVENT in particular, demonstrates 
that the debates around terrorism indeed stand in lieu of more central questions 
that society asks in relation to belonging, identity, who the enemy is and where 
the line ought to be drawn between that which is public and that which is private, 
and ultimately, that which is political. What we see in PREVET then is the 
contextual manifestation of the core dynamics the lie behind terrorism as a 
reiteration of exclusionary practises that casts abstractly defined values as the 
‘founding stone’ in the proud promotion of British values’. (May, 2015)  
This of course can be perceived as an exclusionary approach because 
those that bring new values, a new understandings of the good life, and new 
priorities for participating in fair recognition of the promise of liberal Western 
                                            
32 See for example: (Francis, 2016, Cottee, 2016, Gottschalk, 2013, Jackson, 2007). 
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societies of the individuals’ dignity which expresses itself amongst many others, 
in being entrusted with the responsibility of shaping our abstractly defined values 
and what ‘regard for the rule of law, participation in and acceptance of democracy, 
equality, free speech and respect for minorities’ concretely mean, rather than via 
the demand for the explicit declaration of loyalties with abstractly conceived 
national values. 
It is in the affirmation of the centrality of dialogue and inclusivity, which is 
repeatedly and emphatically declared in the government’s PREVENT and 
Counter-Extremism strategy - yet, remains empty - that preventing violent 
extremism and community cohesion policies, integration and PREVENT could be 
complementary for cohesive communities free of extremism rely on trust and 
dialogue, that PREVENT could have its greatest strength if only it were to allow 
for a reading that were not to reduce individualised choices to a generalised 
understanding of a radicalisation process that significantly builds on a bounded 
understanding of values as enabling lines of orientation in preventative 
counterterrorism. In other words, if the strategy could navigate uncertainty and 
ambiguity and the toleration of risk. As Zuleika notes, ‘those in charge of 
preventing terrorism are likely to be genuinely concerned, responsible individuals 
acting in what they perceive to be in the best interest of society’. (Zuleika, 2012, 
p. 52) In a climate where uncertainty and lack of concrete knowledge meets the 
omnipresent potential of a terrorist attack, the uncertainty of who, when, where, 
how, and why however makes way for the moral imperative to do something to 
prevent that possibility from materialising, because officials have come to believe 
that society expects them to adopt a zero-risk approach to public safety, 
(Jackson, 2015a) the space for navigating a genuine dialogue and partnership 
are limited, because the motivating logic behind preventative counterterrorism 
approaches revolves around action rather than dialogue. Despite the best 
intentions and a declared commitment to not securitise integration (Home Office, 
2011), the need provide for lines of orientation to enable relative knowability for 
preventative counterterrorism measures and policy making that explicitly focuses 
on abstract national values, will necessarily need to emphasise and securitise 
difference. 
This puts an ontological tension at the very heart of the UK’s preventative 
counterterrorism approach, because ultimately ‘our shared values’ and promise 
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of inclusivity in a national security context leads to a paradoxical need for 
openness for dialogue with ‘the Other’. However the parameters of dialogue are 
rigidly enclosed so as to provide a secure space from ‘the Other’. (Gad, 2012b, 
p. 396) It is however precisely this space, that is meant to be equally shared and 
available to the Other and it is this tension, that of course, is not lost on ‘the Other’. 
It is this abstract paradox of the need for permeability yet closure at the same 
time that is contextually experienced as a disingenuous injustice and indeed a 
broken promise of a liberal Western democracy, for it is the government and 
majority society that unilaterally sets the parameters of what constitutes ‘our 
shared values’ within which openness and closure, and security and insecurity, 
are to be exercised by all citizens, including those of a minority that are de fact 
excluded in the contextual shaping of the meaning of abstractly understood, yet 
hegemonically pre-determined, nationalised values.33 
3.2.3.1 Partnership in defeating extremism and broken promises  
With the political recognition for the need to form ‘new and real 
partnerships’ to defeat extremists, Theresa May reiterates precisely that not 
anything goes in a liberal democracy like Britain but that any strategy to defeat 
extremism rests on the proud promotion of British values by which is understood:  
‘regard for the rule of law, participation in and acceptance of 
democracy, equality, free speech and respect for minorities and 
understood as the foundation for success of a multi-racial, multi-
cultural, multi-religious Britain, for these are the values that unite.’ 
(May, 2015)  
It becomes very clear, that at the heart of this understanding lies on the 
one hand a very distinct and seemingly open conception of what it is that makes 
Britain a successful liberal democracy which emphasises an active commitment 
towards inclusivity, while on the other hand it cannot overcome the boundedness 
of this connection in reiterating that this very inclusivity comes with the 
responsibility of respect for these uniting principles as well as the institutions and 
laws that make such respect possible. What is emblematic in this reading of 
course, is a paradox that calls for inclusivity, openness, partnership and dialogue 
on the one hand, yet on the other hand, pre-defines the principles, and indeed 
                                            
33 Awan (2016b) makes a similar argument for the context of the importance of religious identity 
in France in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks. 
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institutions upon which such a partnership must rest in a liberal democracy like 
Britain. In fact, the very wording of PREVENT 2011 that mentions its reliance on 
a successful integration while at the same time not wishing to securitise 
integration (Home Office, 2011) invokes relative knowability in the form of 
immigration in the context of preventative counterterrorism and precisely fills the 
blank that uncertainty as the new security paradigm had initially occupied. 
Because we now ‘know’ that the primary threat to our national security currently 
stems from international terrorism associated with and influenced by Al Qa’ida 
and more recently ISIS, the official understanding is that ideology that distorts 
religion is the problem34 and indeed lies at the basis of (non-) violent extremism, 
we know, at least roughly where to look, especially in a political climate that is 
more and more polarised, with reductionist tendencies and fringe prejudice 
entering into the mainstream as we will shortly see when we look at the notion of 
the suspect community. 
Consequently then, partnership in the civil society context, as indicated 
by May, remains discursively circumscribed as a security problem, even for those 
with whom dialogue or partnership is sought, there is no place of ‘a-
security’.35  Gad notes that the point the government is making in Denmark for 
example, is to ‘affirmatively include Muslims to avoid their self-radicalising 
exclusion,’ in a similar vein as is argued by the UK government for an inclusive 
society founded upon the proud promotion of British values, as the foundation of 
its fight against extremism. We observe that counterterrorism policy based on 
dialogue, and partnership do de facto end up reconstructing an integration 
narrative (Gad, 2012a), a narrative that has been criticised for being a ‘one-way 
street of Their adjustment to Our ways.’ (Emerek 2003) Similarly, Abbas notes 
that nation states offer minorities negotiated spaces where they are ‘expected to 
adapt to pre-determined sense of belonging.’ (Abbas, 2012, p. 349)  
But this is not a space for radical discourse or critical self-reform of the 
hegemonic majority, because ‘in a context of national security the less than 
                                            
34 A mantra that seems to be reiterated in the rhetoric of politicians in the aftermath of terrorist 
incidents, see for example: (Swinford, 2015a, Wintour, 2011).  
35 See for example: Alamy and Husband (2013), who note government approaches to community 
cohesion and counterterrorism to be mutually contradictory in practice and therefore resulted in 
a breakdown of trust between sections of the British Muslim population and agents of the state. 
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radical other ends up discursively as part of the existential threat to Our identity.’ 
(Gad, 2012a, p. 161) Because even though  
‘less-than-radical Others are relatively de-securitised in comparison 
with the highly securitised radical Other (the terrorist). But they are not 
transferred to a space of ‘a-security’ because ‘we’ have a strategy for 
partnerships with ‘them’ so as to prevent ‘them’ from becoming ‘the 
radical Other.’ (Gad, 2012a, p. 161)  
What happens is that ‘the burden of reforming the Other is moved from 
the shoulders of the Self to the shoulders of the other’, and dialogue and 
partnership become a narrative about the self-reform of the Other’. (Gad, 2012a, 
p. 163) it is a narrative that plays into nationalist, exclusive sentiments and thus, 
while potentially well-intended is mainly ‘theatre’ that is hardly manageable in a 
mediated society. 
The role then for engagement awarded ‘the Other’ in a securitised 
narrative is clear, yet circumscribed, reduced and pre-determined by the 
reference to the proud promotion of shared values, which form the basis for 
engagement in the first place. What is at stake, is not merely partnership for the 
purpose of preventative counterterrorism in a national security context, but 
actually, equal citizenship and the process of negotiating the ambiguity of the 
meaning and content of these shared values and the meaning of citizenship 
within modern civil society.   
This dynamic in turn is not lost on those, whose partnership is sought. 
As Lynch (2013, p. 11) notes, the failure to understand the emergence of fluid 
identities particularly among Muslim youth in the UK as a reaction and 
consequence to both 9/11 and 7/7, the ‘increased use of the label Muslim 
constructs a community to the exclusion of all other aspects of identity which 
situates Islam as a definitive and static identity option and as protective and 
unifying ideology and even identity to be positioned both in opposition to the 
mainstream but also as right to be British and fit in’. Neither is this dynamic lost 
to those, who may, for one reason or another, form the so-called pool of potential 
recruits, because (potential) extremists/radicals/terrorists/ do not exist in a social 
or political vacuum, because in a mediatised environment, ‘meanings meander 
and evolve through a string of staged performances at a variety of interconnected 
settings’ (Hajer, 2009, p. 170) and thus, internal identity politics and external 
identity politics are mediated and negotiated, yet communicated and incorporated 
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with an inadequate clarity that politically glosses over contextual uncertainty and 
ambiguity and with undue focus on action, conceptually fails to address the 
ontological lacuna at the very heart of (counter) terrorism.  
Moreover, what gets lost in this context is not only the complexity of 
identity theory from psychology and sociology, but further the subjectivity of the 
individual at the centre of the debate who acquires, learns, creates, modulates, 
negotiates, rejects, formulates and re-formulates motivations and meanings 
against the background of both, internal and external identity politics. Such a 
superficial approach and understanding has as a consequence the failure to take 
responsibility for and uncouple abstract political integration from the ethical 
integration of groups and subcultures with their own collective identities and fails 
to do justice to all citizens. As Habermas (1994, p. 129-134) stresses, political 
integration is rooted in historical experiences which determine the interpretation 
of constitutional principles and cannot be ethically neutral. These principles 
merely reflect a common horizon of interpretation within which current issues give 
rise to public debate about the citizens’ political self-understanding. However, it 
is thorough a socialisation process in an ascriptive network of cultures and 
traditions of intersubjectively shared contexts of life and experiences that form 
the horizon within which all citizens conduct the ethical-political discourse in 
which they attempt to reach self-understanding. And from a normative point of 
view, the integrity of the individual legal person (the individual citizen) cannot be 
guaranteed without protecting intersubjectively shared experiences and life 
contexts in which the person has been socialised and formed their identity.  
Such an ethical-political discourse necessitates co-existence with equal 
rights and mutual recognition of the different cultural membership that recognises 
members as belonging to ethical communities around different conceptions of the 
good and cannot be independent of an introspective self-critique to take place 
within the majority. Ultimately, if only rhetorically, organising counterterrorism 
around a supposedly shared understanding of shared values, while at the same 
time not creating a space of a-security for Muslims, fails to keep apart political 
and ethical integration, and does injustice to those whose departure from the 
social norm, whose (religious) difference is important to their bearer. (Modood, 
2007, p. 66, Galeotti, 2002 Galeotti, 2002) It is this injustice, embedded in a 
dynamic that current counterterrorism policy and rhetoric fails to navigate, that 
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has rightly been pointed out as not only counter-productive to counterterrorism 
efforts and the battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ but further, is an injustice that 
must be rectified.  
It is here, where I argue that Terrorism Studies has the academic 
responsibility to create the space for a terrorist subjectivity in order to not only 
enable better understanding of an individual involved in the act, but to contribute 
to a more inclusive, self-reflective and emancipated understanding of security 
and society, which will help address the epistemic crisis at the heart of 
counterterrorism that contributes to a flawed policy paradigm and moreover can 
integrate a subject-centred, ontologically deep understanding of terrorism with 
contemporary policy approaches. 
In an attempt to defeat extremism then, the government initially around 
David Cameron and now Theresa May focuses on the proud promotion of British 
values as a key foundation of its counterterrorism strategy. While in rhetoric 
notably vague and ostensibly open and flexible to accommodate a variety of 
interpretations of the values in a multi-religious, multi-cultural Britain, these 
values remain abstract and open to be filled by the hegemonic meaning as 
understood by the majority rather than through self-reforming and self-
questioning partnership with the minority. However, the administrative logic and 
appeal to a lingering nationalistic sentiment and emotions of belonging, 
necessitate - albeit not explicitly - a concretised understanding of not only what 
makes a British value, but further what actual, concrete and practised values are 
‘un-British’, ‘extreme’ or potentially dangerous.   
With an inability to control the meaning of the ‘British values’ from raw 
political rhetoric into concrete and tangible guidance for those charged with 
statutory duties to participate in the governments PREVENT strategy it becomes 
impossible to keep apart the securitised logic of prevention where uncertainties 
become filled by generalised lines of orientation filled by fantasy and desire. It is 
the everyday negotiation of these values in the exercise and negotiation of 
personal and communal identity, and citizenship, propped by fallible cognitive 
biases and heuristics, and integration that, not only in the United Kingdom, 
focuses disproportionately on Muslims. In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo 
attacks in Paris, Prime Minister Cameron went so far as to agree with Culture 
Secretary Sajid Javid, who voiced that ‘the Muslim community has a ‘special 
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burden’ and that it is ‘lazy and wrong’ to say that the attacks have nothing to do 
with Islam, for the perpetrators ‘call themselves Muslim.’ (Swinford, 2015a, 
Swinford, 2015b) Stephen Greer ( 2015, p. 144) asks then, what kind of effective 
counterterrorism measures would not turn Muslims into a securitised community 
if ’any serious law enforcement initiative against jihadi terrorism must necessarily 
focus disproportionately upon some Muslims, since only Muslims (and very few 
at that) are likely to be involved in it.’ 
3.2.3.2 Suspect community, Islamophobia and hegemonic narratives  
Although the institutional creation of a securitised suspect Muslim 
community is disputed, (Greer, 2014, 2010, 2008) particularly with reference to 
an ‘objective, deliberate, state-managed process’ of securitisation, (Greer, 2015, 
p. 400) that is said to have to go beyond a mere social process of 
‘suspectification’, the subjectively experienced, perceived, and felt instances of 
‘being suspect’ have been widely documented.36   
Heath-Kelly (2013) for example observes that, particularly PREVENT’s 
focus on anticipatory risk-management constitutes Muslims as sites of 
interventions and as populations both at risk of becoming radical and potentially 
risky. Mythen et al. (2009, p. 736, 739-740) note, that the discourse of insecurity 
in Britain has defined the British Muslim population ‘en bloc as a risky, suspect 
population’, whereby the ‘perceived ‘riskiness’ operates mundanely as a threat to 
the fabric of predominantly white British culture’ and is experienced as a pressure 
to declare loyalties. Lynch (2013, p. 4) moreover argues that the creation of 
binary, security-driven narratives of in-group and out-group, limits options for 
identity negotiation and flexibility but uses identity interchangeably with loyalty, 
and has contributed to making a Muslim identity ‘a public commodity that now 
features in a top-down security driven policy’ as well as ‘political electioneering’. 
Ragazzi (2016) goes even further and argues, that what can be observed in 
relation to preventative counterterrorism policy in general and PREVENT in 
particular is indeed a ‘securitisation of social policy’ which builds on a future-
oriented managerial conception of policing and a racialised conception of the 
social order. Mythen et al. (2016) then show how the concept of radicalisation 
                                            
36 See for example: (Perice, 2008, Anwar, 2008, Pentazis and Pemberton, 2009, Smyth, 2009, 
McDonald, 2011, Hickman, 2011, Awan, 2012, Hickman, 2012, Lynch, 2013, Breen-Smyth, 2014, 
Vermeulen, 2014, Kudnani, 2015).  
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justifies the logic of ‘indicators’ and ‘signs’ which cannot be anchored in a 
scientific understanding of a radicalisation process. This observation leads 
Ragazzi (2016, p. 9) to conclude that PREVENT establishes official categories of 
suspicion, (…) [that] are bound to produce arbitrary categorisations, orienting 
repressive practices towards racialised categories’.  
At the same time, Mondon and Winter importantly point to the 
hegemonic universalism that renders whiteness invisible and non-racialised and 
a white person who commits and act of terrorism is represented as an individual 
with a biographical, political, and psychological narrative that causally explains 
him or her as a ‘bad apple, aberration, or deviant psychopath, but when ‘a Muslim 
commits an act of terrorism, he or she is seen as representative of the faith and 
community.’ (Winter, 2015) The fact that mainstream politicians suggest, that the 
Muslim community has a ‘special burden’ and that it is ‘lazy and wrong’ to say 
that the attacks have nothing to do with Islam, for the perpetrators ‘call 
themselves Muslim’ (Swinford, 2015a, Swinford, 2015b) not only enables subtle 
forms of Islamophobia but further are reflective of silent hegemonic categories, 
rather than truly arbitrary.  
In this context Mondon, writing of liberal Islamophobia refers to the 
construction of a ‘pseudo-progressive binary and narrative’ that defines  
‘Muslim culture and community as inherently opposed to some of the 
core values espoused in a mythical, essentialised, culturally 
homogenous, superior and enlightened West, or specific western 
nation, based on specific examples where the West embodies 
progress, such as democracy, human rights, free speech, gender and 
sexual equality and rights, and ironically tolerance.’ (Mondon and 
Winter, 2016)  
What is interesting here of course is that in appealing to freedom of 
speech as the accomplishment of Western democracy is utilised by opportunistic 
demagogues as the vehicle to break with taboos and political correctness that 
serves to stigmatise Muslims and Islam. Melanie Phillips for example makes clear 
that  
‘Islamists are exploiting our chronic muddle of well-meaning tolerance 
and political correctness (backed up by the threat of more violence) to 
put Islam on a special - indeed, unique - footing within Britain’ and 
points out that ‘[B]elieving that Islamic terrorism is motivated by an 
ideology which has ‘hijacked’ and distorted Islam, it [the government] 
will not acknowledge the extremism within mainstream Islam itself. 
Defining ‘extremism’ narrowly as supporting violence against Britain, it 
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makes the catastrophic mistake of testing the aim of Islamising Britain 
as an eccentric but unthreatening position and not one to be taken at 
all seriously. (Phillips, 2006, p. viii)’ 
She goes on to warn that Islamism, that is the ‘attempt to take over our 
culture (…) will only be repulsed if Britain once again regains the confidence of 
its own culture, heritage and traditions. And these are based on Christianity.’ 
(Phillips, 2006, p. xvi) Even though Phillips acknowledges that  
‘in the wake of such atrocities [like the 7/7 London Bombings] it is 
certainly important not to demonise an entire community for the 
misdeeds of a few’ (Phillips, 2006, p. 134) 
but follows this by focusing on relying on a distinction between moderate 
and extreme Muslims. In her estimation,  
‘it is unfortunately not so easy to agree that British Muslims are 
overwhelmingly moderate in their views, and that those holding 
extremist views are so small in number as to be statistically 
insignificant’ because ‘if ‘moderation’ includes reasonableness, 
truthfulness and fairness, the reaction by British Muslims to the London 
bombings was not moderate at all. Yes, they condemned the atrocities. 
But in the next breath they denied that these had had anything to do 
with Islam. Thus they not only washed their hands of any communal 
responsibility but - in denying what was a patently obvious truth that 
these attacks were carried out by adherents of Islam in the name of 
Islam - also indicated that they would do nothing to address the roots 
of the problem so as to prevent such things from happening again.’ 
(Phillips, 2006, p. 134)  
While Phillips does appear to ‘moderate’ her own assessment on 
occasion, for example when she acknowledges that  
‘the Muslim community in Britain is extremely diverse, consisting of 
many sub communities with different geographical and cultural 
antecedents and views as well as different positions on the religious 
spectrum. Many British Muslims just want to get on with life and have 
no leanings towards religious extremism, let alone violence.’ (Phillips, 
2006, p. 141) 
she repeatedly concludes that  
‘it would appear that there is something particular to Islamic culture at 
this present time that makes it vulnerable to this kind of extremism (…) 
although many in Britain lean over backwards to deny this, the case 
that the cause lies in the religious culture itself is overwhelming.’ 
(Phillips, 2006, p. 141) 
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For Phillips  
‘[T]he essence of a moderate attitude among a minority is that it is 
prepared to live as a minority, to subscribe to the overarching values 
and institutions of the state while practising its own culture in the 
private sphere. British Muslims, however, are increasingly pushing for 
their culture to be highly visible and given parity in the public sphere’ 
(Phillips, 2006, p. 154)  
and follows this with examples where British institutions commonly 
accommodate the minority demand  
‘for such privileges’ that ‘run counter to the normal relationship 
between British society and its minority groups. While minority groups 
are free to pursue their own customs, they do not expect public 
services available to all to be adapted to their requirements, let alone 
encourage a form of separate development.’ (Phillips, 2006, p. 155)  
Phillips’ very broad understanding of extremism and her focus on the 
particularity of Islamic culture that makes it vulnerable to extremism and at the 
same time pointing towards the preparedness to ‘live as a minority, to subscribe 
to the overarching values and institutions of the state while practising its own 
culture in the private sphere’ (Phillips, 2006, p. 154) as a marker of moderation, 
is not only indicative of what Mondon calls liberal Islamophobia, but more 
importantly is not limited to the political fringes. Lee (2015) for example points 
towards the counter jihad online scene as being comprised of ‘a loose collection 
of parties, organisations and associated pundits and talking heads united by their 
belief that they are witnessing an attempted Islamic takeover of the West. For 
Lee, groups and individuals can be considered ‘part of the counter-jihad scene 
only by their shared ideas and sentiments’. These ideas and sentiment, loosely 
speaking, ‘for the counter-jihad scene, Europe and the United States are under 
threat from an aggressive and politicised Islamic world that is attempting to take 
over Europe through a process of ‘Islamification’ with the eventual aim of 
imposing Sharia law’ does find its way into the mainstream political rhetoric.  
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The government, in putting British values at the heart of tackling extremism, a 
notion that is broadly understood as  
‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including 
democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and 
tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. Extremism also includes calls 
for death of members of the armed force’ (National Security Council, 
2015, p. 9)  
echoes the concerns expressed by the likes of Phillips in that it 
understands ‘extremist activity of any sort’ to ‘create an environment for 
radicalising individuals and could lead them to a pathway towards terrorism.’ 
(Extremism, 2013, p. 1) In addressing the National Security Council, then Prime 
Minister Cameron emphasises that  
‘[F]or too long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to 
our citizens: as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone. It’s 
often meant we have stood neutral between different values. And that’s 
helped foster a narrative of extremism and grievance (…) Freedom of 
speech. Freedom of worship. Democracy. The rule of law. Equal rights 
regardless of race, gender or sexuality. We must say to our citizens: 
this is what defines us as a society. To belong here is to believe in 
these things. And it means confronting head-on the poisonous Islamist 
extremist ideology. Whether they are violent in their means or not, we 
must make it impossible for the extremists to succeed.’ (Home Office 
et al., 2015)  
It is via this combination of British values, a focus on extremism and 
extremist ideology in opposition to said values that liberal Islamophobia finds its 
way into the mainstream political and popular discourse even though it appears 
that the terminological vagueness and meaning of extremism and British values 
has proven to be ‘confusing’ and too difficult to resolve for Parliament to proceed 
with the proposed Counter-Extremism Bill.  
The attempt at legislating a muscular liberalism in the form of a Counter-
Extremism Bill and discursively breaking with established precedent and taboos 
with reference to freedom of speech embodied by the insistence on provocative 
terminology such as ‘radical Islamic terrorism’37 and thereby peddling the ‘clash 
of civilisation and values narrative’ (Mondon, 2015) feeds a hegemonic narrative 
upon which the illiberal type of Islamophobia, that is the type that is ‘closest to 
traditional racism based around exclusivist, essentialist notions and concepts of 
race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and religion, as well as identity itself’ (Mondon 
                                            
37 See: (Toosi, 2017, Dilani, 2017). 
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and Winter, 2016) can and does find cover. However, where liberal Islamophobia 
at least on the surface appears to fall within the confines of what is acceptable in 
the hegemonic discourse, because it can rely on invoking values such as freedom 
of speech, the rule of law or tolerance, illiberal Islamophobia then merely serves 
to delineate the extreme from that which is normalised when liberal Islamophobic 
polemic by public actors that break with taboos is allowed to gain disproportionate 
media visibility.38 At the heart however lies a hegemonic power differential in 
terms of access to public discourse and the capacity of individuals to impact the 
hegemonic narrative. (Mondon, 2016) 
It is the social process as consequences of preventative 
counterterrorism and its manifestation in social policy and public discourse 
therefore, rather than an objectively institutionally orchestrated ‘suspectification’ 
of minority communities, which has been empirically observed. Nonetheless, it  
impacts (disproportionately) on the individual from a minority background for they 
perform their subjectivity in response and ‘anticipation of the expectation of the 
suspector’, for example in form of the performance of ‘safe identities’. (Mythen et 
al., 2009, p. 747) This is problematic because, as Breen-Smyth (2014) observes, 
one does not actually express oneself, but conforms to the construction of one's 
projected community by others. At the same time however, Jarvis and Lister 
emphasise that ‘ordinary’ individuals claim a range of different subject-positions 
even in their effort to make sense of counterterrorism powers and the effects 
thereof; moreover and importantly, many individuals believe that counterterrorism 
powers ‘work to position or identify them as particular types of political, gendered, 
religious or other subjects’ and demonstrate how certain subject positions are co-
constitutive in the counterterrorism-identity discourse (Jarvis and Lister, 2016) 
What remains then is a subjectively perceived and consequently experienced and 
felt pressure to declare loyalties which makes it problematic to relate to an 
undifferentiated construction of a national identity (Lynch, 2013), a need to 
interact with ascriptive identities and conflicting expectations of belonging, loyalty 
and duty as Muslim (McDonald, 2011), an awareness of being depicted as a high-
risk group (Mythen et al, 2009) particularly by the media (Poole, 2011, Poole 
2006) and a feeling that one must stake a claim in the growing Muslim identity 
(Modood, 2007), which leads to a formation of identity that takes place in the 
                                            
38 See: (Dabashi, 2017). 
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context of knowing that one is being perceived as ‘Other’, and/or belonging to a 
‘suspect community’. 
What this process ultimately shows, is an inability of the state to 
independently and authoritatively delimit the space of security. In other words, the 
state in unable to provide a bounded space for security and counterterrorism 
policy sets in motion a dynamic, or theatre, whereby government is necessarily 
incapable to control its perceived meanings and felt consequences. Rather than 
addressing the real problem of terrorism through extending equal citizenship 
through partnerships and dialogue as part of counterterrorism initiatives 
PREVENT shows the irresponsible and short-sighted operationalisation of an 
untenable vagueness, fluidity and uncertainty of ‘British values’ as the benchmark 
against which extremism and radicalisation are to be evaluated. This approach 
misses, rather irresponsibly, real concerns of negative stereotyping and 
Islamophobia, of observed and felt experiences, that are negligently, if silently, 
tolerated by an operationalised vagueness of at the core of the government’s 
understanding of the role of ideology in the radicalisation process and the display 
of ‘British values’ as the indicator and/or sign by which the bureaucratic-
managerial apparatus may decide on the safeness of an expressed identity.  
In attempting to solve the real problem of terrorism however, the 
government must recognise and explicitly address the inherent power differential 
between the hegemonic and minority discourse and take responsibility for its own 
participation in the meandering of meanings that evolve through staged 
performances at a variety of interconnected settings. (Hajer, 2009, p. 170) 
Particularly in light of a preventative logic of counterterrorism, where the 
operational policy-paradigm of relative knowability of the intent to harm us, rests 
on the moral imperative to pre-empt a potentially catastrophic terrorist event, 
whose time, place and perpetrator are unknown, government fails to manage the 
epistemic crisis at the heart of counterterrorism responsibly, but fills the 
ontological blank with hegemonic and racialised categories (Ragazzi, 2016) in an 
attempt to operationalise uncertainty and in the well-meaningly perceived best 
interest of a society confronted with an uncertain threat to its national security.  
Applying Gad’s (2012a) observations for the context of the United 
Kingdom, it seems most compelling to speak of Muslims in Britain as not having 
been awarded a space of a-security, rather than being institutionally suspect. 
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While it can indeed not be argued that the state is responsible of an objective, 
deliberate and managed process of ‘suspectification’, it sets in motion a dynamic 
- a theatre of sorts - that it cannot but fail to responsibly manage in a mediatised, 
socially-negotiated, interconnected and ultimately contested and unbounded 
political arena where government fails to navigate the unboundedness of 
terrorism. What is more, it fails to establish trusting and reflexive, self-reforming 
relationships with all its citizens in recognition of the hegemonic power 
differentials that do exist in a post-migration society like Britain. In other words, 
while the liberal democracy promises the equality of all its citizens, dialogue and 
partnership retreat to bounded lines of orientation in order to manage the threat 
of terrorism in times when national security is dominated by paradigms of 
uncertainty. What follows is preventative risk-management enacted by state 
institutions whose operational logic fails to be able to accommodate for the 
promise of the preservation of human dignity for all citizens in a liberal democracy 
but instead, as Sabir (Sabir, 2017, p. 4) passionately argues, ‘in practise, […] 
dictate the governance of ‘others’ based on essentialised understandings of race, 
gender, and ethnicity’ and the ‘institutionalisation of a policy that claims to be 
about social inclusion and ‘safeguarding’ but is, in practice, disciplining, 
excluding, and preventing individuals from articulating a distinctive Muslim 
agency and identity.’  
3.3 The responsibility to pierce moral bubbles 
 The attraction of co-citizens to (violent) extremism abroad captures the 
attention of those in charge of national security with recurring frequency and 
across different nation states. The concern that vulnerable, impressionable and 
young men and women, and even entire families are attracted to join ISIS and 
their likes in their cause with the potential of returnees waging jihad ‘at home’ 
brings with it the inability to geographically externalise the potential threat of 
violent extremist activism at home and appears to have necessitated a renewed 
scrutiny in focus on the ‘drivers of radicalisation’ in general, and a misguided 
interpretation of Islam, in particular. Augmented by the realities of a civil war and 
refugees (temporarily) settling in Europe, the question as to the place of Islam in 
the West as well as its compatibility with Western values, continues to raise both 
questions of integration as well as national security. It is not unusual for both 
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debates to become conflated. The focus on signs of extremism, ideology and 
British values at least suggests knowability and gives direction in a context where 
national security threats are marked by uncertainty and the dissolution of 
traditional lines of orientation. A seemingly clear-cut, muscular liberalism affirming 
British values provide for a new orientation has been shown to form the 
bureaucratic backbone of the preventative approach of the UK government’s 
PREVENT counterterrorism strand.  
Our ‘shared values’ and inclusivity in a national security context lead to a 
paradoxical situation where we depend on the one hand on openness for 
dialogue with ‘the Other’ to forge partnerships in the fight against extremism and 
misguided ideology, while on the other hand there is a true concern about the 
closure of this dialogue to pre-set parameters in order to secure space from ‘the 
Other’ (Gad, 2012b, p. 396) while this notion of dialogue even though couched 
within a national security context touches the core of civil society relationships 
and equal citizenship. It is this abstract paradox that is contextually experienced 
as disingenuous, hypocritical, exclusionary and ultimately unjust in the light of the 
moral promise to equal citizenship by the liberal democratic state and its 
institutions. Indeed, it is paradigmatic of our own moral embubblement that 
prevents us from recognising and confronting our own exclusionary practises 
while at the same time expressing genuine concern regarding the incompatibility 
with liberal values on the other hand.  
The preventative logic of counterterrorism policy then finds its 
manifestation in addressing the ideological component of radicalisation, that 
‘while not involving actual violence fosters and justifies violence.’ (Rabasa and 
Benard, 2015, p. 174) As extremists and terrorist groups do not exist in a vacuum, 
reaching out to Muslim communities has become a major component of 
European Counter-Radicalisation efforts (Rabasa and Benard, 2015) and 
subscribing to liberal political values has become the qualifying criterion for 
dialogue and partnership. (May, 2015, Home Office, 2011) Where the notion of 
radicalisation touches upon issues of identity, meaning and a sense of belonging 
as a matter of national security, bureaucracy via the concept of radicalisation ties 
together and forms the context within which institutional power relations meet 
individual identity processes, or in other words, where the national security 
context interweaves with civil society relations. Values that form the core of a 
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privately lived identity spill over - via privately exercised and embodied choices - 
into the public realm, become sites of public, collective scrutiny and contestation. 
In a climate, however, where a narrow understanding of security is driven by a 
preventative logic geared not towards knowing, reflexivity or critique but towards 
action, the institutional bureaucracy charged with operationalising the remaining 
vagueness, coloured in by fantasies and imagination, fails to provide, and indeed 
closes a space for equal participation in shaping the meaning of citizenship and 
belonging. 
 The individual’s ‘homing desire’ is shaped in the context of social 
interactions and (institutional) power relations and contemporarily against the 
background of counterterrorism efforts. In such an environment, internal and 
external identity politics, the subjectivity of the individual who acquires, learns, 
creates, modulates, negotiates, rejects, formulates and re-formulates motivations 
and meanings - which must lie at the centre of any analytically sound 
understanding of the motivations of terrorism - gets lost. In attempting to solve 
the real problem of terrorism, it is not only governments who must take 
responsibility for their participation in the meandering of meanings that evolve 
through staged performances at a variety of interconnected settings (Hajer, 2009, 
p. 170), but also academics. Such is the political climate and with a significant 
shift in the development of self-perception of national and European identity as 
based on values rather than race or birth forms the context within which individual 
and collective identity are negotiated and ultimately, individual aspirations and 
motivations, amongst so many others but also the one to participate in violent 
Islamist activism, are formed and formulated. It is for Terrorism Studies, to 
dispassionately investigate the subjectivity of the actor and investigate security 
from the perspective of the individual subject in civil society context rather than 
through the lens of national security. Terrorism and the motivation to participate 
in it, are shaped and take place in individually experienced and lived contexts. 
It is these contexts that give shape to the expression and performance of 
individual subjectivity and instilling a negotiated sense of meaning and belonging 
and ultimately security. This sense of security lies in the confirmation of the moral 
promise of equal rights and dignity in return for a deferral of unique individuality 
that brings into harmony subjectivity with meaning giving narratives of collective 
identities. It is to the moral psychological and philosophical foundations as well 
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as the implications of the failure to live up to this promise that the next two 
chapters will turn, in order to emphasise the responsibility of Terrorism Studies to 
challenge the insisted clarity with which the supposed understanding of either the 
meaning of terrorism or the process that leads to terrorism is communicated, 
because it makes the actual individual and their motivations disappear in all their 
multifaceted manifestations. The more terrorism (its supposed understanding but 
particularly the response to it) takes shape in a policy and social context, the less 
nuanced the individual engaged in it becomes. Messy realities make space for 
clear-cut boundaries and polarities that fail to enable understanding of terrorism 
or individual’s subjective motivations. In this chapter, I have shown that UK 
government’s specific emphasis on preventative counterterrorism measures and 
debates which focus on notions of extremism, beliefs and British values has 
turned its focus on Islam and Muslim communities in the UK, who factually enter 
the spotlight in the pre-emptive policy approach to countering terrorism, through 
a supposed link between a rejection of fundamental British values and 
radicalisation, exacerbated by a discourse around the failure of multiculturalism 
and the question of loyalties of Muslim citizens critical-radical space of dissent is 
closed based on the logic of pre-emption.    
Lived experiences of Muslim individuals as ‘suspect communities’ are 
indicative of the creation of polarised, closed spaces for potential dialogue, 
whereby identity processes are communicated as static and dichotomous and 
lead to the disappearance of subjectivity. Such a limitation of individual 
expression to a publicly sanctioned performance of one’s ascribed identity has 
been shown to not only undermines recognition of equal citizenship for the 
individual and further sanitises and polarises messy realities to such a degree 
that the needed complexity to understand terrorism as a social problem makes 
way for a primacy of a bounded, securitised approach to terrorism understood as 
a threat to national security, with the social dimension of terrorism merely caught 
up in the power dynamics around which the national security threat is 
conceptualised. 
Ultimately, it has become clear that preventative counterterrorism policy 
that takes the promise of equal citizenship rather than national security as its 
point of reference is in a morally stronger and perceptually more genuine position 
to bridge its understanding of terrorism as a security issue with its contextual 
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understanding of terrorism as a social problem, because it is in a position to 
navigate recognition of individual subjectivity and identity on the one hand and 
common ownership for human security considerations on the other. It avoids 
drawing boundaries within society through the creation of bounded spaces within 
which individuals may explore their subjectivity in a politically and socially 
sanctioned manner but invites genuine reflexive dialogue on the constitution, 
interpretation and application of concretely lived shared values. It is for Terrorism 
Studies, to provide for a foundation that enables an understanding of terrorism 
as a social problem and its actor as a socially embedded, cognisant and non-
exceptional subject in order to shift the policy debate in relation to terrorism in 
general and radicalisation as a causal precursor to terrorism in particular. So as 
to enable genuine and open, even radical self-reforming dialogue on the values 
that a society of equals choses to recognise as contributing individually and 
collectively to the common good of that society, while at the same time enabling 
an understanding of terrorism that enables law enforcement and counterterrorism 
to protect all individuals in society. 
Because of these contextual observations, Terrorism Studies must take on 
the responsibility to account not only for the strategic security threat that 
emanates from terrorism, but further from the civil society moral implications that 
the unduly bounded debate on causation, motivations and origins of terrorism has 
for the discussion of wider social values and indeed the place of individuals and 
their lived social, cultural and political realities. Ultimately, Terrorism Studies 
needs to provide aids for policy making to self-reflexively interrogate its own 
exclusionary practises and moral bubbles and consecutively reconcile the 
prevalent discourse on national security with that of the civil society’s moral 
promise of Western liberal democracies and human dignity. It must find a way to 
proactively take responsibility in navigating the intersectionality and interstitial 
position of terrorism and Terrorism Studies must play its part in demonstrating, 
where and how taken-for-granted normative positions stand in the way for truly 
self-reforming dialogue in order to enable moral learning and emancipation. 
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3.4 Conclusion  
Contextually we have seen in this chapter, that a key dimension in the logic 
behind preventative counterterrorism policy and debate has brought to the fore 
very distinctly, a focus on the ideological dimension of terrorism and 
concomitantly on an affirmation of morality and values in an attempt to make 
knowable that which merely exists as a potentiality. Having designated those 
Western liberal values a bulwark against (violent) extremism and terrorism, the 
chapter has shown that at the core of the invocation of values in preventative 
counterterrorism remains the maintenance of a hierarchical citizenship through 
exclusionary practises as to who may shape and challenge those values and 
therefore operates within circumscribed power relationships. It is through the 
example of preventative counterterrorism policy that the chapter has contextually 
shown that the contestation of the concept of terrorism, that takes place in the 
context of national security rather than civil society, does indeed occur in lieu of 
a wider social, cultural and political debate on (national) identity including the 
identity of the enemy, the boundaries between political and private life, and 
ultimately the legitimacy of violence and therefore, it is the argument of this 
chapter that a different conceptualisation of violence as other than instrumental 
can provide the basis for focusing on the function of violence and thereby allow 
a more explicit focus on the manner in which morality becomes invoke to maintain 
exclusionary practises and status-quo assisting explanations of motivations to 
engage in terrorism, because it takes seriously the position that normative 
reasoning invokes a compelling logic and persuasive appeal to greater for 
seemingly deontological authority. 
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4 On the centrality of violence and its socio-moral 
function 
 It is against the background of the observations of the previous chapters, 
that this chapter, with reference to Virtuous Violence Theory (VVT), will establish 
the need to recognise the centrality of moral motivations in social action and 
understand terrorism as a social moral action. A moral psychological 
understanding of the motivations to turn to violence moves beyond the 
instrumentality of violence that lies at the heart of so much of terrorism research. 
This chapter will look at moral psychology generally and Virtuous Violence Theory 
specifically in order locate individual motivations for violent actions in the socio-
moral functions violence serves pertaining to social relationships and their 
predictability. The motivation to utilise violence is not only understood to be a 
moral one, but is furthermore and crucially, intended to function as creation, 
management or dissolution of a particular social relationship. In this context, it 
must be noted that moral psychology points towards a human moral sense that 
motivates individual actions and morality thus understood, is merely descriptive. 
This descriptive moral starting point enables an understanding of the motivations 
for violent action that relates to the social function of violence with regards to 
specific social relationships and must be clearly distinguished from a prescriptive 
morality encountered in moral philosophy.  
This chapter then, aims to demonstrate that moral motivations are crucial 
in understanding motivations to participate in violence in the sense that violence 
fulfils a social function in creating, confirming, altering or ending social 
relationships. Violence initially becomes graspable as common and non-
spectacular and even constructive in human affairs. Virtuous Violence Theory 
allows to place the individual at the centre of the investigation and enables a 
relational understanding of their subjective (and always consequentialist) moral 
motivations to commit acts of violence. It provides for a crucial link between 
merely subjective motivations and the social-relational context within which these 
are formed. Furthermore, it offers a reflexive-relational dimension that helps to 
critically engage with the role of contextual factors and commonly invoked 
‘frames’ such as gender and religion and methodologically forces an empathetic 
engagement with the individual violent actor. 
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For the context of Terrorism Studies, the important take away of this 
chapter will be the understanding that because the individual is motivated by the 
socio-moral function violence serves, this motivation is paramount to 
understanding the terrorist actor. This is the case because it frames the way in 
which she subjectively makes sense of her violence. By firstly, moving away from 
an instrumental to a functional understanding of violence, this chapter provides 
the basis for a purely ethical weighing process in relation to specific ‘goods’ which 
have a social-relational significance for the individual. Invoking moral psychology, 
which stresses the importance of descriptively relating a subjectively enacted, yet 
socially acquired, desire to navigate social relations furthermore enables 
empathy with the individual actor. Such an empathetic approach is paramount 
because it is the foundational basis for a critical engagement with the subjectively 
perceived motives and intentions in relation to the creation, confirmation, 
alteration or end of social relationships that centre on the perspective of the 
individual rather than that of the analyst and make accessible unfamiliar and 
diverse notions of right and wrong thereby learning to recognise the less than 
inevitability of negative moral judgement of particular instances of violence. 
 Secondly, and maybe more importantly for the overall thesis, moving 
away from an instrumental perspective on violence moreover allows to 
analytically relegate rather than conflate questions of moral philosophical valence 
which necessitate an explicitly incorporation of the question of morality in order 
to analyse political violence more critically and reflexively. It further shows 
however, that questions of morality form part and parcel of any social relationship 
and that normative questions are necessarily implied and must be embedded in 
the analysis of social actions. Absent explicit normative theorising, analysis must 
remain intellectually, and as this chapter will show, cognitively, vulnerable and 
incomplete.  
Thus far, this thesis has established, that even though contested with 
regards to what constitutes its specific elements, important to Terrorism Studies 
both in its critical as well as orthodox inclination, is the centrality of (political) 
violence. By means of emphasis, the definitional debate visited in the chapter two 
has demonstrated that violence, provides a crucial anchor point for the study of 
terrorism and hereby particularly the framings of concomitant research foci as 
demonstrated by Sageman’s declared stagnation of Terrorism Studies. We have 
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also seen that Critical Terrorism Studies is quick (and rightly so) in critiquing and 
attempting to rectify the one-sided focus on political violence perpetrated by non-
state actors principally by means of offering expanding the definition of terrorism 
and problematising explicitly interest and ideology driving research agendas. 
With the expansion of what is deemed to be considered as pertaining to political 
violence, and in an interesting move through the inclusion of a special section in 
2015 in Critical Studies on Terrorism of everyday terrorism and intimate partner 
violence (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2015, Sjoberg 2015), spectacular instances of 
political violence however remain the generator of most interest and research 
across the field. Sageman’s (2013) question what leads a person to turn to 
political violence? and the way violence generally and terrorism specifically is 
dealt with in the social sciences maintains an - so this chapter will argue - undue 
focus on the political instrumentality of violence. Through this focus on the 
instrumentality of violence, the means/end relationship of violence becomes the 
central lens for attempting to understand individual motivations. This instrumental 
focus however on the one hand misses how political instrumentality may only 
come as a secondary, that is justificatory step in conscious moral reasoning and 
moreover misses how common violence is in human affairs more generally and 
that it serves a social function and on the other hand that human affairs overall 
are mostly conducted without utilising instrumental violence strictly speaking. 
Moreover, the political instrumentality of violence takes for granted a 
means-end relationship common in the understanding of violence amongst 
political philosophers. Arendt for example emphasises that ‘violence being 
instrumental by nature is rational to the extent that it is effective in reaching the 
end that must justify it.’ (Arendt, 1970, p. 79) It is however the contention of this 
this chapter, that with such a framing, not only do we marginalise the constitutive 
dimension of (non-spectacular) violence but, at the same time the political-
instrumental means-end understanding of violence enables, indeed linguistically 
invokes not only a moralising valence in the form of a clearly consequentialist 
logic whereby particular (political) ends justify the use of violence, but this framing 
also locates the use of violence in the political rather than the civil society realm 
and cannot but be embedded in hegemonic power relationships. What follows 
from an academic perspective is that such a framing facilitates the analytical 
inclusion of selective instances of violence that reflects particular disciplinary 
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understandings of violence, as well as the invocation of a moral position which 
sees violence in ultimate reference to its intended aims within generally set 
constellations of power relationships. For the purpose of the study of terrorism 
this of course also means that because the monopoly of force lies with the state, 
the utilisation of force by anyone but the state and its duly appointed organs, 
becomes morally tainted. 
4.1 The centrality of violence in Terrorism Studies 
From the definitional debate in Terrorism Studies outlined in chapter two, 
we have seen that central, indeed a constitutive feature of the analytical study of 
terrorism is its violence, and most academic energies are being devoted 
explaining its causes and context. It is noteworthy, albeit not surprising, that the 
manner in which violence is conceptualised within Terrorism Studies mirrors the 
approach taken to violence more generally, and as Magnani (2011) notes 
violence is seldom a topic for philosophical enquiry. However, as the 
entanglement of violence with wider questions of morality, the question as to what 
is experienced as violence, the social function of violence and indeed the 
constitution of social relationships more generally, cannot analytically be 
separated from its social, functional and historical context (Erlenbusch, 2014, 
Erlenbusch 2010) the lack of a philosophical perspective on violence has 
implication for the insights generated, but particularly the limitations of these 
insights.  
While it is not my intention to challenge the fact that terrorism constitutes 
a challenge to (peaceful) social relationships and national security per se, the 
argument that I am trying to pursue throughout this thesis relates to the fact that, 
however conceptualised, political violence and terrorism is first and foremost an 
individual’s subjective and moral choice to act in their social world. It is as such 
that the methodological approach to violence for the purpose of Terrorism Studies 
must reflect its, that is the social actions wider moral and social entanglements 
and must provide for an approach that explicitly and responsibly accommodates 
the normative conflation of the analytical conceptualisation of terrorism as a moral 
and social action. In other words, and taking seriously the perspective of Devji 
(2005, p. xvi) who has noted that setting Al-Qaeda’s violence within beliefs and 
practices allows to move ‘beyond narrow concerns of strategy and security’ and 
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Baumann (2013) who points out that disqualifying violence as categorically 
irrational or evil derails an empathetic and socially embedded understanding of 
violence, the argument that this thesis advances relates to the responsibility of 
the academic discipline of Terrorism Studies to enable a deep, empathetic 
understanding of an individual’s decision to utilise terroristic violence and this 
academic responsibility entails the need to explicitly highlight how and where 
imagination and fantasy fill the space that terrorism as an empty signifier leaves 
for the observer. It is the contention of this thesis that an unproblematic invocation 
of morality and the seemingly automatic moralisation of the terrorist act deserves 
special attention because it is this that has been demonstrated to have very 
tangible implications for lived, yet subjectively divergent social realities. 
Despite the recognition of the socially embeddedness of our 
understanding of violence, there appears to be a familiar consensus that central 
to violence is its physicality (Magnani, 2011), for it is its physicality that translates 
into observable and corporeally experienceable effects. At the same time 
however, violence is not a single kind of activity and Magnani (2011, p. 8) 
contends that human beings are ‘prisoners of moral bubbles’ which 
’systematically disguise their violence to themselves’ and as such preclude 
certain actions from being understood and treated as violence in the first place. 
As frames for understanding violence emerges in tandem with its experience and 
‘the frame works both to preclude certain kinds of questions, certain kinds of 
historical inquiries, and to function as a moral justification.’ (Butler, 2006, p. 4-5) 
Indeed, as the experience of violence relates to specific instances of violence, 
and as particularly political philosophy points out, violence is generally addressed 
in relation to the wider workings of authority and power, the conceptualisation of 
violence in terms of means and ends - ultimately of its instrumentality - moves 
the (subjective) experience of violence to a question of its justifiability. (Arendt, 
1970) It is as a consequence of this understanding that the ‘full violent potential 
of structures, artefacts, institutions, cultures, and ideologies is marginalised and 
disregarded.’ (Magnani, 2011, p. 4) Counterterrorism policies as we have seen in 
chapter three become perceived as not only as such violent structures but also 
as reifying exclusionary practises and inherently problematic rather than a merely 
welcome approach to deal with the real problem of terrorism.  
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The systemic disguise of violence is facilitated by a jump where initially 
only certain types of violence are registered as such in the first place, and even 
the remaining visible violence must never be understood as an end in itself. The 
focus shifts from the experience of violence to its moral and indeed moralising 
framing. The implication of this is of particular significance for the study of 
terrorism, the conceptualisation of which, strongly emphasises both the political 
and the violent dimensions. This is reflective of hegemonic power relationships 
that take the state, rather than the socially embedded individual as its point of 
reference and thereby, selectively make visible certain acts as both political and 
violent, while disregarding others.  
4.1.1 Instrumentality of Violence and the privilege of power 
Political philosophy posits violence as first and foremost instrumental 
(Arendt, 1970, Coady 2008), which according to Benjamin (1979) is the 
necessary result of the relationship between violence and the law. 
Conceptualising violence as a means to achieve particular ends results in an 
evaluation of violence with regards to different instances of its use and the just or 
unjust ends being pursued, never however as a judgement of violence itself as a 
principle. Where Benjamin constructs the state as the effect of power through 
legal and legitimate violence (law-creating violence) he demonstrates the 
performative character of violence as the guarantor and reinforcer of power. 
Power becomes the true end of the law. Being the instrument of guaranteeing 
and reinforcing power, the link then between the law - providing for the legitimacy 
of violence - and violence is crucial for it provides the foundation upon which 
rests, not only the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence, but also its guarantee 
of power. Arendt (1970) rightly observes the circularity and short-lived utility of 
violence in establishing power and thus ultimately, its limited instrumental utility.  
As violence (outside the law) threatens power itself however, the law 
disallows violence as a means to achieve individual ends but creates a (non-
violent) system within which these ends can be pursued. (Erlenbusch, 2010, p. 
168-170, Benjamin, 1979) The law curtails individual power. Ultimately then, legal 
violence always plays in the hands of the powerful and becomes ethically hollow 
for being self-referential. Indeed, Baumann (2013) concludes that, from a moral 
philosophical perspective, violence always has to be illegitimate because an 
ethics of violence can never be firmly limited outside the ends pursued. After all, 
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it is the state that practically constructs, at times ad-hoc and ex-post, the 
justification for the exceptions to the laws that limited violence in the first instance. 
In other words, terroristic violence is ethically no different to any other instance of 
violence. However, terroristic violence falls outside the readily available, taken-
for-granted and therefore accepted justification and can be understood only as 
an instance of violence that has no place in politics as conceived from within the 
horizon of hegemonic power relationships.  
As much as we can observe the arbitrary moral condemnation of terroristic 
violence, because ‘violence is constitutive of politics, of thoughts and of 
knowledge because all these practices are based on and justified by moral 
options’ (emphasis added Magnani, 2011, p. 66) the fact remains: if violence is 
always already understood with reference to its instrumentality and activates a 
latent, taken-for-granted notion of morality that privileges the exercise and indeed 
definition of violence by those in power as legitimate for being within the 
framework of the law, experiences of violence that fall outside this framework will 
either conflate the normative and descriptive dimension of violence or 
alternatively mute those experiences that are not understood as violence for they 
do not directly threaten state power. It must however be noted that this does not 
represent an ontological necessity but rather reflects an (arbitrary) choice, the 
arbitrariness of which becomes visible to and through those that utilise violence 
and present alternative justifications for it and thereby disrupt the hegemonic, 
taken-for-granted power relationships.  
4.1.2 The experience of violence 
We have seen that violence emerges in tandem with its experience (Butler, 
2006, p. 4-5), yet the previous section has also highlighted the fact that, 
particularly in political philosophy and political sciences, it is the state’s 
perspective of violence and the instrumental understanding of violence that has 
found its way into Terrorism Studies. As the definition debate presented in chapter 
two has demonstrated, terrorism predominantly is conceptualised with the state 
as its point of reference and instrumental violence as a key analytical feature. 
While the debate on the definition has highlighted the arbitrariness of choice of 
the analytical focus on state violence particularly by proponents of Critical 
Terrorism Studies, the instrumentality of violence has generally not been 
problematised. For the purpose of the study of terrorism, even though the mere 
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terminology of ‘terror’ suggest the importance of the subjectivity of the experience 
of violence, its (political) instrumentality has remained crucial.  
Analytically zooming in directly on the (political) instrumentality of violence 
represents a choice that isolates this dimension’s explanatory importance and 
from there on has the potential to distort the constitutive elements of violence. 
Not only does investigating the individual actor with reference to their merely 
instrumental choice to use violence lead to their isolation from a broader 
explanatory framework of events, but at the same time normatively, the centrality 
of the means-end-relationship of instrumental violence leads to a moralisation of 
the violence. Taken together, these choices lead to an unduly bounded framing 
of political violence in general, and terrorism in particular that fails to address the 
fact that the debates surrounding terrorism stand in lieu of wider cultural and 
political questions that societies are being confronted with including a very 
challenge to the hegemonic distribution of power.  
Be it because of ‘moral bubbles’ that preclude from our view specific 
instances of violence as violence or a preoccupation with the utilitarian, rational 
aspects of violence, descriptively we ‘suffer from crucial blind spots not only about 
what violence signifies or expresses’ (Coker, 2002, p. 6) but also what, how and 
when the individual perpetrator experiences violence. But it is the very experience 
of violence which necessitates to take the individual to the centre of the 
investigation, because it is the individual that experiences herself as the actor, if 
not agent, and alternatively recipient at the centre of subjectively experienced 
and expressed instances of violence that make up the narrative of her life. It is 
these subjective experiences that provide the individual with her place, with her 
choices, with her opportunities within broader events and social relations. It is her 
subjective everyday experiences, the collective and institutional context and the 
frames provided by public narratives, rhetorical commonplaces, and cultural 
frames, that are utilised in the (subjective) construction of knowledge and beliefs 
about political events and violent phenomena (Jackson and Hall, 2016, p. 11) that 
make meaningful for the individual their position and choices within a wider 
framework of social forces, historical events and social relations. 
It is such a narrative, anthropological understanding of violence - and 
understanding that investigates the socio-relational function that violence serves 
- that allows to make visible how various large-scale social forces and incidents 
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of subjective violence, that is violence that constitutes the subject position (Dodd, 
2011), become to be translated into personal experiences that can provide for the 
impetus and opportunity for self-reflection, moral learning and emancipation.  
Moreover, it is such an approach that allows for a radical empathetic, for 
subject-centred, understanding of the motivation to utilise violence that avoids 
(for it explicitly relegates) a priori normative moralising, albeit always recognising 
the dynamics of descriptive, indeed experiential moralisation. If we do not ‘begin 
the story with the experience of violence we suffered’ (emphasis added Butler, 
2006, p. 6), we cannot only begin to see that subjectively perceived instances of 
violence, such as structural violence or verbal interactions, are rarely seen and 
acknowledged as “violent”, but also that actual perpetrators of violence think of 
their actions as morally justified. Indeed, Magnani points out that it is precisely 
through this moral disengagement and moral embubblement that structural 
violence is often seen as morally legitimate. He goes as far as to note that even 
if state agents for example inflict physical or invisible violence on the basis of 
legal and/or moral reasons, these reasons do not cancel the violence perpetrated 
and violence does not have to be condoned; Structural violence then, becomes 
systematically disguised as something other than violence. (Magnani, 2011, p. 
178-182) This moral sense, which needs to be clearly and explicitly distinguished 
from a prescriptive, normative morality, is a distinctive mode of experiencing and 
thinking about any action and is paramount in understanding the individual’s 
motivation to act violently. And it is the attempt to understand this psychological 
dimension of a moral sense, that this chapter now wishes to focus on.  
4.1.2.1 Moral sense, affect and social action 
Social psychologists have come to the insight that, close to it being a 
universal feature in human behaviour, individuals possess a moral sense which 
suggests to themselves what actions and behaviours are morally justified. Haidt 
(2007, p. 998) reiterates the insight from evolutionary psychology and 
emphasises that the building blocks for human morality are emotional - not 
rational - while the ability to engage in conscious moral reasoning (moderated 
through language) came much later. Haidt clarifies the insistence on the 
separation between moral intuition and moral reason to be too stark and he 
suggests a new synthesis in moral psychology - the Social Intuitionist Model. This 
model maintains the primacy of affect-laden, automated evaluative processes of 
  133 
good-bad, like-dislike which happen without the conscious awareness of the 
individual but adds to this the recognition that the engagement in conscious 
verbal reasoning is often influenced by the initial moral intuition and temporally 
only takes place after the affective response has happened. He posits then, that 
conscious moral reasoning when it occurs is ‘usually a post-hoc process in which 
individuals search for evidence to support their initial reaction.’ (Haidt, 2007, p. 
998) He finds evidence for this in studies that show on the one hand nearly instant 
implicit reactions to scenes or stories of moral violations, the fact that these initial 
affective reactions are usually good predictions of moral judgements and 
behaviours and maybe most interestingly, by studies that show that individuals 
can be ‘morally dumbfounded’. In other words, individuals know intuitively that 
something is wrong even when they cannot explain, that is provide processed 
reasons, why this is the case. He reaches the conclusion that conscious moral 
reasoning is a bias-confirming process by incorporating insights of studies that 
demonstrate that people generally begin reasoning by setting out to confirm their 
initial hypothesis while rarely seeking disconfirming evidence and being ‘quite 
good at finding support for whatever they want to believe’. (Haidt, 2007, p. 998) 
Pinker indeed notes that ‘the human moral sense can excuse any atrocity in the 
minds of those who commit it, and it furnishes them with motives for acts of 
violence that bring them no tangible benefit.’ (Pinker, 2011, p. 597, p. 751) 
The moral sense helps us understand why individuals (and indeed groups) 
suggest to themselves, that their actions are morally justified and alternatively 
why someone else’s actions are not. The Social Intuitionist Model helps to make 
sense of the thought processes, which shape human moral reasoning and which 
consequently must find reflection in the understanding of human behaviour. We 
will see in Chapter 5, that this affective primacy does not mean that there is an 
inevitable automatism which translates affect into immediate behaviour and 
action, but rather, in true pursuit of a critical methodology we will point to the fact 
that an understanding of the interaction of the affective primacy with that of moral 
reasoning has the capability of unlocking truly counterintuitive, alternative 
behaviours and motivations. 
However, building on the insight of the affective primacy helps to 
appreciate the tendency to universally moralise behaviours and actions and 
points to the need to recognises the implications of this existence of a distinct 
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mode of thinking about an action; this recognition of course has the consequence 
that moralised modes of thinking about actions become actionable, because they 
operate as intrinsically worthy, justifiable norms and taboos, and upholding them 
becomes paramount for social stability. (Pinker, 2011, p. 753-4) It is thus, that 
conscious and unconscious modes of thinking about an action translate into the 
motivation to act morally as well as the moralisation of action more generally. 
As a consequence of this, it is necessary to move the analytical gaze away 
from the focus on the instrumentality violence per se, and recognise violence as 
ultimately always requiring justification. (Baumann, 2013, Haidt, 2007) In other 
words, because violence always requires justification, we cannot fail but 
recognise the utilitarian dimension in the moralisation that takes place. For it is 
only within the concrete circumstances of lived experiences that the subjective, 
yet universal moral sense in its manifestation as moral intuition, translates into 
the post-hoc requirement for an ethical justification. It is plainly human to remain 
caught up in one’s own moral universe and think of one’s actions as morally 
justified and further, to translate this conviction into utilitarian ethical justifications, 
while at the same time, not recognising them as such. 
The interesting consequence of this is of course, that political intentionality, 
that is the instrumentality of violence even from a psychological perspective, 
becomes purely self-referential and violence becomes the only agglomerating 
feature of an individualised action; an action whose meaning, by its pure exercise 
initially rests with the individual only. This however only lasts for so long until the 
action connects the individual, through the contingency of effects, rather than to 
any core substance (for this core substance is inherently self-referential and 
illusive), to something (a meaning, a framing, an observation) she cannot control. 
It is then the effects, as observed and narrated from the outside, that bind 
individuals together rather than any psychological profile or ideological uniformity 
and arbitrarily determine which relationships, which fault-lines and which 
narratives become activated and implicated (Devji, 2005) and what aspects of an 
individual’s biography are deemed irrelevant. It is also this outside (objective) 
social reality that represents the hegemonic universe of power relationships that 
make the meaning of the act experienceable beyond its (subjective) corporeality. 
It is this insight then that allows to connect violence - as the most visible 
and analytically supposedly most interesting aspect of terrorism - to socially 
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projected, individualised beliefs and practices that thereby, rather than making 
these a means of instrumental politics, turn violence into something ethical 
because it precisely goes beyond any controllable relationship between means 
and end. Devji (2005) notes for the context of Al-Qaeda’s jihad, that  
’while indeed meant to accomplish certain ends, [Al-Qaeda’s actions 
of jihad] have become more ethical than political in nature since they 
have resigned control of their own effects, thus becoming gestures of 
duty […] rather than acts of instrumentality.’ (Devji, 2005, p. 3-4) 
At the same time however, it is moral psychology that encourages a shift 
in perspective, away from the instrumentality of violence to its social function in 
facilitating the ‘living out’ of the moral sense and gives explanatory recognition to 
the fact that people expect their relationships to be regulated violently. Rather 
than exceptionalising violence by normatively dissecting the circumstances, 
actors and victims, moral psychology provides for a route to understand that, 
while inherently moralising, no society defines every day, lived virtue and 
wrongdoings according to abstract normative principles. Indeed, among the six 
factors that Horgan (2008, p. 85) suggests as providing a powerful framework to 
explain the openness to socialisation into terrorism, is the belief in violence 
against the state or its symbols [as] ‘not inherently immoral,’ yet it is this aspect 
that, thus far has received little attention. 
Social psychology then generally, and moral psychology particularly, can 
give important clues not only about this ‘openness to socialisation’ into terrorism 
because here descriptive morality - that is the subjective understanding of one’s 
action as moral - functions to motivate social action. Violent action posited as 
social action is understood in reference to its social reflexivity and ultimately 
social function. It moves social relationships and the person’s awareness of their 
social-relational embeddedness and the concomitant unboundedness of the 
social action to the forefront. Moreover, social psychology can also provide for a 
grounding for the demand for radical empathy. It is surprising that this empathetic 
understanding of terrorist violence as moral social action remains undervalued 
because it is precisely the fact that terrorism is understood as a threat to the fabric 
of social relations that forms the basis for so much of the widening of the ‘soft’ 
counterterrorism related, particularly preventative policy and radicalisation 
discourse - a discourse that forces a focus on the practises of social relations.  
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At the same time, analytically distinguishing between descriptive morality 
as per moral psychology, and normative morality helps to untangle the subjective 
motivation to engage in violence from seemingly unproblematic normative moral 
intuitions that follow from the instrumental use of violence. Positing violence as 
moral social action further recognises the reflexivity of the mental processes that 
guide the motivations of the individual to engage in violent action and allows the 
methodological move towards a closer look at the functional dimension of 
violence in the constitution of social relationships. This overall methodologically 
acknowledges the fact that there is a necessary relationship of dependency 
between the analytical and the normative dimension of concrete instances of 
violence. 
4.2 Descriptive morality, social stability, and violence 
Firstly, conceptualising terroristic violence as moral social action allows to 
envision that violence generally grows out of a relationship between perpetrator, 
victims and third parties. In doing so, it enables a closer look at the make-up and 
basis of conduct for these social relationships the individual aims to regulate 
(violently). Secondly, it enables an investigation into the cultural psychology and 
cultural meanings of violence rather than its instrumentality, and the manner in, 
which these functions to regulate relationships. Thirdly, it recognises that people 
are driven by an inherent moral sense and incorporates in the understanding a 
much-needed reflexivity, as well as emotions and intentions into the individual’s 
decision-making process that give rise to violence. And lastly, it necessitates to 
explicitly relegate the question of normative morality to the question of the 
manner, in which social relationships are understood to be regulated more 
generally and thereby opens the route for an emancipatory approach to terrorism 
on the basis of an existential struggle for recognition at a later stage. It will be 
with reference to Virtuous Violence Theory that the first three aspects will be 
addressed for the remainder of this chapter, while indeed relegating the question 
of prescriptive morality to chapter six. 
4.2.1 Virtuous Violence Theory and Relational Models Theory 
Virtuous Violence Theory is based on the ethnographic observation that 
‘people often judge that to constitute or regulate relationships they are morally 
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required to hurt or kill another person, and that obligation makes local 
sociocultural sense’. The theory proposes that, in the purposeful pursuit of 
violence, ’people are morally motivated to do violence to create, conduct, protect, 
redress, terminate, or mourn social relationships with the victim or with others.’ 
(Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 2-3). The crucial core in attempts to understand violence 
becomes the social constitutive function that violence fulfils in social 
relationships, while at the same time making descriptively moral, that is right and 
therefore, stable social relationship the core point of reference. As Fiske and Rai 
(2015) suggest  
‘[T]he perpetrator is violent to make the relationship right - to make the 
relationship what it ought to be according to his or her cultural 
implementations of universal relational moral principles. That is, most 
violence is morally motivated. Morality is about regulating social 
relationships, and violence is one way to regulate relationships.’ (Fiske 
and Rai, 2015, p. 34)  
In other words, reconceptualising violence as morally motivated enables a 
better description as well as explanation of violent acts, because in ‘culturally 
informed relationships, by killing and by being killed, as well as by being liable to 
be killed or obligated to kill, participants constitute and vividly display their social 
relationships.’ (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 34) They come to this conclusion based 
on their extensive and diverse field observations stretching from war to intimate 
partner violence, that particular practices provide contextual ‘evidence that the 
primary motives for violence are at the same time subjectively moral (…) and also 
moral in the framework of relationship theory, where morality is the regulation or 
constitution of vital social relationships.’ (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 34) Rather than 
proposing that perpetrators chose violence because of a failure to inhibit violent 
impulses or for strictly rational reasons in order to achieve instrumental goals the 
theory suggests, that violence is motivated by morality. (Rai, 2015) 
4.2.1.1 Organising social relationships and the normalcy of violence 
Foundational in understanding an individual’s motivations to act in social 
relationships within Virtuous Violence Theory is the complementarity of actions. 
This means that fundamentally and from a social psychological perspective, an 
individual’s action in a social relationship remains incomplete but for an expected 
congruent action by another participant of the social relationship. In other words, 
the individual anticipates the completion of their action by another actor and 
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motivationally evokes and morally invokes the ‘congruent action that will 
complete or dynamically sustain the joint constructed pattern’ (Fiske and Rai, 
2015, p. 17) of the social relationship. Each participant implicitly or explicitly aims 
to induce the completion of their acts per expectations in relation to the manner, 
in which a particular social relationship ought to be constituted. The participants 
expect the other to do their part, in a predictive manner and evaluate the other’s 
actions according to how well they complete the intended coordination of 
activities of their social relationship. Central to any social relationship is a 
prescriptive model that regulates and motivates the expectation as well as 
evaluation of the complementarity of the participant’s action in any given social 
exchange. 
 Virtuous Violence Theory then proposes that a perpetrator utilises 
violence with the motivation and intention of constituting a social relationship in 
correspondence with a prescriptive model of what that relationship ought to be. 
(Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 17) Rai (2015) for example points to a disperse array of 
instances of violence ranging from public executions, rape, domestic violence, 
honour killings to judicial corporeal punishment and emphasises that in all of 
these cases, perpetrators are using violence to create, conduct, sustain, 
enhance, transform, honour, protect, redress, repair, end and mourn valued 
relationships and think that violence is an acceptable means of making things 
right. This conclusion is based on the extrapolation from the interpolation and 
intuitive folk psychology where informants express not only their understanding 
about the prescriptive morality of ideal beings, but further about their social-
relational motives; the reasoning goes: if the gods do it, everybody (ought to) 
regulate their relationships violently. The purpose of violence and the motivation 
to utilise it, is to sustain a moral order (Rai, 2015) and people feel that it is 
deeply intrinsic to the nature of social beings that they regulate their relationships 
violently. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 53) The moralisation of the exchange in a social 
relationship is founded upon the expected predictability of the completion of the 
participants’ actions in a social relationship and becomes a function of the 
preservation of social stability.  
While the psychologists Haidt and Graham (2007) suggest ‘moral 
foundations’ as the basis for an individual’s behaviour and actions and the 
anthropologist around Shweder (Shweder et al., 1997) has found that moral 
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norms across the world cluster around a small number of themes39, Fisk and Rai 
(Fiske and Rai, 2015) follow relational models theory and organise moral 
concerns - the expectations of how an individual’s action in a social relationship 
ought to be constituted in order for it to complete the action - in a fourfold manner. 
They propose that because an individual’s action has a social meaning as well 
as specific moral function in constituting a social relationship, the way in which 
people conceive of their social relationships, that is the norms and manner in 
which they organise them, prescribes specific moral motives as well as a 
repertoire of available, complementary actions in order to coordinate their social 
activities. People coordinate their social activities by four fundamental relational 
modes: Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, Equality Matching, and Market 
Pricing.  
Each of these relational models suggests a core moral motive that 
motivates the generation, shape, and preservation or dissolution of the social 
relationships. It is this moral motive that lies at the basis of the expectation and 
evaluation of the appropriateness of the complementarity of the action of another 
participant in a social relationship. The core moral motive guiding Communal 
Sharing is unity. People perceive people of the same group as undifferentiated 
and equivalent in salient features while others are not and suggest a sense of in-
group loyalty whereby resources are shared within the group. 
The core moral motive that guides Authority Ranking is hierarchy and is 
directed towards the creation and maintenance of ranking in social groups which 
designates the relative position of individuals in a linear hierarch defined by 
dominance, status, age, gender, size, strength, wealth or precedence. While 
hierarchy comes with entitlements for the superior it also obliges a responsibility 
to protect those subordinates.  
As the name suggests, the moral motive for Equality Matching is equality 
and is utilised by participants of a social relationship in order to keep track of 
                                            
39 Shweder et al. (1997) organise the world’s moral concerns in a threefold way: Autonomy, the 
ethic we recognise in the modern West, assumes that the social world is composed of individuals 
and that the purpose of morality is to allow them to exercise their choice and to protect them from 
harm. The ethics of Community in contrast sees the social world as a collection of tribes, clans, 
families, institutions, guilds and other coalitions, and equates morality with duty respect, loyalty, 
and interdependence. The ethics of Divinity posits that the world is composed of a divine essence 
proportions of which are housed in bodies, and that the purpose of orality is to protect this spirit 
from degradation and contamination. […] The ethics of Divinity lies behind the moralisation of 
disgust and the moralisation of purity and asceticism; See also: (Pinker, 2011). 
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whether they are even. It is directed towards enforcing an even balance and in-
kind reciprocity in social relations and reflects a basis for a sense of fairness.  
Lastly, Market Pricing is morally motivated by proportionality and is 
directed towards calculating and acting in accord with ratios or rates among 
otherwise distinct goods to ensure that reward or punishment for each party are 
proportional to their costs, contributions, efforts, merit or guilt.  (Fiske and Rai, 
2015, p. 18-21) 
Importantly however, we have to note the possibility that, while each 
participant in a social relationship invokes and evokes specific moral motives, 
each participant could be using a different relational model to generate their own 
action, as well as to evaluate the relationship coordination. They therefore could 
perceive their own action as conforming to the anticipated completion of their 
intended action, while perceiving the other participant’s action as incongruent and 
transgressing the core moral motive. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 40) This of course, 
brings with it the potential for conflict.  
Moreover, people tend to have multiple - potentially conflicting - moral 
sentiments which are a result of distinct aspects of their various social 
relationships (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 4, Rai and Fiske, 2011) and each action 
could activate more than just one relational model, once again impacting on the 
implementation of the action and the expected complementarity which in turn 
entails the potential for conflict.40 
While each relational model is driven by a specific moral motive, the 
realisation of the relational model in a given situation necessitates the 
coordination and/or evaluation of any activity in context and with reference to 
other social relationships and their moral motives. The individual requires 
guidelines, which specify which relational model applies, how, with whom, when 
and with respect to what that relational model operates. The actual 
implementation of the relational model must be ‘guided by cultural precedents, 
praxis, prototypes, paradigms, precepts, propositions, prescriptions, 
pronouncements, proverbs and the like’; (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 22) A similar 
                                            
40 The manifestation of this dynamic has been elaborated upon extensively particularly in Social 
Movement Theory see for example: (McAdam et al. 2001, Munson, 2008 Pisoiu, 2012, Pisoiu, 
2015).  
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observation leads Haidt (2007) to conclude that while morality is universal on the 
one hand, it is also culturally variable on the other.  
4.2.1.2 Cultural variability, moral motives and social stability  
At this point, two things need to be emphasised: Firstly, relational models, 
while expressing a universal moral core, do not prescribe and offer a resolution 
as to the individual’s choice of relational model, or the structure of implementing 
it. Relational models are abstract. Relational Models Theory however would be 
of limited use in aiding an understanding of concrete actions and behaviours were 
it not for the explicit recognition that there have to be cultural guidelines that 
specify the modalities of the implementation for a particular context. It is the 
cultural context that provides both, the general expectations about the conduct in 
social relationships as well as the background against which the individual 
interprets which relational model applies, how, with whom, when and with respect 
to what that relational model operates. The moral core actualises through 
respecting or violating a relational model as well as its concomitant cultural 
guidelines rather than through abstract moral norms. This particular aspect will 
be elaborated on shortly to illustrate how individual’s engage in moral reasoning, 
suffice it for now to point out, that generally, moral reasoning is not only a matter 
of getting our premises to be true (that is reasoning in the abstract) but also a 
matter of situating ourselves in our social community. (Edmonds and Warburton, 
2017) 
Secondly, Virtuous Violence Theory emphasises the purposeful pursuit of 
violence in order to make a particular relationship conform with its understood 
core moral motive. From anthropological observations, which substantially 
contributed to the formulation of the theory, we learn that violence (for the most 
part) does not disrupt the moral core of social relationships, because a 
perpetrators’ moral sentiment by and large are consistent with the sentiments and 
judgements of their own cultural communities, however much they may differ from 
those of other cultures. (Rai and Fiske, 2011, p. 11) In the abstract, Magnani 
(2011) points out that morality is not only viscous, that is, infringements upon the 
moral core by individuals do not lead to the collapse of the communities entire 
moral horizon, but rather that individualised infringements can actually serve to 
reinforce the strength of a particular moral conviction of a society and further 
emphasises that our own ‘moral embubblement’ and points out that it is this 
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dynamic that ‘renders invisible and condones both the disengaged morality and 
the related violence.’(Magnani, 2011, p. 178) Of course, importantly this aspect 
illustrates further our previous observations of chapter three in relation to the 
hegemonic universalism and the selective manner in which individual Muslim 
perpetrators of terroristic violence are seen as representatives of the faith and 
community and Muslim communities are seen as representatives and how this 
dynamic sustains liberal Islamophobia. 
While it must be noted that Magnani’s position is primality a moral 
philosophical and normative and prescriptive one and will be revisited as such in 
a later section, his analysis of moral disengagement is helpful in explaining the 
function of cultural contextuality of morality and preos.41 Magnani points out that 
moral disengagement is facilitated through tools like  
‘ideology, religion, convictions, nationalistic commitments, ethnic 
stereotypes’ and often occurs in a reciprocal interplay of personal, 
social, and institutional influences and pressures and concludes that 
moral disengagement ought to be understood as basically a 
reengagement with another morality; (Magnani, 2011, p. 172) 
This he considers to be  
‘favoured by peer modelling and exposure to bad examples. Moral 
mediators of various types, available “out there” in human and artificial 
environments, can serve moral disengagement providing new moral 
justifications and excuses.’ (Magnani, 2011, p. 173)  
Importantly, he points out that people know how much they can allow 
themselves to ‘lose control’ as he puts it and points out that ‘it is not that cultures 
place a positive value on violence but that culture dictates when and where (and 
how much) it is appropriate to lose control.’ He concludes based on insights from 
moral psychology that it is not that a particular setting needs to place a ‘positive 
value on violence’ but can nonetheless encourage violence ‘by making 
appropriate to let oneself go in response to a broad range of provocations.’ 
(Magnani, 2011, p. 174) While I wish to advise caution regarding Magnani’s use 
of the terminology ‘lose control’ and ‘let go’, due to its potential to invoke theories 
                                            
41 Fiske coins the term preos to describe ‘shared indicators for how, when, and with whom to 
coordinate their social interaction. These interactions are universally structured but culturally 
organized; He uses the term ‘preos’ because it ‘takes the form of precedents, prototypes, 
paragons, precepts, propositions, practices, and paradigms’ and could be understood in short to 
be the culturally specific mode to translate a relational model into a concrete and complementary, 
that is culturally appropriate action. (Fiske, 2000, p. 83).  
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explaining violence with a breakdown in morality and the concomitant failure to 
suppress violent impulses,42 the perspective is useful in pointing out the 
relativistic, and indeed utilitarian as well as arbitrary tendency in thinking about 
morality and violence, while at the same time pointing towards ‘tools’ like religion, 
custom and ideology or the individual’s understanding of their position in wider 
social relationships in explaining violence. 
It must be emphasised that these tools are directed at engineering social 
stability. The social relationships that people want to constitute (generally) are 
relationships that are culturally prescribed, ideally prototypical, or traditionally 
precedent, which means that ultimately, they conduct social relationships that 
conform to the local cultural preos. In short, they are relationships that sustain a 
familiar social order, bound and built on morality. Such a community constrains 
the individual and ties her to others, and in doing so creates an entity with shared 
norms about how members ought to behave combined with the means for 
imposing costs on violators and/or channelling benefits to co-operators. 
From an evolutionary perspective, Haidt (2007, p 1000) reminds that 
humans attain extreme group solidarity by forming moral communities within 
which selfishness is punished and virtue is rewarded. Where Haidt emphasises 
with reference to Durkheim (1973), who observed gods to play an important role 
in the formation of such communities and understood religion to provide for a 
unified system of beliefs and practices, he points out that nearly all religions have 
culturally evolved complexes of practices, stories and norms that work together 
to suppress the self and connect people to something beyond the self. Haidt then 
concludes more abstractly, that through the evolution of these communities’ 
reciprocal altruism is extended by indirect reciprocity. That means that virtue, or 
acting within the moral expectations of a particular community, pays by improving 
one’s own reputations and elicits later cooperation from others from that 
community. (Haidt, 2007) From a social evolutionary perspective, we see that the 
communal maintenance of a moral core together with the complementarity of 
action provides the individual with a strong motivation for cooperation (Haidt, 
                                            
42 Note for example the propositions of disinhibition theory), which applied for the context of 
violence suggests that people have violent impulses that are usually held in check but (in 
response to particular stresses) when their moral sense breaks down, or is somehow blocked, 
they give in to violent impulses: (Muraven and Baumeister, 2000, Rai, 2015).  
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2007) with a bounded group demarcated by cultural guidelines which reinforce 
and maintain a stable social order. 
4.2.1.3 Individual at crossroads: group guidelines and ambiguity 
In order for the individual to actualise the abstract moral sense that is 
embodied in a particular relationship model, and to coordinate any aspect of any 
activity or to make any evaluations, the partners in an activity must know how 
precisely and contextually to participate in the interaction. She must know how to 
be part of a community. To successfully - that is morally - participate in the social 
relationship all participants must not only complement the chosen relational 
model of the other but further complement each aspect of the interaction in 
motive, intention, emotions and evaluations, but further do so in accordance with 
the appropriate cultural precedents, praxis, prototypes, paradigms, precepts, 
propositions, prescriptions, pronouncements, and the like. Expectedly this 
abundance of possibilities brings with it the potential for misunderstanding and 
conflict. 
Anthropologists have long pointed out that individual experiences and the 
larger social matrix within which these are embedded can provide a picture of 
how larger-scale social forces come to be translated into personal behaviour and 
choices, because given processes and forces ‘conspire - whether through 
routine, ritual […] to constrain agency.’ (Farmer, 1996, p. 263) Such an 
understanding acknowledges the embeddedness of the individual in social 
relationships and institutions that, explicitly as well as implicitly, act upon the 
individual and therefore, limit their agency. Further support for this perspective 
can be found in Baumeister (1997) who points out that perpetrators of violence 
specifically, do not see things in simple, black-and-white absolutes but perceive 
events as complex and morally ambiguous. While they may well see something 
wrong with what they did, they also see how they were affected by external 
factors, including some that were beyond their control. This is confirmed by Fiske 
and Rai’s ethnographic accounts and reflected in their conception of Virtuous 
Violence Theory. The point is, that morality according to Virtuous Violence Theory 
consists of intentions, motives, emotions, and judgements about realising 
relational models according to cultural preos as the perceiver interprets and 
applies the preos to the situation and violence is morally motivated when the 
perpetrator intends to regulate a relationship in a manner that is congruent with 
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the cultural preos as the perpetrator perceives them. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 
138-139) Crucially, there is nothing about the features of the act that makes them 
right or wrong, but actions acquire their moral qualities when evaluated post-act 
from the perspective of meaningful principles. (Baumeister, 1997, p. 269) In other 
words, while the meaning of the act initially rests with the individual only, by nature 
of the effects of the action, the individual loses control over the determination of 
the meaning of her action and ‘invites’ post-act moral scrutiny from others. 
However, by merely focusing on the act as the unit that determines our moral 
categorisation, we cannot generally detach ourselves from our moralising 
intuitions and engage in the attribution of moral meaning, which is prone to 
confirm pre-existing positions rather than a mere analytical reflection of the act.  
While I will elaborate on particular psychological mechanisms in the next 
chapter, I consider it helpful to briefly preview the insight from cognitive 
psychology. This suggests that cultural narratives are more likely to achieve 
cultural stability if they are characterised by minimal counterintuitive cognitive 
structures, that is they incorporate clear intuitive concepts combined with a 
minority of counterintuitive ones. In other words, the persistence of stereotypical 
representations, myths, rituals, prototypes, paradigms, taboos which critically 
make up the cultural repertoire that provides the cultural preos is explained by 
the ease with which these can be recalled by the individual and the psychological 
relief this effortlessness affords (Norenzayn (2006) as quoted in Magnani, 2011, 
p. 255) and it is this psychological relief that makes religion for example 
cognitively speaking ‘easy’ and thereby crucial in maintaining social stability.  
This insight crucially points towards a demarcation between the 
perceptions of the individual as the actor and those of the group. It moreover 
points to the analytical and communicative limitations of the scholarly observer. 
While the congruence of any act or practice with the preos of a given culture or 
subculture is always more or less ambitious, especially at the margins, within a 
community, religious or otherwise, there is often a fair degree of consensus about 
the morality of particular acts, but not necessarily unanimity - differences in 
perception and perspective are ubiquitous. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 140) This of 
course is not surprising, for we have seen earlier that the purpose of this 
consensus is indeed community building and serves to feed predictability and 
social stability.  
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For Baumeister (1997) ‘evil’ begins when someone crosses a moral line, 
that line however may be fuzzy or unclear, ambiguous or blurred by incomplete 
information. As he points out ‘the luxury of reflection’ is what allows individuals to 
see choices framed in stark moral terms on a high level of abstraction and moral 
principles, however in reality people often find themselves thrust into situations 
that require them to make highly consequential decisions without being afforded 
that luxury. Structures, customs, rituals and the like, aim to minimise ambiguity. 
However, by nature of the sheer complexity of social life these tools merely 
suppress yet never managing to neutralise, ambiguity. It remains for the individual 
who needs to make contextual choices in situations that do not necessarily afford 
her with the luxury of reflection, albeit being firmly embedded in a social order 
with ‘clear’ cultural guidelines to make a decision and act accordingly. Seldom 
however is the analysing scholar equally firmly embedded in that social order and 
it is difficult to analytically do justice to the embeddedness and subjective choices 
that the individual perceives to be moral. Analytical categorisations that invoke 
moral intuitions, limit the methodological empathy available and thereby the 
understanding of the universal humanity and understanding of the motivations of 
the individual, who commits a violent act. It is for this reason that explicit 
normative theorising must be a crucial part of all scholarly endeavours to 
overcome these barriers. 
As much as there is room for free will, as Magnani (2011) puts it, he must 
be acknowledged that morality, as embodied in moral knowledge passed down 
through cultural repertoires, merely permits free will because of the order it 
imposes on the randomness of human behaviour. As he emphasises, ‘moral 
practises protect the ownership of our destinies because ethics renders human 
behaviour more predictable and when we can count on shared values in dealing 
with other ‘moral’ human beings, we can better project our future.’ (Magnani, 
2011, p. 253)  
Of course, here we can observe the interesting parallel of a point that has 
been raised in the previous chapter in relation to the relative knowability in the 
context preventative counterterrorism measures, which was demonstrated to 
invoke values as but one way of coming to terms with uncertainty as the new 
security paradigm. Relative knowability for preventative counterterrorism seems 
reminiscent of both, shared values that make dealings with other human beings 
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more predictable and a recognition of free will. What looking at preventative 
counterterrorism measures has however also shown, was that the conception of 
shared values precisely called into question the compatibility of the different 
perspective on ‘morality’ of those who offer different values and providing the 
opening for hegemonic power struggles to play out in determining the value 
horizon available to constitute the social community. Indeed, here we can see 
affirmed the psychological logic behind shared values as that which makes 
behaviour predictable and enables preventative counterterrorism. This however 
is not to say that this dynamic is strictly speaking rational. 
Albeit Magnani’s being a primarily philosophically motivated perspective, 
it runs analogous and thereby lends credibility to Fiske and Rai’s key motive of 
the complementarity of action, which underlies Virtuous Violence Theory. It must 
be noted, that culture has long been a topic in psychology and sociology, 
influences the manner, in which individual make decisions to act in general, and 
to act violently in particular, for it is the social environment that both limits but also 
liberates the individual in making her decision to act. Furthermore, it is abundantly 
clear that the aim of violence is often to regulate relationships not just with the 
victim but also with others. This leaves us to conclude that we cannot understand 
violence without recognising the meta-relational configuration that morally 
motivate it. Fiske and Rai (2015) speak of meta-relational motivations in an 
attempt to recognise the multitude of, potentially conflicting social relationships, 
that the individual is embedded in. Each of these relationships exercises an 
influence on the perceived expectations of moral conduct on the individual and is 
paramount in understanding mediating influences. At the same time, we must not 
forget that it is not necessary that a particular culture attaches a positive value to 
violence per se. We must recognise however, that culture dictates, when and 
where and how much violence is perceived as appropriate by the individual. It is 
therefore necessary, to make explicit the psychological mechanism, which 
underpin our hegemonic biases, in order to enable an empathetic understanding 
of the action of the individual who commits an act of violence from their frame of 
reference. 
For the purpose of this thesis in particular, we must also note how these 
insights from social psychology provide a framework to make tangible the 
subjective investment of the individual for the context of equal citizenship and the 
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moral promise of a liberal democracy which I referred to in the previous chapter. 
The psychological investment in the moral promise of a liberal democracy and 
equal citizenship can be understood in the context of a distinct moral practises 
upon which the individual relies for the projection of her destinies while at the 
same time reconciling individual free will with the need and interest in social 
stability and predictability. In other words, the individual could be understood to 
defer her individualised desires (that is by making an effort to make her actions 
to be more congruent with that of the community) in return for actualising her 
participation in that community and the concomitant stability and predictability of 
the social order understood to rest on equal citizenship. 
4.2.1.4 Religion as vehicle for individual moral action and social order 
Religion is a complex object of investigation because it constitutes of both, 
ontological beliefs coupled with a set of social and moral implications. Religion is 
not only cognitively easy, because it provides stereotypical representations, 
myths, rituals, prototypes, paradigms, taboos which make up the cultural 
repertoire and are easily recallable. Religion is secularly intertwined with public 
axiological areas of human actions, which determines the actualisation of a 
specific understanding of what constitutes morality and thereby provides a basis 
for predictable and stable social relationships. (Magnani, 2011, p. 237) While 
those two aspects of religion of course can be analysed separately, failure to 
account for both aspects simultaneously clouds the fact that religion works 
beyond its ontological beliefs and indeed is embedded once again in hegemonic 
power-relationships. 
Sociology of religion has, from its onset, emphasised the importance of 
religion as an expression of social cohesion; religion in the definition of Durkheim 
functions ‘to provide a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred 
things, i.e. things set apart and forbidden — beliefs and practices which unite into 
one single moral community (…) all those who adhere to them.’ (Durkheim and 
Fields, 1995, p. 62) This leads Haidt (2007) to extrapolate that humans attain 
extreme group solidarity by forming moral communities more generally where 
selfishness is punished and virtue is rewarded. Haidt notes however, that nearly 
all religions have culturally evolved complexes of practices, stories and norms 
that work together to suppress the self and connect people to something beyond 
the self. In so far as religions carry prescriptive moral views they provide a code 
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how people within the group can expect to be treated;43 however, this moral code 
is not extended, at least not in the same way to others outside the group and their 
actions potentially undermine social cohesion and threaten the group. 
This follows from an understanding of humans as ‘limited access strategic 
agents’ which, in essence, reflects the fact that, because humans do not have the 
ability to discern other’s intention with certainty and because information for a 
relevant social interaction is limited and/or faulty, access to perfect information is 
impossible. Conversely however, gods are ‘full access strategic agents’ and have 
access to all that is needed to make a sound judgement in any particular situation. 
Moral religions conceive of gods as interested parties in moral choices. In this 
way they become the vehicle for the moral code for that society to function as a 
coherent unit. Ultimately, religion not only provides for modes of suppression of 
the self in the form of moral codes, but also affords ‘supernatural oversight’ and 
thereby overall functions as a signal of the willingness to cooperate for and by 
those who share in it. (Magnani, 2011, p. 141, p. 251) 
This understanding of the function of religion has found its way into 
thinking about religion, morality and violence. Religion becomes the vehicle for 
the moral code of a society as well as a signal of willingness to cooperate. Built 
explicitly on explaining the genesis of violence as well as a way of escaping it, 
religion is central in providing ethical knowledge and social learning; moral 
religions, through narratives, metaphors and stories provide scripts for secularise 
moral knowledge and teaching, shaping what is allowed and what is forbidden, 
and providing the individual with a place in the narrative, all with the purpose of 
imposing order on the randomness of human behaviour. (Magnani, 2011, p. 253)  
 Taking religion specifically as an example of preos is a fruitful avenue to 
have highlighted, not only because it provides a tangible example for the 
provision of concrete behavioural guidelines in the realisation of relational models 
through stories, rituals, myths, pronouncements, prescriptions and the like, but 
also because - be it in relation to questions surrounding the role of Islam in the 
West or the role of religion in relation to violence and terrorism - religion assumes 
a new centrality in popular, media and political consciousness in relation to core 
                                            
43 Religion in this sense therefore can be understood as a particular manifestation of the generally 
conceived moral grammar that regulates and orders social relationships of recognition as 
theorised by Honneth (1996). See Chapter 6 of this thesis.. 
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values, sacredness and identity (Griffin, 2012) in contemporary politics. 
Furthermore, in emphasising not only the function of religion in facilitating 
cooperation through providing the individual with a place amongst others and 
encouraging the suppression of the self as virtuous, the fact that an individual 
perceives their deferral of their self as virtuous investment that ought to be 
respected and recognised as such can be made more tangible, because not only 
does it facilitate social stability but moreover conferred respect and/or recognition 
of said deferral enables minimal counterintuitive cognitive feedback affording 
psychological calm. A look at sacred values and taboos in the next section can 
illustrate this aspect further.  
4.2.1.5 Sacred values, taboo, and identity 
One of the most interesting aspects of religion is how it shapes very 
precious relationships with and around that which it designates as sacred.44 
Tetlock et al (1996) define as sacred, a value or resource that ’a moral community 
treats as possessing transcendental significance the precludes comparison, 
trade-offs, or indeed any mingling with secular values’. Following, what Tetlock et 
al describe as a long tradition of thought that suggests that ‘citizens are more 
likely to do what they are supposed to do if they believe the moral codes that 
regulate their lives are not arbitrary social constructions but rather are anchored 
in bedrock values that transcend the whims or mere mortals’, he summarises that 
in spite of a vast variation in the content of what groups hold sacred, sacredness 
qualifies as a functional universal across societies. Moreover, moral communities 
‘erect a variety of psychological and institutional barriers to insulate sacred values 
from secular contamination.’ (Tetlock, 2003, p. 320) 
Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM) (Tetlock et al., 2000) suggests, 
that when sacred values come under secular assault, people struggle to protect 
their private selves and public identities from moral contaminations by the impure 
thoughts and deeds implied by the taboo proposal. The moral outrage that they 
experience reflects the individuals’ commitment to others of the same moral 
community with whom they share the sacred value, by requiring us to even reject 
contemplating that certain values are comparable. Contemplating the trade-off of 
a sacred value is morally corrosive. Moral cleansing refers to the notion that, in 
                                            
44 Note how (Francis, 2016) makes a similar argument for the context of terrorism. 
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face of scared resources and competing values, people are in ‘disturbingly close 
psychological contact with temptations to compromise’ on sacred values which 
impacts on their subjective sense of having betrayed the sacred value and a 
concomitant need to reaffirm solidarity with the moral community. Suggesting that 
people are generally sincere in their commitment to sacred values and their 
protestation of their possible infringement, sacred value protection model 
however also recognises that reality constraints even the most sincere 
commitment to a sacred value and poses decision problems in which the cost of 
upholding a sacred value becomes prohibitive. (Tetlock, 2003, p. 321, Tetlock et 
al., 2000) 
Tetlock et al. make very clear, that the SVPM hinges on cultural specific 
knowledge of what people hold sacred but maintains that functionally, sacredness 
is crucial in understanding individual decision making that does not reflect strictly 
rational-utilitarian, but rather an intuitive-theologian decision-making. 
Interestingly, Francis (2016) also suggests that the concept of non-negotiable or 
‘sacred beliefs’, rather than ‘religion’ could provide for a more fruitful and 
alternative framework when looking at the justifications for terrorism and the role 
that beliefs play in motivations for sacred values can be invoked by both, secular 
as well as religious actors. McCauley (as quoted by Bower, 2016) rightly points 
to the need for clarification as to what counts as a sacred value and why some 
sacred values outweigh others. 
A clue for (not) answering this question may be found in the tension 
between private selves and public identities that Tetlock et al. suggest, lie at the 
core of the sacred value protection model. Indeed, if as McGraw et al. (2003) 
observe that individuals infuse objects with meaning that reflect their relationship 
histories, what counts as a sacred value for the individual and why it outweighs 
one but not another one, would be found in the subjective narrative of the 
individual. Only she can give an indication as to the significance, meaning and 
content of the sacred value, because it is her that defines her own place relative 
to the object. In analogy to the endowment effect, which describes a twist in 
prospect theory, namely that the disutility of losing something is greater than the 
utility of gaining it, it can be argued that sacred values represent an individualised 
emotional investment in a something beyond the individual, which ties the 
individual to a moral community which shares the emotional investment. The 
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individual’s publicly lived commitment to both the sacred value and the moral 
community shape not only her membership in that community but also her 
personal history, experienced present and projected future.45 
It is the difficulty to offset the endowment effect, exemplified by the 
interlacing of private emotional investments with publicly lived membership in 
diverse moral communities that helps to shed light on to the tendency to polarise 
discourse in relation to the public accommodation of hybrid identities. This 
polarity and insensitivity to the emotional investment of individuals in sacred 
values can be experienced in the context of debates around minority treatment 
and rights, be they religious, sexual, ethnic or otherwise. A tendency to focus on 
rational-utilitarian considerations miscalculates, if not dismisses, the intuitive-
theological, emotional investment that individuals make in infusing their live 
histories with relationships made up of various sacred values in the form of public 
institutions, resources, ownership, visibility or participation. It is here where the 
‘private’ yearns for public reconciliation or indeed recognition in order to be able 
to claim participation and ownership of ever expanding moral communities.  
4.2.1.6 Philosophical interjection - constitutive pervertibility of religion  
It is important to point out that religion as a vehicle for descriptive moral 
views also ultimately always substantiates prescriptive morality. Because religion 
offers positive ontological statements about reality, the concomitant instructions 
that regulate behaviour as well as inform moral judgement is derived from the 
commitment to these ontological beliefs. Philosophically it is important to 
emphasise that because religion originally and fundamentally addresses the 
problem of overcoming violence and evil, constitutively acts of faith contain in 
their empirical and historical actualisation their own pervertibility. This follows 
from the fact that, if religion proposes a positive, universal solution to the problem 
of violence, it is still religion that spills over in the reasoning that suggests a ‘good 
way for emancipation’ from violence and evil. (Magnani, 2011, p. 235-262, p. 239) 
This of course has the important implication that it is neither possible to 
speak of religion as just peaceful - and of people who claim to act violently on 
                                            
45 This emotional investment will be revisited in chapter six in relation to the development of 
meaningful relations to the self as well as the existential struggle for recognition, whereby the 
individual defers part of their unique identity traits in anticipation of their sacrifice being understood 
as that and the individual therefore valued as a contributor to a shared communal goal. 
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behalf of a religion as misguided - nor is it possible to speak of religion as just 
violent. Both extremes would miss the philosophical point Magnani is making 
regarding the constitutive pervertibility of religion.  
However, while Magnani points out that religion, by explaining the genesis 
of evil and violence and at the same time providing a way of escaping it, constitute 
the conditions which are inclined to shape the possibilities for conflict that can 
lead to violent outcomes, he also emphasises that every vehicle which 
substantiates morality always opens up by itself both a potential command to 
emancipate from violence and evil and an ineluctable commitment to violence 
and evil. (Magnani, 2011, p. 237) Religion however is unique in the sense that it 
is still fundamental in understanding political and institutional ways adopted by 
Western democracies to regulate seemingly secular interactions between their 
citizens and Others, particularly with respect to their cultural and personal 
identities. While it can be argued that religion generally no longer provides for an 
integral and compelling system of belief or narratively constructed way of life, it 
still provides critical terms, argumentative resources and a bold imaginary, taken-
for-granted and crucially necessary for analysing contemporary culture 
successfully. (Magnani, 2011, p. 219, p. 240-1) 
Even though we have looked at religion as exemplary for its pervertibility, 
the fact that religion is ‘secularly intertwined with the public axiological area of 
human action’ means that any decision that invokes a moral quality - religious or 
otherwise -  by virtue of attempting to address any problem contains within itself 
the potential of its own pervertibility’ (Magnani, 2011, p. 237) for this is its 
philosophical constitutive paradox. The specificity of religion then does not 
primarily come from the constitutive paradox of acts of faith containing within 
themselves the potential for their own pervertibility, but from the fact that religion 
is so central in providing cultural stability and predictability through ethical 
knowledge so as to create the illusion for the individual of control and ownership 
of her destiny in the face of always incomplete and/or imperfect information. This 
of course is augmented by the fact that our cognitive heuristics have evolved in 
such a way to systematically disguise our own moral embubblement. As matter 
of principle, we remain unaware of our own moral embubblement and therefore 
generally do not possess the critical awareness to scrutinise hegemonic power 
relationships and their manifold manifestations. Acknowledging the inherent 
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pervertibility of religion as a representation of any descriptive moral view and the 
relationship to normative judgements, makes explicit and can raise awareness 
for the subjectivity and ambiguity of descriptive moral positions. This bring with it 
not only the potential for conflict, but also the need to resolve it. 
4.3 Getting violence ‘right’ 
Against the narrowly conceived instrumental purpose of violence - that is 
an understanding that violence in the short run can establish power and material 
gain - it must be noted that it does not generally produce lasting positive 
outcomes for the perpetrator.46 It is however such a bounded understanding of 
violence that is central to so much of the conceptual approach that drives the 
study of political violence in general and terrorism in particular, especially in 
attempts to understand motives and intentions of perpetrators. 
Psychologically, culturally and philosophically however, it has been made 
clear that violence is a strategy intended to regulate social relationships in order 
to establish tranquillity and predictability that eases the navigation of social life. It 
is the desire to participate in reputation-based social relationships and the 
individual’s understanding those social relationships are guided by universal 
moral principles that determine the culturally and socially appropriate motive, 
context, implementation and limitations for a violence act as but one relationship 
regulating strategy. As a regulating strategy, not all violence is appropriate and 
cultural psychology theorises that conformation systems are the primary way 
through which people regulate a specific relationship model. A confirmation 
system is a ‘natural, intuitive, especially evocative and binding and is employed 
in interpersonal communication in intrapersonal cognition as a way to represent 
the relational model’. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 252) Fiske and Rai utilise 
Conformation Systems Theory in order to map what purpose a specific act of 
violence serves as a relationship-regulating strategy to understand the specific 
social-relational motive that drives the particular instance of violence. It is through 
                                            
46 Due to the magnitude gap, it does however very much establish negative outcomes for the 
victim. (Baumeister, 1997) Here, the victim suffers losses that are larger compared to the benefits 
of the perpetrator which means that violence is mainly effective in causing the victim to suffer 
seriously and disproportionately. Violence thus is only effective instrumentally, if the goal is 
suffering. 
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conformation systems that they attempt explain what (amount and type of) 
violence is perceived as intuitively right in a particular context. 
Based on the four relational models,⁠ which we have seen to embody four 
core moral motives, the manner through which individuals regulate a relationship 
based on Communal Sharing and unity is consubstantial assimilation which 
operates to ‘by making bodies equivalent, people make themselves socially 
equivalent’ and predict that violence to regulate Communal Sharing relationships 
will ‘focus on the bodily essence of the victim in relation to the bodily essence of 
the person with whom the relationship is being constituted. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, 
p. 253) A relationship based on Authority Ranking and hierarchy is regulated 
through the physics of magnitudes and dimensions, in which relative magnitude 
or order along the dimension corresponds to social rank. Violence in this context 
functions to restore or create hierarchy and rank. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 254) 
Concrete ostensive operations is the manner through which Equality Matching 
and equality is regulated and it is aimed at establishing one-to-one 
correspondence; an act to regulate such an relationship would be expected to be 
a practical demonstration that balance is restored. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 255) 
Lastly, individuals regulate a relationship based on Market Pricing and 
proportionality through arbitrary conventional symbolism because the 
relationship surrounds ratios of distinct goods. Violence as a regulating 
mechanism in this context is particularly interesting because it is removed from 
the individual and becomes impersonal and bureaucratic based on abstraction, 
efficiency, and expected utility. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 257) 
However, this is not to deny the fact that these motives are ideal types and 
that, more often than not, human action is open and multiply motivated. It is 
difficult to discern specific confirmation systems and motives and/or intentions in 
their purity. Being able to point at conformation systems as cognitive 
mechanisms, which provide motives for the regulation of social relationships, 
merely enables a guide to the manner in which the individual’s immediate, affect-
laden emotional responses fit into socio-cultural contexts. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, 
p. 257) This points towards and clarifies that violence - as a strategy adopted to 
regulate a specific relationship - one the one hand is not inevitable, because we 
can become more sensitive to other people and their emotional responses and 
their intentions and motives in a particular context. On the other hand, it clearly 
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allows the conclusion of violence as a morally indifferent social action because 
independent of the perspective of culture or the actors’ perceptions and intentions 
there is nothing about the features of the act as such that give it its moral quality. 
Ultimately, ‘violence is morally motivated when the perpetrator intends the 
violence to regulate a relationship in a manner that is congruent with the cultural 
preos as the perpetrator perceives them.’ (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 139) 
Virtuous Violence Theory builds on the premise that the social 
relationships people want to constitute are generally those that are ‘culturally 
prescribed, ideally prototypical or traditionally precedent’ (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 
141) and proposes violence, that is intended to regulate relationships in 
accordance with a culturally prescribed fashion, as descriptively moral. This 
presupposes a certain degree of consistency and predictability of the types of 
social relationships as well as the manner, in which social relationships are 
established, organised, navigated, and the like. This is the case because within 
Virtuous Violence Theory, the morality of violence stands and falls with the 
individually perceived, yet culturally prescribed and deemed appropriate, 
enactment of motives and intention. But as Fiske and Rai (2015, p. 4, 2011) point 
out, humans typically have ‘multiple conflicting moral sentiments, derived from 
distinct aspects of their social relationships’ and it is difficult for the individual, to 
get their relationship regulation exactly right. Humans, as ‘limited strategic social 
agents’ not only have multiple motives and conflicting sentiments but moreover 
lack full access to information. 
Individuals, as we will shortly see, operate with ‘unknown unknowns’ in the 
form of a systematic disguise of their own cognitive biases and the additional 
fallibility and/or exploitability of their cognitive heuristics, and moreover are 
constantly confronted with incomplete information that make up environmental 
unknowns. After all, modernity forces the individual to experience reality as 
fragmented, ambiguous and ‘liquid’. (Devji, 2005) Modernity robs the individual 
of a ‘psychological terra firma’ (Griffin, 2012, p. 29) and creates mobile citizens 
that inhabit a global society which is no longer defined by their particular tradition, 
culture, or place of origin. As much as Virtuous Violence Theory posits that 
individuals rely on a relatively static cultural preos in order to appropriately create, 
navigate and manage social relationships, modernity renders this relative clarity 
and predictability untenable. This however is not to negate the utility of Virtuous 
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Violence Theory for its intention is ironically primarily to do away with the 
automatism that violence is seen as morally objectionable, but merely to 
emphasise the crucial importance of the individual’s perception of contextual 
circumstances and taken-for-granted mechanisms for relationship regulation. 
Where modernity breaks down cultural cohesion and moral absolutes become 
diluted, Devji (2008) makes the convincing point that the individual can no longer 
participate in instrumental politics of control as she can no longer successfully 
apply and navigate social relationships in accordance with relatively known and 
predictable preos. 
Modernity entails a shift towards the individual, authenticity and ‘the 
subject’ while at the same time, globalisation mediates the local and indeed 
entails the latter with an existentialism that is yet another indication of the 
fragmentation of modern life. Devji (2008, p. 20) for example suggests an 
understanding of Islamic militancy as an instantiation of the manifestation of 
humanity because local histories in a global arena ‘knock against one another to 
find accidental points of contact and construct new trajectories’. Militant acts, he 
explains ‘serve to make humanity manifest’ because they cannot serve a 
conventional political purpose. This follows from his thoughtful elaboration that 
Islamic militancy is too weak to participate in politics of control - and instrumental 
politics conventionally conceived - because there does not exist a proportionate 
relationship between cause and effect or means and end. He mentions for 
example that Al-Qaeda’s jihad lacks intentionality and their violence lacks 
instrumentality, because Al-Qaeda can neither predict nor control the global 
repercussions of their militancy. He concludes, that ‘the actions of this jihad, while 
they are indeed meant to accomplish certain ends, have become more ethical 
than political in nature, since they have resigned control of their own effects, 
becoming gestures of duty or risk rather than acts of instrumentality properly 
speaking’. (Devji, 2005, p. 3-4)  
As the individual - and indeed movements and groups - cannot control the 
effects of their own actions, political action in modernity does no longer allow the 
individual to assume a position where she can anticipate with relative certainty 
the complementarity of her action. Politics become replaced with ethics, that is 
an individualised, subjectively perceived, globally mediated and locally expressed 
sense of virtue and duty, as a way of engaging with a complex, interrelated 
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‘accidental universe’ and to forge social relations through ethical action. This 
triggers a need for a more explicit normative theorising and moral learning that 
can provide the individual with the methodological tools for self-reflexivity and 
critical inquiry to navigate the ambiguities and inconsistencies of modernity. 
Indeed, Devji (2005, p. 19) makes a convincing point in so far as he suggest that 
‘in a landscape of relations that are not determined by causes and intentions, the 
jihad must eschew a politics that would organise people around common beliefs 
or practices (…)’ but rather encourage that such ‘beliefs and practices are given 
over to individual rather than collective examination.’  
It is the centrality of this fragmentation facilitated by the accidentality of 
effects of globalisation that not only depends on, but contributes to, the erosion 
of traditional religious and political allegiances and authorities that forces a 
penetration of the relative tranquillity and stability of social relationships that 
moral bubbles enable. When Baumeister notes that ‘evil begins when someone 
crosses a moral line and may be promoted by anything that tends to make the 
line fuzzy or unclear’ but emphasises, at the same time, that ‘when the line 
between right and wrong is clear, most people will consistently do what is right’ 
(Baumeister, 1997, p. 255), modernity provides for a context within which the 
individual is not securely socially, culturally, temporally or geographically 
embedded but picks and choses from a diverse pool of offerings. Robbed of a 
psychological terra firma, individuals, who are conceptualised as ‘prisoners of 
moral bubbles’, furthermore are permanently exposed to conflicting cognitions 
(Magnani, 2011, p. 178) and anxiety, which stems from the ontological fuzziness 
that modernity entails. (Griffin, 2012) 
It follows, that when we attempt to understand violence, our approach 
must be cautious and empathetic. Cautious, because we can, and must 
understand violence as a descriptively moral social action even when 
instrumental intentionality is professed. Recognising Devji’s insight on the 
fortuitousness of effects and the limitations of political control moreover can lead 
us to a more empathetic approach. This is the case because the individual that 
performs the violent act, is not only a limited strategic access agent whose 
intentions and motives are multiple, complex and potentially conflicting, but also 
because she, like everyone else, is tragically embedded in a moral bubble that 
systematically disguises her violence to herself. This situation contributes to the 
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retreat to moral bubbles and polarities and it is this aspect that the following 
chapter will now turn to. 
4.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I offered an alternative for looking at violence primarily from 
the perspective of its immediate physicality: that is, its relation to the visible 
corporeal consequences. I did this because I suggest a line of argument that 
posits, that it is this perspective that leads Terrorism Studies to focus on questions 
of instrumental rationality and means/end relationships, particularly if Terrorism 
Studies attempts to operate within disciplinary frameworks in which the legitimacy 
of political violence rests with the nation state. We have seen that it is this 
perspective that, even though critiqued by particularly proponents of the Critical 
Terrorism Studies orientation, still dominates the conceptualisation of terrorism, 
within and beyond its academic study. 
This thesis wishes to advance a position for the academic study of 
terrorism that focuses on social relationships, with the ultimate purpose of 
demonstrating that it is from such a starting point that emancipatory research 
becomes possible. I have argued that the preoccupation with the instrumentality 
of violence in the study of terrorism importantly misses its embeddedness in 
hegemonic power-relationships and the socio-moral function of violence and this 
in turn disconnects the individual from the central desire of participating in and 
shaping of social relationships as the motivation to use violence. With reference 
to Virtuous Violence Theory, I could suggest, not only that violence is central in 
regulating and manoeuvring social relationships, but furthermore that the 
individual is motivated to utilise violence because she subjectively perceives 
violence to be the appropriate, socially-sanctioned and therefore descriptively 
moral mechanism for the particular instance of relationship regulation. Therefore, 
it was possible to conclude that the violent act in itself does not possess an 
inherent moral quality, but rather leads us to conclude that ‘violence is morally 
motivated when the perpetrator intends the violence to regulate a relationship in 
a manner that is congruent with the cultural preos as the perpetrator perceives 
them’. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 139)  
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5 On the tragic of moral bubbles and the persistence of 
exclusionary practises 
It is the purpose of this chapter to highlight the tragic limitations in the form 
of fallacious cognitive heuristics and social practises, which inhibit precisely the 
fully actualised empathetic perspective-taking and the pursuit of emancipatory 
truth claims. This will be done by firstly showing that violence can become 
selectively disguised by cognitive heuristics that function to process information 
efficiently, but in doing so serve to sustain the stability of an individual’s subjective 
reality to minimise cognitive effort and psychological discomfort. Secondly, the 
chapter will show how these heuristics manifest socially in the form of myths, 
narratives and ideology and can thereby fall prey to exploitation when combined 
with specific power interests that ‘help’ the individual to locate their subjective 
reality in a wider social reality. Thirdly, this chapter will illustrate how these 
mechanisms and dynamics manifest with reference to the Islamist radicalisation 
process. Lastly, this chapter will elaborate on the political manifestation of 
exclusionary practises and cognitive biases in preventative counterterrorism and 
revisit the political rhetoric of knowability and manageability to caution against 
bounded conceptions of values and identities as a contextual manifestation of the 
process of social stability and predictability. 
This is done in order to demonstrate in the next chapter that Terrorism 
Studies, which takes a struggle for recognition as its framework for understanding 
social conflicts can establish a normative position from which Terrorism Studies 
can engage with the phenomenon of terrorism by contributing to the mediation of 
disparate perceptions of the phenomenon. Terrorism Studies can be in a position, 
to focus on emancipatory truth claims, which encourage perspective-taking, in 
order to enable radical methodological empathy with disparate perceptions of 
reality, truths and values. It challenges the stability of subjective realities and 
concomitant exclusionary practises that serve as the motivation for the struggle 
for recognition in order to counter-balance and navigate the tragic cognitive 
fallacies, their exploitability, and their polarising policy manifestation, and instead 
introduce a more responsible and indeed productive manner of relating to 
terrorism. 
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 While the understanding of violence as serving a socio-moral function that 
we have seen in chapter four, has the distinct advantage of explicitly divorcing 
the violent act from the analytical necessity of a moral evaluation, it furthermore 
allows us to recognise the fact that ultimately, the violent act always carries a 
moral valence that reflects of a particular interpretation of right and wrong, not 
least because Virtuous Violence Theory also recognises the social and moral 
embeddedness of the violent act. The violently acting individual as a limited 
strategic access agent can get their violence, observationally speaking, wrong. 
This however does not do away with the fact that the underlying motivation to act 
violently, from the perspective of the acting individual, remains descriptively moral 
and oriented at demonstrating their commitment to and the power-relationships 
embedded therein and membership of relatively stable and predictable social 
relationships. It does, however, force a focus on the mechanisms that lie at the 
heart of the maintenance of disparate perceptions of the morality of the violent 
act in spite of its descriptive morality and it is the purpose of this chapter to sketch 
these cognitive and social mechanisms that inhibit reflexive perspective taking 
and indeed contribute to the maintenance of moral bubbles and polarisation. 
Magnani stresses the need for ‘philosophers of violence’ to complement 
philosophers of science and philosophers of morality, not only because violence 
is no less important a topic than morality, but, he argues, because ‘morality and 
violence are strictly intertwined’. (Magnani, 2011, p. 2) For Magnani (reminiscent 
of the earlier conclusions drawn on the basis of Virtuous Violence Theory) the 
violent act acquires its moral quality when evaluated from the perspective of 
meaningful principles focused on the act, but not in isolation from these principles. 
These meaningful principles, however, generally follow from moral principles that 
usually represent the hegemonic consensus. Violence cannot be understood on 
its own, but only as an ‘aggressive activity to which judgements apply’ (Magnani, 
2011, p. 9) and this judgement, by and large, excludes the fact that perpetrators 
of violence generally act on the basis of moral deliberations. Indeed, he professes 
that  
‘violence is constitutive of politics, of thought, of knowledge, because 
all these practices are based on and justified by moral options and 
orientations that constitute more or less constrained or preferred 
options, conflicts and possible dominant relationships of power, and in 
turn favour (against others) certain behaviour followed by individuals 
and groups’. (emphasis added Magnani, 201, p. 66) 
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The question then arises, as to how it can be, that only particular kinds of 
violence evoke negative moral judgements, while the violent potential of 
structures, artefacts, institutions, cultures, and ideologies is mostly disregarded 
and/or marginalised. Crucially, violence (for example, when exercised on the 
basis of legal and/or moral reasons) generally is seen as morally legitimate, even 
though this fact of course does not cancel out the instance of violence as such. 
This of course is not a new insight, but one that very much is picked up in the 
definitional debate of terrorism and the criticism (particularly from within Critical 
Terrorism Studies) relating to the exclusion of state-violence from the definition of 
terrorism, or of course in the more vernacular allegations of hypocrisy and double-
standards. (Stanley and Jackson, 2016) What is new, however, is that Magnani 
relates the phenomenon of this systematic disguised of violence to a ‘human 
imprisonment in moral bubbles’. (Magnani, 2011, p. 8) What Magnani does, is to 
work out the tragedy of the moral bubble, rather than its hypocrisy, in so far as he 
traces the origin of the systematic disguise of violence to cognitive fallacies; these 
cognitive fallacies, he emphasises, result in unavoidable errors. These errors or 
double-standards are unavoidable because our collective and individual cognitive 
heuristics are such that they not only disguise our own violence, but moreover 
conceal their fallacy from themselves. (Magnani, 2011) This means that ‘any act 
of error-detection and error-correction is subject in its own right to the 
concealedness [sic.] of error’. (Magnani, 2011, p. 77) In other words, Magnani 
understands the ‘tragic’ [sic.] of the moral bubble to lie in an inability to leave it 
behind because cognitively and socially, the existence of this bubble remains 
concealed by the very faculties that establish their existence in the first place and 
necessitates a critique of the underlying social relationships, the stability of which 
is the aim of the moral social action. 
This unusually empathetic and indeed generous for inclusive perspective, 
explicitly problematises the observation that humans are always constrained in 
their sensitivity to other people, because even when we tell stories about our 
lives, these narratives are intended for our own private consumption, for us to 
comprehend events: to make sense of the world and our place in it. However, 
these private stories, through the act of narration become public and part of the 
way we socially interact and construct the world. Due to this interaction and 
construction, many narratives do not remain under our exclusive personal control, 
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but derive a publicly-moderated meaning not only because the social construction 
of the world does not directly represent our personal reality, (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967) and because our tragically fallacious cognitive faculties lend 
themselves to social exploitation and manipulation, which for the context of our 
focus on the moral valence of violence manifests itself in the subtly constructed 
yet individually perceived self-evidence of the immorality of particular incidents of 
violence.  
Two points follow from this: firstly, individuals, even in their capacity as 
conscious moral agents, can exercise (that is, actualise) only so much control 
over their own private destinies, as the collective sensitivities (in the form of 
perspective-taking by a limited strategic access agent) for another permit. 
Secondly, the actualisation of the full potential of individual (as well as our and 
their collective sensitivities) is inhibited, yet importantly not determined, by 
cognitive heuristics that facilitate cognitive fallacies and social practices that 
privilege the maintenance of moral bubbles and the concomitant social 
predictability and stability over fully-actualised empathetic perspective taking and 
emancipatory truths claims. It is the latter problem that a critical theory 
perspective is particularly appropriate to address. 
5.1 Locating oneself in a social universe of meaning 
For social psychologists, who profess the importance of people’s 
subjective perceptions of the social environment in making sense of their social 
behaviour, cognitive heuristics enable the individual to solve complex problems 
by relegating these to simpler judgemental operations to make decision-making 
more efficient. While they can (and do) produce erroneous conclusions, they are 
generally used, relied upon and trusted by a ‘social perceiver’ because they 
typically produce correct inferences. (Fiske, 2016)  
Cognitive heuristics merely offer explanations of how people construct 
preferences and judgements using selectively-remembered information. (Fiske, 
2016) As inferential approximations (based on remembered information 
however), they are not normative models and carry with them the potential for 
error and bias, precisely because they are subjectively relied upon for efficiency 
and psychological ease rather than for their accuracy. While social psychologist 
posit automated types of judgement mechanisms such as cognitive heuristics, for 
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their sheer efficiency, they also emphasise their understanding of individuals as 
motivated tacticians that ‘rely on relatively automatic processes or alternatively 
on more effortful ones, depending on the situational and motivational demands’. 
(Fiske, 2016, p. 25) If the social perceiver becomes more thoughtful, either by 
recalling a wider pool of information or by having more time to recall information, 
for example, individuals do not have to remain constrained by their cognitive 
heuristics and their ensuing potential for bias and/or error. Acknowledging the 
typical reliability as a rule of thumb, however, allows us to investigate the social 
contexts within which the social perceiver remains biased to see what she 
expects to see. (Fiske, 2016, p. 177-178) 
5.1.1 Tragic moral bubbles and emancipation 
Before I address, utilising social representation as well as communication, 
particularly the function of ideology, as examples of how social manipulation 
exploits our cognitive heuristics and their fallacious tendencies, I wish to 
emphasise that, from a moral-philosophical perspective, while the terminology 
might suggest otherwise, ‘exploitation’ or ‘manipulation’ of cognitive heuristics is 
not intended to suggest moral responsibility. This is precisely because I am 
sympathetic to Magnani’s understanding of the tragic fallacy of cognitive 
heuristics that conceal their own errors from detection in order to achieve 
cognitive and as a consequence social stability and predictability. 
Contrary to proponents of Critical Security Studies, or indeed Critical 
Terrorism Studies in particular, I wish to emphasise the tragic pervertibility rather 
than a position that locks in on pointing to, the most certainly available possibility 
of, hypocrisy, double-standards or strategic propaganda in representation, 
stereotypes or ideology. While I shall justify this position later on in relation to 
mediating influences and modernity, suffice it here to mention the tendency of 
calling out hypocrisy or state-complicity to fall into unhelpful polarities and 
partisanship - because not even well-meaning academics are immune to the 
fallibility of their cognitive faculties - that do neither contribute to methodological 
empathy nor the actual emancipation that Critical Terrorism Studies is aiming for. 
The following sections sketch how representations and ideology, in aiming 
to create stability and predictability, play on cognitive fallacies to make life - 
evolutionarily and psychologically speaking - easy. I suggest the need for 
generous empathy as well as reflection in the face of acts of violence, by pointing 
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to universal cognitive processes and their tragic pervertibility exemplified in 
relation to representations and ideology. It will become clear however, that even 
though humans inhabit moral bubbles that are facilitated by cognitive fallacies 
and that these generally provide tranquillity and psychological ease, the 
maintenance of these bubbles is not an automatic necessity and that awareness 
of these cognitive fallacies, can (and must) be utilised for an empathetically and 
reasoned position taking to overcome the consequences of cognitive fallacies. 
This is an important step in critical theory method because it demonstrated the 
barriers to self-aware knowledge and emancipatory understanding. While social 
psychology does not problematise notions like a shared cultural pool of 
knowledge, social representations, ideology or culture in its attempt to uncover 
psychological mechanisms per se, we cannot fail but notice that the general pool 
of remembered and cultural knowledge of course must originate from somewhere 
and hegemonic power relations can find their way into the more ‘neutral’ 
mechanisms identified by social psychology. 
5.1.2 Dialectic construction of social reality and reality 
maintenance  
Cognitive heuristics offer psychological explanations of mechanisms that 
describe how individuals, who exist in complex and multifaceted social 
environments, process information under conditions of limited capability and 
capacity. In short, these mechanisms help the individual to make sense of their 
interactions with the social world by providing rules of thumb that individuals apply 
to process information. Central in understanding the functioning of these 
mechanisms is remembered information, its recallability and the concomitant 
judgement that is acquired and learned to be formed and generally applicable on 
its basis. McGarty et al. (2002, p. 5-6), for example, explain in relation to the 
formation of stereotypes, that there is a shared cultural pool of knowledge, social 
representations, ideology or culture from which different people sample and it is 
this that produces commonality of views as well as normative beliefs and 
judgements that are shared by members of groups because the members of 
groups act to coordinate their behaviour accordingly. Stereotypes are but one 
example of the biases that can develop when people are trying to make sense of 
the world and utilise readily accessible, that is, learned and remembered cultural 
knowledge and representations to enable and inform their understanding of the 
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social world. However, it is but one way of understanding and making accessible 
that social world.  
Individuals, as social beings, however participate in the dialectic construction 
of their subjective reality. As we have seen their cognitive heuristics serve to 
provide generally reliable rules of thumb for processing information and therefore, 
for the individual to make sense of the social world. Furthermore, knowing social 
reality is the result of a process of socialisation whereby the individual selectively 
acquires the concepts to make sense of their being in the social world. Hereby, 
primary socialisation provides the basic structures that enables the individual to 
identify herself in an objective social reality into which the individual is born. This 
reality, while mediated through significant others and their subjective location 
therein, is acquired as a subjectively coherent and plausible identity, that also 
serves as a location in a specific social world that can be subjectively 
appropriated. (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 150-152) It is the routine, 
everyday social interactions and experiences that provide for a general social 
stock of knowledge that builds on taken-for-granted cognitive and normative 
operating procedures and overall produce, a generally, cohesive social universes 
within which the individual knows to locate themselves.  
While the individual comes to know her subjectivity as distinct from significant 
others during the process of primary socialisation, it is also this process that 
provides the individual with a symbolic universe that provides meaning for the 
individual, even in her most solitary experiences and provides order for the 
subjective apprehension of biographical experiences. Being able to call upon a 
social stock of knowledge and taken-for-granted cognitive and normative 
operating procedures also enables the individual to integrate and/or incorporate 
new experiences from different spheres of reality into the same overarching 
universe of meaning. (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 114-115) This symbolic 
universe orders, and thereby legitimates, everyday roles, priorities, and operating 
procedures by integrating them into the most general frame of reference 
conceivable. Within the same context even the most trivial transactions of 
everyday life then of course may come to be imbued with profound significance. 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 117)  
As however subjective and objective reality can never be fully congruent 
because the individual consciousness is limited in her socialisation by the social 
  167 
distribution of knowledge, a subjective biography cannot be fully social. In 
appropriation of Ugilt’s terminology, subjective reality is meaningful in excess and 
there is always more subjective biography than is expressible in social reality. 
Throughout secondary socialisation and the experience of new social sub-
realities, the individual must continuously engage in a balancing act, facilitated 
by conceptual procedures and taken-for granted cognitive mechanism, that serve 
to integrate new components of other realities into an already existing reality. 
Importantly, society must develop procedures of reality-maintenance to 
safeguard a measure of symmetry between objective and subjective reality, for 
otherwise taken-for-granted cognitive and normative operating procedures would 
lose their plausibility and threaten the tranquillity that a cohesive social universe 
provides.   
Subjective reality is always dependent upon specific plausibility structures, 
that is, the specific social base and social processes required for its maintenance 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 174) because the empirical existence of 
alternative symbolic universes poses a threat to the taken-for-granted inevitability 
of one’s own social universe and thereby challenges the inevitability of one’s own 
social reality and the concomitant psychological ease and tranquillity. 
5.1.3 Accessible cultural knowledge and the inability of 
perspective-taking 
Being aware that our cognitive heuristics facilitate misconceptions in our 
understanding of the world, by for example zeroing in on and overestimating the 
frequency of, for example, spectacular events of violence, overall, we utilise these 
heuristics in an attempt to make sense of our social environment. 
Representations, stories and myths then, serve as social procedures of reality-
maintenance and play to our cognitive heuristics by anchoring and making readily 
accessible a cultural pool of knowledge that navigates the individual’s position in 
the social world and thereby attempting to eliminate psychological strain and 
discomfort that could be caused by conflicting (or counterintuitive) information 
that necessities greater effort with regards to its psychological processing. The 
notion of the cultural pool of knowledge reminds of the notion of preos that we 
have previously seen utilised by Virtuous Violence Theory in providing concrete 
guidelines for the implementation of abstract conceptions of morality and justice. 
Unlike preos however, representations, stories and the like do not generally 
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provide concrete social and/or cultural guidelines for behaviour but merely enable 
a more or less implicit detection and processing of information in the form of 
latent, readily accessible background information upon which explanations and 
judgements are formed and that then find social and/or cultural expression. 
Baumeister’s (1997, p. 54-55) work on the myth of evil as a particular 
frame to think about violence, provides an illustrative example of how the 
tendency to see violence in morally clear terms with innocent, virtuous victims 
and evil, malicious perpetrators results from representations of evil in folk 
mythologies, religion, tales and more contemporarily in movies. The centrality of 
representations is merely one perspective from which Baumeister approaches 
the problem of evil. As a social psychologist he recognises that ‘the reality of evil 
is sometimes shaped and altered by the image’ - an image which he suggests is 
‘habitually shaped from the viewpoint of the victim.’ (Baumeister, 1997, p. 33) He 
investigates how evil has usually been portrayed across a wide selection of 
resources, from religious theology to children’s cartoons in order to understand 
the cultural pool of knowledge for the psychological forces, that is cognitive 
heuristics that sustain the myth of pure evil that eventually shape behaviour and 
the generally negative judgement of violence. This breadth of images leads 
Baumeister to conclude that the myth of evil is a composition of depictions that 
represent evil as the intentional infliction of harm, driven by the wish to inflict harm 
gratuitously without otherwise well-articulated motives whereby the victim is 
depicted as innocent and good while the perpetrator is ‘the other, the enemy, the 
outsider’ and has been such since time immemorial and does not respond to 
context or circumstances. Evil comes to represent the antithesis of order, peace 
and stability as well as self-control. (Baumeister, 1997, p. 60-75) 
The central tenor of Baumeister’s observation and a conclusion to draw 
for the purpose understanding how representations impact on behaviour is 
twofold: on the one hand it is that this representation produces normative beliefs 
by providing a clear and widely shared and therefore, readily accessible 
demarcation between victim and perpetrator. On the other hand, being able to 
refer to those widely shared representations as remembered information makes 
these normative beliefs and concomitant behaviours and judgements easy to 
recall and representations exploit cognitive heuristics that can lead to biased 
judgements and faulty conclusions. Both aspects however point to a dynamic that 
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privileges the maintenance of a particular social reality and the individual’s 
investment therein. As Baumann points out, the representation of evil blinds 
people to the reciprocal, mutual causes of violence by inhibiting perspective-
taking between victims and perpetrators, which ultimately leads to a kind of moral 
immunity on part of the victim. However, perpetrators on the other hand do not 
see things in simple absolutes but as complex and morally ambiguous. 
Baumeister points out that while perpetrators may well see something wrong in 
what they did, they also see how they were affected by external factors and/or as 
having acted in a way that was fully appropriate and justified, however the 
representation of evil puts responsibility on one side while it absolves the other. 
(Baumeister, 1997, p. 47, p. 91) The perpetrators’ perspective, as a position to 
make sense of an act of violence however is widely missing and inaccessible 
because it cannot activate an equally readily available cognitive heuristic and/or 
social stock of knowledge, and one reason for this is to be found in the one-sided 
representation of evil.  
Indeed, it is the perpetrator’s perspective that confronts the victim with a 
discrepant symbolic universe which entails specific constellations of subjective 
reality and identity. While in principle this availability empirically demonstrates the 
existence of an alternative symbolic universe and thereby demonstrates the 
relativity of all social worlds including one’s own, the representation of evil 
functions as a procedure of reality maintenance that safeguards the plausibility 
of a particular social reality and we can conclude that the confrontation of 
alternative symbolic universes implies a problem of power. (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967, p. 126)  
It is the role of ideology then, that is generally understood to serve as a 
means to interpret the same overall social universe in different ways and 
combining this with concrete power interest. By relying on plausibility structures 
generated through socialisation processes and thereby being able to locate 
concrete power interests within a specific social universe, ideologies are able to 
generate solidarity from within this specific social universe. (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967, p. 141) The understanding that ideology works on the basis of 
socially acquired plausibility structures, which in turn serve the purpose to provide 
cognitive and normative ease and bring into alignment subjective and objective 
reality but also are ontologically threatened by the existence of divergent social 
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sub-universes sheds a different light on to a dynamic that serves to maintain a 
specific social reality propped by power interests. This shows that the question of 
power cannot successfully be divorced from analysis in social sciences. 
5.1.4 On the function of ideology 
While the role of ideology in terrorism in general and radicalisation in 
particular is central to the study of terrorism as well as preventative 
counterterrorism policy, not least because motivation becomes a key ingredient 
to definitionally distinguish terrorist violence from other kinds of violence, this role 
is not without controversy. Even though there is a clear political interest in the 
narrative content of ideology because counter-extremism strategies aim to 
counter and address ideology a key ingredient for terrorism. (National Security 
Council, 2015) Ideology after all, is regularly posited as enabling terrorism to 
grow. (Dawson, 2015) This section will not focus on the content of ideology per 
se, and will not try to deconstruct its proclaimed truths, but rather it looks at the 
cognitive purpose ideology serves. This is done to show its working and thereby 
enable an understanding of ideology that allows for methodological empathy and 
the caution with regards to normative judgement. 
Ideology can activate cognitive heuristics as quick mechanisms the 
individual utilises to process information and efficiently make decisions in a 
complex social world and provides the individual with both, clarity and coherence 
- enabling quick availability and concomitant recallability, representativeness, 
anchoring and framing - which enables predictability in relation to the position for 
the individual in the social world. This latter aspect of connecting the individual to 
their social environment, equips the individual with an orientation that transcends 
her own existence, through membership in a community expressed in a shared 
world-view and beliefs. This world-view and beliefs are normative in so far as they 
shape the individual’s behaviour to signify membership in that community and 
ultimately enable transcendental meaning beyond the individual. As Berger 
points out, ‘human beings construct a social world not just for practical 
considerations of economic cooperation, but so as to impose order and self-
transcending significance on the ‘discrete experiences and meanings of 
individuals’. (Berger as quoted in Griffin, 2012, p. 64) Where Griffin (2012, p 48) 
imagines the ‘militant fanatic as self-enclosed in a sacred cognitive and moral 
space’ and Magnani (2011, p. 206-207) exemplifies his notion of moral bubbles 
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with reference to ideology, both authors in fact point to ideology as a tool that 
eliminates doubt and ambivalence through a targeted play with (fallible) cognitive 
heuristics. When Magnani concludes, that violence merely becomes a response, 
not to the content of the questioned beliefs but, of the potential disruption of the 
tranquillity that those beliefs allow, both authors converge and demonstrate the 
significance of understanding the role of ideology in the provision of norms that 
enable cognitive tranquillity and ease. (Festinger, 1957) 
In an attempt to eliminate doubt then, and in order to establish 
psychological ease, ideology provides a reservoir of meaning and an anchor point 
for both collective and individual action and behaviour and functions utilising the 
same cognitive heuristics that enable the navigation of complexity and efficient 
decision making. Activating pervious knowledge acquired from others, 
anticipating long and abstract chains of causation and coordinating our behaviour 
with others enables ease and efficiency in everyday operations. (Pinker, 2011, p. 
686-687) In order to achieve this tranquillity however, ideologies must rely on 
cognitive heuristics that can and do produce erroneous and/or tainted results 
because they also operate on the basis of particular power interests. In avoiding 
disruption of this tranquillity, both individually and collectively, Pinker (2011, p. 
682-688) summarises five cognitive mechanisms that he identifies as crucial in 
explaining how ideology works to justify violence, particularly pointing at 
processes that edit beliefs in order to make actions seem justifiable, through 
reframing, moral disengagement, dispersion of responsibility, gradualism and 
derogation of the victim. It is with an eye to these objectives that ideologues can 
utilise ideology in order to eliminate doubt and/or ambivalence.  
Magnani (2011) then concludes that ideologies thrive on the fact that they 
rest on the mutual reinforcement of moral beliefs, where each individual moral 
bubble acts together and combines their roughly similar moral beliefs into a 
collective moral bubble. This collective bubble then aims at systematically 
defusing all potential doubts, and cognitive heuristics aid in this diffusion. 
Consequently, each agent within the bubble ‘perceives his own moral principles 
as a given, just as much as a cognitive agent takes his beliefs as a positive, 
genuine truth.’ (Magnani, 2011, p. 206-207) Understanding that cognitive 
heuristics generally run in the background to enable a more or less effortless 
navigation of the social world, ideologies serve a soothing function.  
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Central then is the insight that violence ensues when the tranquillity that 
ideology enables is disrupted, through for example the confrontation with an 
alternative world view that makes one’s own subjective world view appear less 
than inevitable thereby undermining the stability and predictability and ultimately 
the psychological comfort that the narrative, or ideology intended to facilitate. 
Deconstructing ideologies by pitting them against counter-narratives or pushing 
them to the fringes or underground may unsettle this tranquillity and indeed be 
rather counter-productive. Cognitive heuristics moreover, it must not be forgotten, 
merely serve as rules of thumb for effortless navigation of the social environment 
and as that do not dictate a particular course of action and/or behaviour. It is worth 
reiterating that, if the social perceiver becomes more thoughtful, either by 
recalling a wider pool of information and indeed by being confronted with multiple 
social realities and the relativity of one’s own or by having more time to recall 
information for example, individuals do not have to remain constrained by their 
cognitive heuristics and their ensuing potential for bias and/or error. Appreciating 
the ease however with which these fallible heuristics and concomitant plausibility 
structures can be utilised and furthermore the psychological tranquillity thus 
afforded, however should at least provide for a degree of empathy for the tragic 
of moral bubbles. At the same time, it should however also demonstrate the need 
to intervene in expanding these ideologically and religiously motivated moral 
bubbles in order to mitigate the tendency to retreat in polarised positions via an 
approach that explicitly focuses on emancipatory truth claims rather than the 
maintenance of social stability and predictability.  
5.1.5 Alternative discourse and the limitations of understanding 
others 
At this point I consider it important to come back to the academic study of 
terrorism and consider that the very possibility of being able to invoke moral 
judgement by being able to rely on representations, the myth of evil or a particular 
representation of reality in the form of ideology and thereby persuading an 
audience of one’s own moral stance, of course privileges status-quo narratives 
on morality and causation. This possibility relies on representations and can be 
augmented by the ability of being able to invoke academic objectivity. For the 
purpose of the study of terrorism this means that this dynamic contributes to a 
marginalisation, if not muting, of alternative narratives and by extension mutes 
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the standpoint of the terrorists’ subjectivity. Because the question of morality is 
rarely made explicit, the mere act of paying attention to what the terrorist might 
have to say is already seen as a fateful step toward perhaps making an effort to 
understand their motives,47 something that might lead to somehow ‘justifying’ 
what is unjustifiable. (Zuleika and Douglass, 2008, p. 32) For as long as Terrorism 
Studies privileges a focus on the reality as perceived by those that primarily 
identify with the victims of the act, does the act become terrorism, while an 
identification with the perpetrator turns the act into something more justifiable, 
even legitimate. (Greisman, 1977) 
Resorting to terrorist means of course can also be understood as an attempt 
to make visible and construct an alternative discourse, an alternative social 
reality, backed by the willingness to utilise violence. (Devji, 2008) Terrorism has 
the potential to bring an alternative view to public reality, the perception of which 
makes all the difference. (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p. 141) Even though, it is a 
discourse that is made sense of from within an ideology that provides ‘the 
framework for thinking (…) about the world – the ‘ideas’ that people use to figure 
out how the social world works, what their place is in it and what they ought to 
do.’ Ideology contributes to the significance of meaning and representation, which 
are expressed through language, social action and practice (Hall as quoted in 
Taylor, 2011, p. 137) and has taken a very prominent position in attempts to 
explain terrorist violence. However, when Taylor and Horgan (2011, p. 138) posit 
that ‘action and activity might be the route by which people initially engage with 
terrorism’ and suggest that ‘the recruit has to learn about the particular ideology 
and ‘meaning’ their behaviour has within the terrorist movement’s context’, and 
Crenshaw points to the ‘theory of cognitive consistency’, which suggests that 
individuals only absorb information that supports their beliefs and ignore 
discomforting evidence (Crenshaw, 2011, p. 254), a meaningful understanding of 
terrorism must include ‘culturally derived measures of social status and needs to 
embed values in a particular social context’ (Kuznar, 2007, p. 318) so as to 
provide situated and coherent meaning for the individual, who ultimately utilised 
what becomes described as terroristic violence. While ideology is surely 
important in framing narratives and perceptions, Toloyan (2001, p. 218) rightly 
observes that terrorism is a creature of its own time and place but ‘what is more, 
                                            
47 See for example the discussion on research ethics in (Smyth, 2009). 
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it can be the time that is embedded in the historiography, traditional narratives, 
legend and myths which a society constitutes itself as a temporal entity’. Noting 
that the act of terrorism may well continue to have identical legal status in court, 
dismissing specific social descriptions of the way in which different societies 
maintain their vision of their collective selves with different projective narratives 
and so produce different terrorisms and different terrorists, with different cultural 
meanings and motives, and indeed morality inscribed that are relatively 
autonomous of legal codes or analytical conceptualisations. (Toloyan, 2001, p. 
220) 
Terrorism can neither be separated from its perception, nor its social context 
and the concomitant subjective moral universe. The scientific research on 
terrorism must, particularly in light of the perceptual importance of the divergence 
in morality of acts of terrorism, explicitly account for its moral commitment, 
because a closure of discursive space may very well lie in the implied amorality 
of the terrorist actor. After all, the concepts we use are acquired through our 
social context.  
This implies that human beings and society construct and constitute each 
other simultaneously Terrorism is a phenomenon in itself and, at the same time 
only possible to understand as ‘terrorism’ through the concepts of meaning 
(Staun 2010, p. 9, Wittgenstein 1995) and moral valence. What is indeed required 
is an understanding of the motives and intention of others, (Booth, 2008, p. 75) 
or more empathetically, a restoration of the terrorist’s identity into a meaningful 
whole. Such an understanding starts from the premise that the decision to 
‘eschew survival in order to realize a higher goal’ differs for everyone because 
what constitutes this higher goal is culturally conditioned. (Zuleika and Douglass, 
2008) This necessitates making contextual approaches central to the study of 
terrorism, and thereby placing acts that are labelled terrorist within the broader 
context of wider social practices and civil society relations, enabling researchers 
not only to see perpetrators of terrorism as part of a wider social environment, 
influenced by societal dynamics and broader intellectual debates, and actors that 
move in and out of terrorism. (Toros and Gunning, 2009, p. 95-107) In order to 
be able to do justice to this understanding however, it is necessary to explicitly 
problematise the moral valence of the act of violence and the role this plays in 
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communicating the stability of a particular social universe and the implied 
hegemonic power-relationships.  
5.1.5.1 On radicalisation as occupational change 
Indeed, the significance of extremist rhetoric and narrative frames has 
permeated attempts to explain social movement activism in general and terrorism 
in particular and receives special attention in the context of the notion of 
radicalisation particularly in relation to the role of ideology48.  
Haleem’s (2012, p. 141) emphasis on the need to engage with reason in 
radical Islamist rhetoric because it ‘can be seen as providing for its audiences a 
framework of interpretation, that is, a particular framework to understand 
experience’ can be seen as complementing the social psychological insights on 
perceptions and aids in developing a bridge between experience, knowledge and 
motivations, while Pisoiu’s (2012) understanding of Islamist radicalisation as an 
occupational change illustrates the contextual workings of plausibility structures 
and secondary socialisation.  
Pisoiu is interested in understanding what the specific motivational 
mechanisms for Islamist radicalisation are and why and how they get activated. 
Her model suggests that there is no sui generis process of Islamist radicalisation 
but that this process represents a variation of a more general process of 
occupational change - a process which reminds of secondary socialisation more 
generally - which under certain conditions results in radical, activist, and for her 
case, Islamist occupation. Her model is interesting because, while mirroring 
Haleem’s conceptualisation of Islamist extremism as universal, for existential and 
motivated by a struggle for recognition, Pisoiu’s aim is to critique the 
understanding of the radicalisation as exceptional and argues strictly for a rational 
choice approach. Her grounded theory approach utilises an analysis of the 
transcripts of court proceedings and is aimed at establishing what ‘participants 
themselves perceived as ‘what is going on’. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 47-8). She anchors 
her explanation of the nature of the motivation for choosing and staying within the 
Islamist radical occupation in ‘following individuals developments along a 
process’. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 50) 
                                            
48 See: (Holt et al., 2016, Silke and Brown, 2016, Sedgwick, 2012, Kruglanski, 2006). 
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As Pisoiu is particularly critical of the notion of grievances because it implicitly 
suggests that had there not been a grievance in the first place, the choice would 
not have been made, (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 55-59) she proposes that participation is 
explained rationally through selective (non-material) incentives. Individual goods 
can be used as selective incentives in the form of prestige, respect, leadership 
position, friendship, psychological gratification, group support, or more generally 
speaking ‘social sanctions and rewards’. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 48) It appears however, 
that while this insistence on rational choice is intended to de-exceptionalise the 
participation in terrorism, the caution and unease in relation to the 
conceptualisation of grievances is unfortunate, precisely because grievances can 
give an insight into the essence of the motivation, rather than its nature. Jasper 
(1997) for example, posits that a visible violation in someone’s existing beliefs 
leads them to their activism while Munson (2008) observes that only after people 
engaged in activism do they transform a rather superficial, abstract and 
unconnected sense of a specific issue to a strong and crystallised position that 
the activist is able to understand and relate to a larger moral universe consistent 
with other beliefs and values. (Munson, 2008, p. 35) 
5.1.5.2 Occupational change and perceived social approval  
Pisoiu’s approach identifies reward, standing and recognition as the main 
categories of selective incentives that impact on an individuals’ occupational 
choice and points out that, on an abstract level, any occupational choice, ‘the 
mujahid, the politician and the soldier all aim at reaching standing’ but there is a 
difference in the way in which standing, and values are conceived. (Pisoiu, 2012, 
p 48, p. 85) Standing hereby not only denotes the relevant social surrounding but 
further reflections commonly shared values and invokes the idea of ‘value 
commonality’ which defines what is valued or recognised as valuable in a certain 
social environment. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 91) 
Recognition for Pisoiu refers to the perceived approval and support of action 
and activities by the social surrounding based on commonly shared apprehension 
of what is valuable or acceptable (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 94-5) and can plausibly tap 
into socialised structures the individual is familiar with. It is thus similar to 
Honneth’s understanding of recognition, on which we will focus in the next 
chapter, in so far as the value and/or acceptance of the action is dependent on 
‘commonly shared’ or accepted modes of recognition. It is distinguished however 
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by the lack of explicit reference to an existential and universal desire for 
recognition and cannot immediately trigger the moral consequentialism that the 
struggle for recognition necessitates. Recognition and perceived social approval 
in Pisoiu’s model function as a mediator to the learning and adoption of norms, 
values and patterns of behaviour. 
However, with reference to what Pisoiu terms ‘reward’ it is arguable that we 
can stretch her conceptualisation to fit Honneth’s framework and more 
specifically the dimension of practical relations to the self; reward for Pisoiu refers 
to the idea of making a difference, which find expression in conviction of 
righteousness, morality and importance of what one did, the drive to affect the 
situation, and the conviction that one's actions would actually have an impact. 
The type of impact sought went along the lines of helping the poor, the oppressed, 
and reversing a situation of injustice. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 101) Thus concretised, the 
desire to make a difference mirrors and resembles the precondition for social 
conflict that Honneth expresses regarding an existing intersubjective framework 
of interpretation that allows to show an individual’s diagnosis of a situation to be 
typical for an entire group; Because Pisoiu focuses on explaining a process of 
radicalisation, she elaborates that there is a gradual and purposive adoption of 
an ever more exclusivsing radical interpretative frameworks, a process facilitated 
by three non-discrete stages of probing, centrifying and professionalising. (Pisoiu, 
2012, p. 53) It is through this process that standing, recognition and reward are 
interpreted, and the salience of this interpretation is explained. Her elaborations, 
while remaining true to her commitment of explaining the radicalisation process 
in terms of an ordinary occupational change process rather than a sui generis 
process, can be supplemented with a normative framework that the struggle for 
recognition that we will focus on in the next chapter, enables and thereby it is 
possible expand her procedural insights to encompass a universal for existential 
dimension that can form the foundation for emancipatory truth claims.  
5.1.5.3 Radical interpretative frames, resonance and reason 
While Pisoiu seeks to provide an explanatory framework that accounts and 
elaborates on the Islamist radicalisation process, Haleem makes clear that 
distinguishing between the nature of the motivation to participate in Islamist 
extremism and its essence is paramount for successful policy approaches 
because only this enables a critical introspection as to the reciprocal causality of 
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violence. Understanding the existential and universal essence of terrorism and 
its moral consequentialist justification needs to take note of the fact, that hurt 
feelings become the motivational basis for collective resistance only, if the 
individuals/group are able to articulate them within an intersubjective framework 
of interpretation. (Honneth, 1996) It is only then, that they can show that their hurt 
feelings are in fact typical for an entire group and can demonstrate ownership 
and participation in the sustenance of a moral grammar and therefore show their 
struggle for recognition as one for greater justice overall. 
Empirically, Pisoiu (2012) can show how radical interpretative frames impact 
on what counts as valuable to explain why some individual choses the radical 
Islamist occupation over another alternative. Shifting to the level of language and 
ideas she demonstrates the need to capture how individuals interpret 
experiences through radical interpretative frames. This move from actual lived 
experiences to frames is necessary because they account for ‘the interests, 
perceptions, stereotypes and values we bring to the situation and that influence 
our goals and aspirations’ as well as how we ‘see the facts’. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 106) 
Here Pisoiu, while not making this explicit, seems to follow a rationalist 
epistemological perspective. Haleem explains that from this follows that 
‘knowledge (…) does not require actual experience (sensory input) of the thing 
whose knowledge is in question.’ (Haleem, 2012, p. 142) For Haleem (2012, p. 
142), it is clear that ‘reason in radical Islamist rhetoric can be seen as providing 
for its audiences a framework of interpretation, that is, a particular framework to 
understand experiences’ that builds the foundation for knowledge of reality, which 
is the foundation for a particular perception of reality. In other words, while some 
experience is indeed necessary, reason as represented to rhetorical frames of 
interpretation play an equally important part in shaping the knowledge of the thing 
that we have experienced, because reason shapes knowledge by systematising 
and ordering our experiences. 
In investigating radical interpretative frames, Pisoiu is primarily interested in 
an analytical understanding of how individuals acquire and cultivate ways of 
doing and thinking and thereby points to the significance of collective beliefs and 
their empirical credibility. However, particularly in relation to the latter, Pisoiu 
highlights the importance of accumulated learning, which depends on the 
confirmation or legitimation of newer ideas through cultural resonance with 
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existing ideas acquired at an earlier stage. (Pisoiu, 2012) One important 
implication this observation has, is that the social environment serves the ‘role of 
learning stepping stones and ‘normalisation’ regarding frameworks of acting and 
thinking. This is fundamental for the change and activation of occupational 
categories as reward, standing, and recognition’. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 126) But 
importantly, because these frames are schemata of interpretation that grow in 
existent belief systems that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and 
label occurrences within their life space and the world at large, (Goffman, 1974, 
p. 21) there is no clear separation between general social beliefs and specific 
‘radical’ frames. Furthermore, individuals evaluate beliefs, norms, and meanings 
as a whole. Pisoiu is not alone with her interest in frames, and Halverson et al 
(2011) engage with a selection of 12 ‘master narratives’ of Islamic extremists, that 
they understand as deeply embedded in a culture and providing a pattern for 
cultural life and the social structure by creating a communicative framework that 
guides people in certain situations. While they note that their selection of master 
narratives are treasured by Muslims throughout the world, the meanings and 
political implications differ substantially from those extremists give. (Halverson et 
al., 2011, p. 6) Pisoiu cautions, that the concrete radical interpretative frames that 
she identifies, are only useful as an analytical, yet not an empirical, category 
(Pisoiu, 2012, p. 109), such a clear distinction is untenable precisely because of 
the interstitial position of terrorism expertise that was discussed in chapters one 
and two. Moreover, for the context of the pro-life debate in the US, Munson (2008) 
for example, cautions against the possibility that the instrumental and the 
expressive, as well as the political and the religious, can be separated analytically 
and empirically as clearly as Pisoiu is suggesting and notes that religious practice 
cannot be separated from the everyday and political happenings of the 
contemporary world. (Munson, 2008, p. 176-177) 
From this follows then that the clean, analytic concepts we often use 
sometimes do a poor job of capturing the much messier reality of individual, 
everyday experience. Munson observes that the concept of religion as either 
churches or sets of belief is not fully adequate to understand the relationship 
between religion and activism and notes that rather than ‘thinking of religion as a 
separate, distinct social phenomenon exerting an independent influence on the 
pro-life movement and the way in which people become activists, it is necessary 
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to see religion and activism as overlapping domains of action, each continually 
constituted and reconsidered by the practises of those who are involve in them.’ 
This means that the boundaries between the two are blurry and ‘events can speak 
in two voices’. (Munson, 2008) For Munson, this comes with two insights: Firstly, 
the importance of polysemy in everyday experiences whereby ideas, events, and 
behaviours do not have a single meaning, with the methodological implication 
that it is not possible to interpret a social phenomenon and tell us what it ‘really’ 
means. To those involved in events, the focus on single meanings manifests as 
a need to explain the reason they believe or act the way they do. However,  
‘experiences can take on multiple meanings, events can take on 
multiple voices, and behaviours can simultaneously express multiple 
intentions and beliefs. The issue is not to reduce these manifold 
meanings to one that is primary or more fundamental but instead to 
recognize [sic] that the polysemy of action can be a major source of 
social dynamism.’ (Munson, 2008, p. 184) 
Secondly, Munson concludes that activism can be a source of religious 
negotiation, exploration, and change. In the relationship between religion and the 
pro-life movement, the movement is not simply an ‘effect’ caused by religion. He 
notes that a surprisingly large number of activists did not come to understand 
their activism through a religious lens but instead came to understand their faith 
through a pro-life lens.’ (Munson, 2008, p. 184) 
Methodologically however, the difficulty of generating data that differentiates 
between ‘thin beliefs’ and ‘robust ideological commitment’ lead to an almost 
catholic acceptance of the notion that grievances are a necessary prerequisite 
for mobilisation, yet Munson observe that beyond a very basic idea, ‘there is no 
single movement worldview, master frame, or unified ideology that ties the 
movement together’ and activists differ enormously in means and motivations. 
(Munson, 2008, p. 185-190) 
 But if we combine these insights with Haleem’s, what follows is that, while 
there are concrete experiences, these experiences are subjectively interpreted, 
and moreover, represented in such a light that they create the knowledge for its 
audience that is both, empirical and rational, so much so that one’s perception of 
how things are cannot be divorced from an understanding of actual experiences. 
This of course means that ‘knowledge or ‘reality’ need not necessarily reflect 
concreteness or absoluteness (or the thing in itself, reality as it really is); 
knowledge of reality may reflect instead a particular understanding of reality 
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(through the systematisation and categorisation of experience)’. (Haleem, 2012, 
p.145) Haleem indeed makes clear that  
‘what is presented by the recruiters of Islamist extremist groups as the 
‘reality’ of things is in fact a product of their particular reason (their 
systematisation and categorisation of experience that appears in their 
discourse) and which in turn shapes knowledge (through reason in 
rhetoric) of their audiences and shapes their perceptions. Perceptions 
of reality then ultimately determine the motivations of individuals to 
engage in violent and self-destructive missions.’ (Haleem, 2012, p. 
146)  
This of course demonstrates the importance of language as the basis for 
rhetoric in providing its audience with the framework of interpretation to make 
sense and bring into alignment their subjective social worlds, and it is important 
to emphasise the manipulative role that language plays in society. What becomes 
clear however is that it is possible, from an epistemological perspective, 
confirmed by empirical observation, to connect language and rhetoric via reason, 
knowledge and subjective yet shared perceptions of reality to individual 
motivations, whereby the individual strives to generate and indeed force 
symmetry between disparate non-inevitable, competing social realities. The 
detour focussing on the Islamist radicalisation process as occupational change 
process shows how cognitive heuristics operate in context.  
5.2 Cognitive heuristics, conflict and reason 
As much as cognitive heuristics enable a fall-back on automated decision-
making processes and allow for the ‘preservation of cognitive energy’, the 
concomitant moral intuitions however usually refer to affect-laden processes in 
which an ‘evaluative feeling of good-bad or like-dislike appears in consciousness 
without any awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing 
evidence or inferring a conclusion.’ (Haidt, 2007, p. 998) It must be emphasised 
that, neither of these two processes does rule out more controlled processes of 
conscious activity in order to reach a reasoned, rather than affect-laden moral 
judgment or decision. 
In a series of experiments, Haidt (2007, p. 1001) clearly demonstrates that, 
in spite of moral motives being implemented by quick and automatic intuitions, 
individual moral reasoning can at times correct and even override moral intuition, 
especially in response to individuals navigating different and sometimes 
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conflicting social goals, which may however remain within the same social 
universe. He notes that there are at least three ways, all founded upon an 
understanding of moral reasoning as a result of social interaction, in which 
individuals can and do override immediate intuitive responses: through conscious 
reasoning, through reframing and through social interaction that brings to light 
new arguments. Haidt (2007, p. 1001) suggests that from an evolutionary 
perspective, moral reasoning utilises a relatively new ‘cognitive machinery’ that 
evolved ‘by the adaptive pressure of life in a reputation-obsessed community’ and 
concludes, that people reason morally, rather than relying exclusively on affective 
intuitions, because they care about how they (and others) treat people and how 
they (and others) participate in groups. He remains however generally sceptical 
about the persuasive power of moral reasoning in conflict situations because 
people do possess quick and automatic moral intuitions and when called on to 
justify, these intuitions generate post-hoc justifications out of a priori moral 
theories. He points out that this post-hoc reasoning relies on a priori moral 
theories that are made up of ‘culturally supplied norms for evaluating and 
criticising the behaviour of others’, but people do not necessarily realise this 
because of their reliance on automated cognitive processes. (Haidt, 2001, p. 823) 
Crucially, in conflict situations, people lack time to engage in conscious reasoning 
and/or social deliberation that could bring to the fore new arguments to re-
evaluate the initial intuitive moral response. In the absence of urgency however, 
people can contemplate details and are able to see their choice framed in stark 
moral terms, on a high level of abstraction and moral principle, and consider 
multiple social relations with potentially conflicting prescriptive and proscriptive 
links - albeit in principle merely from within their own plausible social universe - 
and consider these in reaching a morally reasoned conclusion. In principle, both 
Baumeister and Haidt agree in their emphasis that ’in reality, however, people 
often find themselves unexpectedly thrust into situations that require them to 
make these highly consequential decisions or do not even recognise the issue as 
a great moral test of character at that crucial moment.’ (Baumeister, 1997, p. 259) 
Baumeister (1997, p. 276), then in reference to research on self-control and 
violence, points out that ‘people acquiesce in losing control’, that is they learn 
‘when and where (and how much) it is appropriate to lose control’ and to be 
violent, and in what context ‘being violent’ will not carry a reputational penalty. 
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5.2.1 Potential for conflict and violence 
Whether an ensuing conflict is regulated with violent means does not 
(necessarily) depend on the instrumental value of violence as a means to achieve 
a specific strategic goal, even if it is this later understanding that takes precedent 
particularly for researchers on political violence as well as policy makers, 
probably precisely because individuals engage in post-hoc moralised 
justifications of their violence which resembles cost/benefit calculations. Indeed 
empirically, Ginges and Atran (2011) found that, in spite to the widespread 
understanding that people support violence in an instrumental rational manner - 
which they expected to find manifested in quantitative indicators of success and 
the perception of the efficacy of violence - support for violence more reliably 
followed deontological49 reasoning. In other words, Ginges and Atran can show 
empirically that the decision to engage in violence resulted from morally 
motivated decision-making. Appreciating the moral valence of violence and the 
general intent to act morally as well as frame one’s own action in moral terms, 
enables an understanding of the motivation for as well as violence as social action 
that communicates more than its instrumental and/or strategic goals. Indeed, 
focusing the understanding of violence on its instrumentality can backfire and 
have serious implications for the resolution of conflicts. Indeed, Ginges and Atran 
(2011, p. 1) have found that ‘the judgement about the use of war are bounded by 
deontological reasoning and parochial commitment’ rather than material 
incentives or the notions on the efficacy of political violence. 
However, as human beings usually possess various moral frameworks 
that can be willingly and easily interchanged, Magnani (2011, p. 91) recognises 
the very high likelihood of (moral) conflict and violence. While cultural precedents, 
practices, prototypes paradigms, precepts, principles, proscriptions, and 
prescriptions and so forth provide aids and contextualised frames of reference 
that render individual action less random. This contributes to the stabilisation of 
human social relations in the form of a social order, but they can only provide for 
an approximation of abstract universal moral concerns. As much however as 
there may be broadly universal moral concerns, individuals in the pursuit of their 
                                            
49 While Ginges and Atran (2011) speak of deontological reasoning, this terminology appears 
inaccurate for the purpose of this thesis and would more appropriately reflect consequentialist 
reasoning within the framework of an existential struggle for recognition. 
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subjective understanding of moral action can and do get their social actions 
wrong. Humans after all are limited strategic access agents and this means that 
they are limited in their ability to predict with confidence and accuracy the 
intentions, motives, emotions, desires, needs and the like of others. Moreover, 
their cognitive heuristics are mere rules of thumb that have evolved to preserve 
cognitive energy rather than absolute accuracy and can lead individuals to false 
conclusions. What is more, individuals are also constrained in their individual 
action by the available cultural preos that makes actualisable subjectively 
perceived moral concerns. Inherently, social action carries with it the potential for 
conflict and violence as has been made very clear in the previous chapter is but 
one strategy to organise social relationships. 
With the permanent potential for conflicting moral obligations emanating 
from diverse social relationships yet from within the same social universe, the 
immediate response of knowing what action is morally required (or even morally 
irrelevant for a specific situation) without the need to know why, balances, 
reconciles or combines fallible cognitive heuristics with potentially conflicting 
motives with the primary goal of managing social relationships. However, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, we cannot understand these relationship-
regulating strategies until we recognise the social-relational motives that drive 
them and the relationship-regulating aims they seek to fulfil. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, 
p. 161) The violent act then is morally indifferent in so far as it gains its (i)morality 
only in context and through the post-hoc evaluation of the act as an appropriate 
means to regulate a specific social relationship. 
As we have noted before, anthropologists have long pointed out that 
individual experiences and the larger social matrix within which these are 
embedded can provide a picture of how larger-scale social forces come to be 
translated into personal behaviour and choices, because given processes and 
forces ‘conspire - whether through routine, ritual […] to constrain agency.’ 
(Farmer, 1996, p. 263) Such an understanding acknowledges the embeddedness 
of the individual in social relationships and institutions that, explicitly as well as 
implicitly, act upon the individual and limit their agency. This, as we have also 
seen is confirmed by Fiske and Rai’s ethnographic accounts and reflected in their 
conception of Virtuous Violence Theory.  
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In other words, the persistence of stereotypical representations, myths, 
rituals, prototypes, paradigms, taboos which critically make up the cultural 
repertoire that provides the cultural preos is explained by the ease with which 
these can be recalled by the individual and the psychological relief this 
effortlessness affords (Norenzayn (2006) as quoted in Magnani, 2011, p. 255) 
and it is this psychological relief that makes both, religion and ideology, 
cognitively speaking ‘easy’ and thereby crucial in maintaining the social stability 
within a particular social universe.  
This insight crucially points towards a demarcation between the 
perceptions of the individual as the actor and those of the group. It moreover, 
points to the analytical and communicative limitations of the scholarly observer. 
While the congruence of any act or practice with the preos of a given culture or 
subculture is always more or less ambitious, especially at the margins, within a 
community, religious or otherwise, there is often a fair degree of consensus about 
the morality of particular acts, but not necessarily unanimity - differences in 
perception and perspective are ubiquitous. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 140) This of 
course is not surprising, for we have seen earlier that the individual actualises 
their subjectivity within a specific social universe and the purpose of this 
consensus is indeed the maintenance of the plausibility of that social universe 
and an investment in community building that serves to feed predictability and 
social stability. In other words, fallible cognitive heuristics facilitate the 
maintenance of biases and bubbles, which in turn contribute to our inability to 
initially detect and subsequently leave our moral bubbles because the immediate 
psychological tranquillity translates into social and normative beliefs, which are 
propped by implicit or explicit power interests and plausible power relationships, 
that afford the same tranquillity and provide for plausibility of the inevitability of 
our social universe and subjective social reality. 
5.3 Multiculturalism, human dignity and recognition 
Thus far, we have seen how cognitive and social processes generally 
(can) function in concert in order to generate social stability and maintain a 
particular social universe, which in principle enables the individual to make sense 
of their location in a particular social universe, or for the example of the Islamist 
radicalisation process as occupational change to bring into alignment and stability 
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with previously acquired frames of reference, which in turn provides for 
psychological tranquillity and ease. As we have also come to recognise however, 
none of the available social universes are inevitable and indeed the existence of 
divergent social realities confront the individual with alternative social universes 
and thereby threaten the tranquillity afforded by any particular social universe 
within which the individual knows how to locate themselves, thereby empirically 
demonstrating the relativity of one’s own social universe. In threatening the 
inevitability of a particular social reality and thereby implicitly calling into question 
roles, hierarchies and the distribution of power, the existence of alternative social 
universes not only disrupt the individual’s psychological tranquillity but 
furthermore demonstrates that the social and political distribution of power is but 
one possibility.  
Contextually chapter three has already drawn attention to the manner in 
which counterterrorism policy approaches and rhetoric, relies on the 
establishment of boundaries and the reification of a particular social universe. 
This necessarily fails to capture the multiplicity of identity processes and 
subjectivity in the lived every-day contexts of individuals and has been 
demonstrated to carry the potential for political polarisation and social conflict. 
This in turn has been shown to be taken up in counterterrorism discourse and 
policy making. This chapter however, thus far has demonstrated that fallible 
cognitive heuristics and the selective social interests in the maintenance of 
coherent social universes inhibit fully actualised perspective taking and 
emancipatory truth claims. Terrorism Studies has not managed to carve out a 
normative space from which it can participate in the mediation of subjectively 
moral claims to social truths.  
Based upon an epistemic crisis of counterterrorism and a failure to 
politically adequately account for the implications and questions raised by the 
unboundedness of terrorism, policy making, and political rhetoric cannot but fail 
to confront the unboundedness at the heart of terrorism. In an attempt to exercise 
a perceived moral duty to prevent terrorist atrocities, governments in general, and 
as has been shown the UK government in particular, rely on constructed lines of 
orientation which incorporate existing exclusionary practises and cognitive biases 
that remain hidden but which take the form of ‘British values’, notions of 
extremism and radicalisation in order to be able to communicate relative 
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knowability of the origins of threats to national security in a climate where the 
dominant paradigm is one of uncertainty. Policy making and rhetoric, that is driven 
by an unrealistic desire to offer predictability, knowability and manageability, 
however does so by relying on a bounded conception of values and a sense of 
belonging. This do not do justice to the multiplicity of identity processes and 
subjectivity. Government therefore runs counter the promise of openness and 
equal participation of all citizens by failing to recognise that it makes it demands 
from within but one specific, pre-determined social universe, which moreover 
represents hegemonic power-relationships that minorities have few opportunities 
to shape. It must indeed be noted, that Stampnitzky (Forthcoming) is absolutely 
right in her observation, that the contestation on (the definition of) terrorism 
stands in lieu of more central questions that cultural and political life in a post-
migration raises in relation to notions of the enemy, notions of the separation 
between public and private and what counts as political as well as on the 
legitimacy of violence. In other words, at the heart our relating to terrorism, lie 
exclusionary social, political and cultural practises, which privilege the status quo. 
This chapter thus far has illustrated cognitive and social mechanisms conspire to 
facilitate this privilege. But it has also made clear, that this privilege is no 
psychological or sociological necessity, precisely because it was shown that both, 
social reality and knowledge thereof, are dialectically constructed. 
The following section builds on the processes that construct and enable 
knowledge of social reality and draw attention to the importance of identity 
processes and subjectivity in the context of a multicultural liberal democracy, in 
order to understand the subjectivity of the expectations that the promise of 
inclusivity and human dignity generate and concomitantly to see how 
preventative counterterrorism that focuses on a bounded conception of values 
serves to illustrate the exclusion of communities whose existence is not afforded 
a space of a-security. Overall, the purpose has however been to call upon 
Terrorism Studies to participate more responsibly in enabling policy making by 
making intelligible the fluidity and ambiguity at the heart of terrorism and promotes 
the ontological crisis at the heart of counterterrorism. It does so because it takes 
seriously the promise of a liberal democracy that expresses its commitment to 
human dignity and mutual respect for all its citizens and ultimately understands 
the academic study of terrorism to have a responsibility vis-a-vis humanity in the 
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form of emancipatory citizenship. It will serve the purpose to demonstrate that the 
task of Terrorism Studies ought to be to make intelligible and indeed navigate 
both the ontological and epistemological dimensions of terrorism, not only in 
order to enable better policy making but indeed to allow to navigate the fluidity, 
ambiguity and uncertainty that is not only the marker of counterterrorism but 
identity processes and subjectivity in modernity (Griffin, 2012) which attempt to 
deal with an ontological need for security and indeed the confrontation of the very 
questions that Stampnitzky argues to lie at the heart of the contestation of the 
notion of terrorism. 
5.3.1 The pressure on multiculturalism 
In Britain in particular, the notion of ‘British values’ (re-)captured political 
rhetoric and gained momentum since the election of the conservative government 
in May 2015, in its attempt to counter (non-)violent extremism. (National Security 
Council, 2015) Cameron’s muscular promotion of British values and the 
institutions that uphold them juxtaposes this with a too tolerant multiculturalism. 
(Cameron, 2015) Multiculturalism has come under increasing political pressure 
throughout Western Europe (Malik, 2015), particularly for the supposed role it 
plays in enabling extremism, radicalisation and terrorism (BBC, 2011) for it is 
thought to be the root of the problem of domestic terrorism. (Cameron, 2011) 
When Alexander (Alexander, 2007, p. 117) observes that community 
cohesion offers access to Britishness in ‘circumscribed circumstances’ the 
current political rhetoric in relation to the limits of tolerance in a liberal democracy 
like Britain is a case in point. As Theresa May, then Home Secretary makes clear:  
‘The starting point of the new [Counter-Extremism] strategy is the 
emphatic rejection of the misconception that in a liberal democracy like 
Britain, “anything goes”, the belief that living in a society like ours 
means there aren’t really any fundamental rules or norms. Instead, the 
foundation stone of our new strategy is the proud promotion of British 
values.’ (May, 2015) 
This mirrors then Prime Minister Cameron’s stance that  
‘[O]ur values have a vital role to play in uniting us. They should help to 
ensure Britain not only brings together people from different countries, 
cultures and ethnicities, but also ensures that, together, we build a 
common home. In recent years we have been in danger of sending out 
a worrying message: that if you don’t want to believe in democracy, 
that’s fine; that if equality isn’t your bag, don’t worry about it; that if 
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you’re completely intolerant of others, we will still tolerate you.’ 
(Cameron, 2015) 
 Just as Alexander (2007, p. 118) notes for the context of community 
cohesion however, the rhetoric surrounding ‘British values’ in fact highlights the 
unresolved tension between ‘the assertion of a common citizenship, the position 
of diverse ethnic, racial and faith communities and the ongoing issues of social, 
political and cultural marginalisation of minorities, both as collectives and as 
individuals.’ This places into renewed focus Parakh’s question of ‘what values 
and loyalties must be shared by communities and individuals in One Nation (…) 
How is the balance struck between the need to treat people equally, the need to 
treat people differently, and the need to maintain shared values and social 
cohesion?’ (CFMEB, 2000, p. xv) 
 In spite of the populist-charged criticism that the idea of a multicultural 
society receives then, multiculturalism remains the encapsulation of a moral 
promise for equal membership in society in spite of difference. (Taylor and 
Gutmann, 1992) It is the political and social attempt to come to terms with the 
existence of post-migration minority groups within a majority society. Indeed, 
Modood (2007, p. 39) observes, ‘multiculturalism refers to the struggle, the 
political mobilisation but also the policy and institutional outcomes, to the forms 
of accommodation in which ‘differences’ are not eliminated, are not washed away 
but to some extend recognised.’  
As institutions and conventions within a polity are shaped to first and 
foremost suit the needs and practises of the dominant cultural, linguistic or 
religious groups however, it must be acknowledged that the public space cannot 
be neutral, but ‘unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities’. (Kymlicka, 1995, 
p. 108) In promoting certain cultural identities, even implicitly through their 
unquestioned, silent space in public institutions and conventions however and 
the only subsequent and explicit adjustment to the (negotiated) needs of a 
marginalised group, non-dominant cultural identities are disadvantaged. The 
presence of cultural, linguistic or religious minorities in a polity has a political 
character and gives rise to the processes and outcomes of political struggles and 
negotiations around the fact of difference, where struggles and outcomes in which 
certain kinds of difference are asserted, recognised and accommodated is not 
considered illegitimate. For multiculturalism recognises that cultural identities are 
constituted by differences that matter to people. 
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Multiculturalism then recognises that cultural identities are constituted by 
difference and recognises that group-differentiating dimensions exist in ways that 
are established both from inside the minority culture, but also from the outside. 
Difference is a product of exclusionary processes, of impositions both, from 
outside one’s culture, as well as from the inside and is central to the social 
constitution of cultural identities. (Modood, 2007, p. 35-40) 
The reason why cultural identities deserve public recognition is because 
their recognition acknowledge difference as not only a stigmatic differentiation 
from others but also as entailing a sense of belonging to others, that is a sense 
of identity that groups so perceived have of themselves. The differences 
perceived both, from the inside as well as from the outside, do not just constitute 
a form of distinctness but a form of alienness or inferiority, which  contributes to 
a mode of being as well as a mode of oppression that fosters an unequal ‘us-
them’ relationship. (Modood, 2007, p. 36-37) The moral promise of 
multiculturalism, captures an extended concept of equality, not just in the sense 
of equal dignity, but also in the sense of equal respect and necessitates an 
inclusion into and the making of a shared public space, rather than a (demanded) 
retreat to the private. (Modood, 2007, p. 61-62) Taylor and Gutman (1992, p. 24) 
note that mutual respect requires a widespread willingness and ability to 
articulate our disagreements and defend them in order to discern the difference 
between respectable and disrespectable disagreements, with the ability to 
change our own minds when faced with well-reasoned criticism. For this, the 
moral promised of multiculturalism depends on the exercise of open-ended 
deliberation and reason. 
The political struggle for recognition, and multiculturalism according to 
Habermas (1994, p. 117), actually recognises the individual as a bearer of right 
to cultural membership and begins with the struggle about the articulation and 
interpretations of context-specify achievements and interests, whereby the scale 
of values of the society as a whole is up for discussion. A consequence of this of 
course is that, core private areas will become part of the public articulation of the 
expression of a collective identity and established boundaries between public and 
private spheres are up for discussion as well. Because it is recognised that it is 
through socialisation processes in inter-subjectively shared contexts of life that 
an individual conducts their ethical-political discourses and attempts to reach self-
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understanding. With the individuals’ identity interwoven with collective identities, 
and the moral promise of equal dignity and respect, the individual’s 
intersubjectively experienced identity can only be stabilised in a network that is 
not merely private. Of course, what becomes clear then is that, via ’British values’ 
the state appears to appeal to a seemingly cohesive reality and can lean on state 
power in order to invoke normative, affective and cognitive components geared 
to safeguard a measure of symmetry between objective and subjective reality. 
Identity, however is a key element of subjective reality stands in a dialectical 
relationship with society and is never static. (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 194) 
5.3.2 Identity and Recognition 
Alexander (2007) reminds us that identity and difference take shape within 
institutional regimes of power and political practises but also notes that people 
locate themselves in relation to more immediate and more tangible sets of ties 
and obligations that stands between - and mediate - the state-citizen relationship. 
How we understand identity, becomes critical for our understanding of 
community, difference and how policy in relation to these is formulated. 
Brah (2007, p. 140) furthermore points out that ‘we become human 
through our sense of unique otherness’. Identity encapsulates ‘a latent 
psychological investments in culturally specific, social ways of doing things in a 
particular way, an investment that reflects subjectivity and ‘the self’’. This in turn, 
is shaped by contradictory processes of identification, projection, disavowal, 
aspiration and ambivalence.’ Social or political identities on the other hand, are a 
conscious action that seeks to make sense of ‘the self’ - the opaqueness of 
subjectivity - in relation to a lived social and political reality. The psychic 
investment in social or political identification, which consciously brings ‘the self’ 
into alignment with social reality is one that defers difference, (Hall in Du Gay, 
1996) in the sense of forsaking a degree of our own sense of unique otherness. 
Because social and political identities come with this psychological investment 
and identities are shaped by social realities and collective dialogue, the public 
recognition of our identity requires a politics that leaves us to deliberate publicly 
about those aspects of our identities that we potentially share with others, 
(Gutman in Taylor, 1992, p. 7) for it acknowledges our humanity. 
Social and political identities then are constituted by aligning ‘the self’ with 
social interactions and public discourse. By making the unconscious workings of 
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the self ‘the private’ conscious and public, conscious agency and unconscious 
subjectivity are enmeshed in everyday rituals which provide ‘the site on which a 
sense of belonging’ may be forced in articulating its difference from other people’s 
way of doing things. (Brah, 2007, p. 142) Brah (2007, p. 144) describes this as a 
‘homing desire’ that gives individuals a sense of belonging and security and 
arises from the concrete circumstances that ‘give content to identification’. 
Failing to recognise groups as individuals, however bears the danger of 
disregarding unconscious processes that are at work in deferring difference and 
forsaking a degree of our unique otherness and the psychological investment that 
comes with this. It may contribute to an undifferentiated obsession with a singular 
identity and indeed social stability, which appears to be the only one available for 
an individual and becomes the only source of meaning and pride, the only bond 
with others and the only way of forming part of a collective narrative. However, 
this erases both the recognition of individuals with minds, interests and talents of 
their own as well as the negotiated deferral of difference in which the individual 
has invested in bringing into alignment their subjective self with a conscious social 
or political identity. (Wolf, 1994) 
The push for an identification with a political identity, such as ‘Britishness’ 
then must be both, part of a lived reality and a matter of daily experiences, 
nurtured through social relationships based on recognition and equality for it to 
provide for a sense of belonging and security. This is so because it recognises 
the psychological investment that comes with the deferral of our unique otherness 
that comes with this identification.  
Morally then, national identity must be respectful of and build upon the 
negotiated identities that people value and does not trample upon them, precisely 
because it comes with the recognition of a negotiated individual subjectivity that 
may - or may not -  identify with collectively expressed and/or performed 
signifiers. Such respect moreover, is a recognition of the moral promise of equal 
rights as well as equal dignity which flows from an understanding of a secure 
cultural context as a ‘basic primary good’ to provide meaning and guidance in 
peoples’ (individual) choice of a good life. (Taylor, 1992) A genuine recognition of 
equal dignity must go beyond solidarity with those who express the desire for 
respect of their (non-hegemonic) choice of the good life. It necessitates 
transformation of our own standards and values for the moral thrust of the 
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argument based on the recognition of equal dignity lies in a concern with the 
unjustified judgement of inferior status allegedly made of non-hegemonic 
cultures, that is the lack of understanding of what constitutes value from the 
perspective of ‘the Other’. 
Such a demand for respect and recognition necessitates a plural, 
changing, inclusive and lived British identity. Modood (2007, p. 150-151) points 
out that such a national identity, which is based on the ‘fusion of horizons’ can be 
as emotionally and politically meaningful to British Muslims as the appeal of jihadi 
sentiments, and would provide for a ‘homing site’ that provides both belonging 
and security. Sharing a common fate with fellow citizens then depends on the 
public recognition - both institutional and social - of the thrust of the moral promise 
of equality of rights and dignity so that, the subjectively experienced desire to 
flourish as an individual as well as the sacrifice in the form of the deferral of unique 
individual difference and the negotiated identification is intimately linked, for 
recognised as being linked, with the flourishing of public institutions and society.50 
This however, stands in stark contrast with observation that the notion of 
‘Britishness’ today is ‘non-relational and stresses passive attributes’ that get most 
easily activated to ‘disqualify any group that appears to show insufficient 
‘Britishness’’. (Parekh, 2007, p. 134-135) It must be questioned, whether the 
move towards ‘Britishness’ or ‘British values’, can satisfy a ‘homing desire’ and 
provide a meaningful sense of belonging and concomitantly, increase national 
security. 
In the absence of such a recognition and the undifferentiated bureaucratic 
application of the notion of ‘British values’ particularly in the context of 
preventative counterterrorism, it may indeed serve to remove ‘Britishness’ further 
from lived realities and daily experiences but become a function of institutional 
regimes of power and exclusionary political practices that jeopardises the ties 
that individuals have with the state and encourage a retreat to exclusive identity 
categories and a retreat into the private realm, where fallacious cognitive 
heuristics can go unchallenged. This attempt to offer bounded notions of threat 
and relative knowability in order to enable the management of uncertainty and 
                                            
50 This draws together Brah’s homing desire as well as the CFMEB’s report suggestion that 
national identity depends on the recognition of the interlink and investment in between the 
individual’s and society’s fate. (Brah, 2007, CRMEB, 200, Brah, 1996). 
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potentiality in preventative counterterrorism approaches does not only break the 
moral promise of equal citizenship but the overbearing focus on the potential 
threat to national security and the perceived moral obligation to ‘do something’ to 
counter that threat, makes it increasingly difficult to be self-reflective. In relating 
to the threat of terrorism, the government contributes to the establishment of a 
moral cocoon, which serves to reify and preserve as the objective social universe 
only one of many different readings of values and citizenship to the exclusion of 
all the others, which the moral promise of equal citizenship entails. 
5.4 Terrorism Studies and the need for emancipatory 
truth claims  
This chapter has demonstrated that individuals as well as societies 
function on the basis of operational procedures that enable the individual and the 
collective to make sense of their subjectivity in relation to their social universe. 
This process however is not only dynamic, socially mediated and selective but 
also works on the basis of fallible cognitive heuristics that, while enabling the 
individual to generally process information with ease, can lead to faulty 
conclusions. While it should generally hold true, that in a society where discrepant 
worlds are available on a market basis and an increasing consciousness of the 
relativity of all worlds, including one’s own should develop, (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967, p. 192) we have also observed that, social processes and 
cognitive heuristics work so as to privilege the maintenance of moral bubble and 
social predictability and stability to the detriment of emancipatory truth claims and 
the recognition of subjectivity. The tragedy hereby lies in the fact that both, social 
processes and cognitive heuristics function not only against the background of 
specific power interests and the threat inherent in the confrontation with an 
alternative that calls into question the inevitability of one’s own subjective social 
(and moral) universe but also through the systematic disguise of their existence. 
Taken together, these processes inhibit empathetic perspective taking and the 
pursuit of emancipatory truth claims and contribute to the perpetual maintenance 
of moral bubbles and exclusionary practises. 
It is against this background that this chapter wishes to reiterate its 
suspicion of positivist research and caution against the possibility of neutral and 
objective expertise on terrorism. What should be clear by now is that terrorism as 
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an unbounded object of knowledge and triggering, particularly for the context of 
preventative counterterrorism measures, uncertainty as the domineering security 
paradigm leads to relating to terrorism via questions central to civil society, 
national identity, and importantly via the invocation of morality. 
Conceptually it is important that Terrorism Studies explicitly affirms the 
possibility, that terroristic violence is morally indifferent, and that morality follows 
from the selective, and as will become clearer in the following chapter, necessarily 
consequentialist application of moral theories. It is critical to note that morality as 
such does not fall apart because it is infringed upon by an individual, be it only 
once or on various occasions. Morality is viscous, that is morality recovers so that 
individual acts of violence will not make the system fall apart because ultimately 
morality serves to enable social stability. And because morality is viscous, it is 
arguable that the morality of violence is dominated by a consequentialist logic 
that relies on readily available moral theories to justify post-hoc instances of 
violence. Because morality bounces back, it is more than conceivable that 
morality requires forgiveness and empathy that facilitates the ongoing inclusion 
of the (violent) actor as well as the violent act in the social order.  
It is in recognition of the fact, that the ‘evil’ of one’s own violence is 
disguised from the individual, that I wish to re-emphasise the very tragedy at the 
core of researching political violence in general and terrorism, in particular. On 
the one hand, violence is disguised ontologically through the individual’s moral 
embubblement propped by fallible cognitive heuristics and instances of our own 
violence may not be discernible as such. On the other hand, empirically we 
disguise our own violence through the post-hoc justification with a-priori existing 
moral theories, in an attempt to mitigate the potential for cognitive dissonance 
and psychologically experienced discomfort. We do in fact justify violence with 
reference to utilitarian considerations that find resonance with our own cultural 
repertoire, that is integrating our own subjective universe with the operating 
procedures of our social universe. It is for this twofold tragic augmented by that 
fact that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, humans can and do get social 
actions wrong, because they are limited strategic agents whose cognitive 
heuristics and operating procedures privilege stability over emancipatory truth 
claims.  
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An emancipatory approach to violence ought to start with an empathetic 
understanding of the social embeddedness of the individual social actor and the 
subjectively experienced and processed internal as well as external constraints 
upon an individual’s social action that is guided by an explicit recognition of this 
very tragic. This understanding enables a radical methodological empathy rather 
than a clouding of analysis due to the moral valence that an act of violence 
(tragically) invokes. I emphasise the need for a radical methodological empathy 
because the processes and mechanisms described in this chapter apply 
universally, to policy-makers, to co-citizens, to interested observers as well as to 
perpetrators of terroristic violence, albeit of course as a mirror image of the other’s 
perception. In recognising the humanity as well as tragic fallacies in ourselves as 
well as others, especially when we are shocked by their (non-) violent 
articulations and actions, we can respond in a more responsible manner that 
recognises and confronts the unbounded nature of terrorism for we recognise 
and mitigate for the fact, that our cognitive faculties are geared towards 
boundedness, embubblement and exclusion that are disguised from ourselves 
but importantly, visible and experienced from the perspective of the Other. It is for 
this reason that Terrorism Studies must provide expertise on the basis of an 
explicit normative position that enables emancipatory truth claims and instils 
moments of reflection that enable critical self-reflection and moral learning. 
5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated how contextually differentiating between 
descriptive morality and normative valence of a violent act is made difficult, 
because in processing information and manoeuvring social relationships, 
humans rely on cognitive heuristics that privilege social stability and predictability 
and the concomitant psychological ease over (emancipatory) truth claims and 
non-consequentialist notions of morality. The (cognitive) aids, which help 
individuals to find their place in society and process information efficiently, have 
however been shown to be liable to be fallacious and thereby encourage a retreat 
to moral bubbles. This, due to the stability that cognitive heuristics and their 
structural manifestation enable, tragically prevent us from recognising our own 
biases and the power interests incorporated therein, by systematically fallible 
disguising our own violence from ourselves. We have however also noted, that 
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cognitive heuristics and the maintenance of the stability of our social universe are 
by no means inevitable but rather maintained in dynamic and open dialogue with 
social reality. Most importantly we have noted, that humans when called upon 
possess the ability to overcome affect-laden cognitive heuristics and incorporate 
new, reasoned information and thereby challenge conclusions reached by more 
automated processes which lends credibility to the claim, that moral learning is 
indeed possible. A tension, however, remains if confronted with alternative social 
universes that demonstrate the relativity of social universes to the individual and 
thereby disturbed the tranquillity afforded by cognitive and social processes of 
reality maintenance. This systematic albeit tragic fallibility of our cognitive 
heuristics as well as their exploitability for the purpose of maintaining social 
coherence and stability of course is inextricably linked with the construction of 
terrorism as inherently evil and the fact that in order to maintain credibility and 
authority, ‘experts’ on terrorism ‘needed to maintain a certain distance from their 
very object of expertise.’ (Stampnitzky, 2015b, p. 165-166) Stampnitzky notes 
that ‘as terrorism solidified as an object of expert knowledge, it did not become 
‘purified’ of its political or moral character; but rather, the expert discourse 
became more characterised by an intertwining of moral, political and 
scientific/analytical concerns, leading to persistent difficulties for those who would 
treat political violence as an object of rational knowledge accessible via positivist 
research methodologies.  
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6 Stretching Moral Bubbles - Existential struggles for 
recognition and emancipatory research 
  “Since there is no typical psychological terrorist profile and since most 
terrorists are normal in a clinical sense (albeit not in a moral one), typologies of 
terrorism that take the terrorist actor as their main criterion for classification are bound 
to be of limited value.” (Emphasis added Schmid, 2011, p. 191)  
 
Chapter two has established that terrorism as an object of knowledge 
occupies an intersitial position whose meaning Terrorism Studies continues to be 
unable to control because terrorism is an unbounded object of knowledge that is 
shaped through fluid and open discourse due to the lack of barriers that would 
qualify responsible participation and expertise on the topic. The academic and 
analytical study of terrorism, rather than being able to stabilise the discourse by 
appeal to universal, neutral, or apolitical principles cannot but fail to live up to this 
academic standard of objectivity, not least due to the permeability of its 
disciplinary boundary. Moreover, we have seen in chapter three that terrorism 
takes shape in the context of civil society and not only in the context of national 
security. This has tangible implications for the recognition of the existence and 
contestation over shared public space and exclusionary practises and 
discourses, which, for the context of the UK have been demonstrated to 
particularly shape the manner in which Muslims, can and do, express their subject 
and citizen position, most notably but not exclusively in the aftermath of terrorist 
atrocities. This has lead us to agree with Stampnitzky’s observation, that 
contestation of terrorism can in fact be understood to reveal more profound 
questions central to contemporary political and cultural life, which has moreover 
been demonstrated to hold true particularly throughout chapter three for the 
context of preventative counterterrorism approaches under the UK government’s 
PREVENT strategy and chapter five for the context of post-migration social 
realities and the contestation of multiculturalism, citizenship, and hegemonic 
values.  
Through the lens of the politics of terrorism we saw that the move towards 
prevention relies not only on the notion of potentiality of the actualisation of a 
future threat or terrorist event, but moreover on the relative knowability as to the 
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origin and type of threat, which necessitates the delineation of boundaries as 
lines of orientation to enable policy making where the dominating policy paradigm 
rests on uncertainty. Against the uncertain threat of a potentially catastrophic act 
of terrorism, a vague and abstract notion of shared values has come to provide 
these lines of orientation aimed at making identifiable the uncertain threat, in an 
attempt to communicate relative knowability. Particularly the latter part of chapter 
three has also shown that the notion of shared values at the same time serves to 
reify taken-for-granted hegemonic power-relationships and to limit the 
unmitigated spaces for expression of notions of identity and equal citizenship that 
a dynamic liberal democracy promises.  
The contextual manifestation of the politics of terrorism in the form of the 
PREVENT approach in the UK has shown, that the terrorism researcher is 
confronted with an inherent tension between the unboundedness of the object of 
knowledge and the concomitant permeability and consequences of its discourse 
and thus far, has remained unable to stabilise this tension through a responsible 
normative position from which to develop and exercise her expertise on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, an empathetic recognition of the universal human 
tendency to establish boundaries in an attempt to establish plausibility structures 
that aid the maintenance of a particular social universe and thereby provide a 
basis for relative knowability to enable not only preventative counterterrorism 
approaches but more universally, to generally enable the individual to 
successfully manoeuvre her social environment with psychological ease and 
tranquillity.  
Chapter four on the other hand has emphasised the social psychological 
evolution of violence as an affect-laden strategy to regulate social relationships 
and stressed the fact that, even when humans regulate their social relationships 
violently, they generally aim to do so within culturally shared and recognised 
moral motives. The culturally shared and recognised moral motives however 
have been shown to be highly contextual and subject to the individual’s 
perception but can indeed be understood as representative of the individual’s 
attempt to navigate a particular social reality. The focus of the chapter was to 
demonstrate the fact, that even when individuals utilise violence, they do so with 
a subjectively moral motive in mind. This motivation has empirically been shown 
to hold true in spite of its counterintuitive appeal and has served to justify the shift 
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away from a focus on the corporeal manifestation and the instrumental utility of 
violence because of the latter’s embeddedness in social and political power 
relation. Chapter four furthermore necessitated to distinguish normative moral 
valence of the violent act from the a contextual-descriptive morality of violence.  
With this in mind, chapter five then demonstrated how contextually 
differentiating between descriptive morality and normative valence of a violent act 
is made difficult, because in processing information and manoeuvring social 
relationships, humans rely on cognitive heuristics that privilege social stability and 
predictability and the concomitant psychological ease over (emancipatory) truth 
claims and non-consequentialist notions of morality. It has therefore been difficult 
for experts to carve out a position from which to produce expertise that is 
rational/apolitical/value-neutral, and even experts who seem to get too close to 
terrorists may be tagged as ‘sympathetic’, and thus, lose their credibility.’ 
(Stampnitzky, 2015b, p. 166) While these observations have important 
implications for the structural limitations of terrorism expertise, Jackson notes that 
Critical Terrorism Studies arose precisely as a counter-expertise movement 
aimed  
‘in part at exposing, resisting and deconstructing knowledge-power 
flows and relationships both in relation to the security and 
counterterrorism establishment as well as knowledge mediators 
between academia, the media, policy and the public, terror expertise 
nonetheless remains entangled in ‘the politics of anti-knowledge’ 
(Jackson, 2015b, p 186) 
 At the same time and most importantly however, he notes that one 
weaknesses of Critical Terrorism Studies was the failure to ‘fully articulate the 
theoretical basis for CTS in terms of its ontological, epistemological, 
methodological, and normative basis’ (emphasis added, Jackson, 2015b, p. 197) 
which in other words confirms Stampnitzky’s observation that experts failed to 
carve out a position from which to produce expertise. I argue that a normative 
position in fact would allow to recognise and responsibly account for the 
systematic disguise of different types of violence as strategies to regulate social 
relationships and anchored in fallible cognitive heuristics and thereby enabling 
empathy for the subject positions and motives of those whose violence we tend 
to cast as ‘morally tainted’ recognising moral taintedness as put a particular 
manifestation of taken-for-granted hegemonic power-relationships.  
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Indeed, it is the contention of this thesis, that the failure to provide a 
normative basis for the study of terrorism critically prevents Terrorism Studies 
from acting as responsible knowledge mediators of an unbounded, politicised, 
and as we will shortly see necessarily moralised object of knowledge. In 
recognition of the workings of the politics of terrorism and the boundedness and 
concomitant retreat to moral bubbles this encourages, Terrorism Studies can thus 
far, not provide the normative guidance that allows to responsibly navigate the 
tension between the tragic cognitive fallacies that lead to moral embubblement 
and its contextual implications for wider questions of political and social life, and 
terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge. In other words, Terrorism 
Studies does not have a normative-theoretical position from which it could act as 
a responsible mediator of knowledge to encourage self-reforming moral learning 
and knowledge, that reminds of the need to take perspectives, allows for 
subjectivity and critical reflection and most importantly encourage caution 
because of the recognition of universal cognitive blind-sports and biases 
particularly in light of the observation that empirically, every act of terrorism brings 
to the fore terrorism experts as narrators or commentators that can and do exploit 
these necessarily fallacious cognitive heuristics. Without a normative position 
however it is the contention of this thesis, and as the quote from Schmid above 
makes clear, terrorism cannot be but morally condemned even in seemingly value 
neutral, positivist research approaches, even if this is rarely made explicit, 
because, as we have seen in the previous chapter, humans have cognitively 
evolved and adapted fallible heuristics to selectively ‘see’, and moralise violence. 
It is in recognition of the fact that individuals and societies privilege social stability 
and predictability, for Terrorism Studies to take on the role of generating 
responsible knowledge and precisely take on the task of making emancipatory 
truth claims.   
However, the analytically thus far unchallenged position that terroristic 
violence has an often merely implicit pejorative moral valence - rather than seeing 
it as subjectively moral social action - has been shown in chapter five to build, in 
principle on the same evolved cognitive fallacies. Generously and empathetically 
understanding our own position of moral embubblement as a tragedy rather than 
hypocrisy, that lies at the very core of a disparate and precisely never neutral 
manner of relating to terroristic violence, would encourage reflexivity and an 
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explicit commitment to the production of emancipatory expertise. This must be 
done with the generous methodological recognition that neutrality and an amoral 
stance are tragically illusive. Recognising the universality of evaluative processes 
in relation to violence from a social psychology perspective as well as the 
exploitation of these processes has demonstrated to open an avenue for 
academic researchers to implore a more deeply reasoned and normative 
engagement with terroristic violence by making more explicit its essence and 
thereby facilitating a normatively-reasoned yet affect-empathetic engagement 
with terroristic violence. In other words, if terrorism research can develop a 
normative position that recognises universal, but fallacious individual cognitive 
heuristics to lie at the basis of the equally universal, moral motivation to utilise 
violence as a strategy to regulate social relationships, Terrorism Studies can 
contribute responsibly to the wider debates and the confrontation of exclusionary 
practises within societies that are shaped and framed through the lens of 
terrorism and counterterrorism.    
While Stampnitzky (Forthcoming) insightfully points to the fact that the 
contestation over the definition of terrorism indicates that the more interesting 
question actually may be ‘what does terrorism define?’ and suggests that within 
the struggle to define terrorism are contained three fundamental of contemporary 
political life, namely ‘who is the enemy? When is violence legitimate and when is 
it illegitimate? And which questions and concerns count as properly political?’, 
this chapter will suggest that understanding terrorism from a context of social 
conflict in general and as a struggle for recognition in particular, can provide for 
the normative framework from which Terrorism Studies can exercise 
emancipatory expertise. This chapter wishes to follow Haleem (2012), who 
argues that paramount for understanding the essence of Islamist extremism is 
the ability to distinguish between the radical Islamist explanations of violence and 
the radical Islamist justifications of violence. Haleem shows that the former is 
conceptually reasoned in terms of existential Hegelian struggles for recognition, 
she demonstrates that the latter conceptually follow a moral consequentialist line 
of reasoning.  
Placing terrorism within the context of social conflict and thereby taking 
the struggle for recognition as the normative framework for the study of terrorism 
will be demonstrated to not only provide for a position to produce responsible 
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expertise, but in its course also to humanise the terrorist actor and move beyond 
the event-driven accounts that contemporarily dominate the visibility of terrorism 
experts beyond the academic realm because it can serve to anchor terrorism as 
social conflict and fundamental questions that confront contemporary political life. 
This is possible because the struggle of recognition understands the essence of 
terrorism as both existential and universally anchored in the social reality of 
individuals. Within this framework it is possible to empathetically engage with the 
terrorist actor and take her and her social embeddedness as the main point of 
reference. This is with the reasoned recognition of the origins of the moral valence 
of the actor’s violence and its observer’s evaluation because the moral framing 
of the motivation. This is the case because the actor’s expressed justification for 
activism is anchored in the self-understanding (beliefs) of the individual activist; 
these beliefs, the individual holds legitimately, because the very self-
understanding of violence originates from an appeal to a universalised moral 
grammar to which the individual can lay claim. This normative framework follows 
the logic of the struggle for recognition and captures more than a reasoned 
appeal for the recognition of the ambiguity of moral judgement. This is the case 
because it can account at the same time for a moral self-understanding of the 
individual activist as well as the moral, political and social context (understanding 
by a third party) against which and within which the individual's activism takes 
place. It is this understanding that is the basis for making emancipatory truth 
claims. In other words, such a normative-theoretical framework allows to engage 
with the subjectively moral meanings of the motives of terrorists and at the same 
time, appreciates the need to responsibly manoeuvre the fact that 'research on 
terrorism is and has been deeply enmeshed with the politics of terrorism.' (Ugilt, 
2012, p. 41) 
6.1 Moral indistinguishability and the essence of 
terrorism  
Trying to appeal to the need to understand the subjectively intended 
meaning of terrorism, Baumann (2013) approaches terrorism from a perspective 
that critically engages with the traditional difficulty in sociology to grapple with the 
normalcy and order of violence and broadly follows a phenomenology of violence 
that does not understand violence as a disturbance. By means of an 
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understanding sociology he follows Weber (1922), who sees violence as social 
action. Understanding violence as normalcy and social action that makes sense 
and has meaning in relation to another that conditions and shapes the action is 
an explicit attempt to move away from understanding violence as a social evil. 
This paths the way for Baumann to endeavour an investigation into the logic of 
violence rather than a demonstration of causal relationships. Indeed, Baumann 
stipulates that the traditional search for objective characteristics and causes of 
violence and therefore, by extension of violent behaviour of individuals is 
precisely unsuccessful because it builds on a double understanding of violence 
as both, a breakdown of ‘normal’ social relations as well as a social evil. 
(Baumann, 2013, p. 29) Baumann’s approach is promising and familiar to Critical 
Terrorism Studies scholars, for it confronts the exceptionalism of terrorism from 
both a sociological as well as moral-philosophical perspective. In contrast to 
chapter four however, the approach taken here is less interested in understanding 
the individual’s social-psychological motivations to utilise violence as a 
relationship regulating strategy, but rather focuses on the perspective of the 
observer and their perceptions and concomitant evaluation of the violence to 
demonstrate the need and opportunity in shifting this perspective. It moreover 
allows to embed the action within the workings of social relationships and can 
shed light on the manner in which violence serves to shape other questions 
central to social and cultural life within a society. 
Baumann helpfully grounds his moral-philosophical considerations in a 
practical ethics and demonstrates amongst others by dissecting the application 
of Just War Theory that the supposedly absolute moral taboo of the killing of 
innocent civilians is regularly transgressed. He concludes, that the killing of 
innocents is not as much a moral taboo51 - as it is widely taken for granted 
(Schmid, 2011b) when it comes to acts of terrorism - because the notion of 
(innocent) victimhood as the basis for its moral condemnation becomes 
irrelevant. Demonstrating the moral-philosophical obsolescence of the notion of 
the sanctity of innocent civilian life in conflict (Baumann, 2013, p. 192-200) as 
well as Just War Theory (Baumann, 2013, p. 202-214), he observes that both 
                                            
51 For challenging positions on the supposed moral taboo of killing civilians for the context of wars 
see for example (Glover, 2012, Downes, 2008, Walzer, 2006).  
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notions that limit violence as well as theories that justify violence52 embody an 
inherent moral ambivalence or indeed, as a more cynical observer may note, a 
hypocritical double-standard.  
Of course, this moral ambivalence remains hidden from within the social 
universe that maintains the individual’s moral bubble, not least because it reflects 
the hegemonic consensus on the state’s monopoly to violence. Baumann 
concludes, that in principle, violence always lacks ethical foundation, and 
consequently that violence is always morally illegitimate. However he also notes 
that precisely because the act of violence is always illegitimate, any act of 
violence requires justification. (Baumann, 2013, p. 243) Because Baumann can 
demonstrate that the moral evaluation of an act of violence is not absolute but 
arbitrary, and the application of a moral theory is consequentialist and not 
deontological, he provides a moral-philosophical perspective that allows to 
empathetically understand the subjectively intended motives of terrorists by 
focusing on the justifications of their violence, that is a justification from within 
their social universe. 
By demonstrating the moral indistinguishability of different acts of violence, 
Baumann captures the core of what is often described as hypocrisy when it is 
perceived as legitimate to justify one act of violence against civilians if it is 
committed by a nation state on the one hand and the blanket condemnation of 
acts of terrorism as immoral on the other. Baumann shifts attention to the level of 
justification and the availability to communicatively establish legitimacy of one act 
of violence over another. He further reiterates that communicating the legitimacy 
of the violent action is politically relatively easy for the state, because it can invoke 
a foundational legitimacy, but that any non-state actor that employs violence 
needs to ideologically, socially, or politically justify or seek legitimacy for their act 
of violence. (Baumann, 2013, p. 62) For the non-state actor, who does not 
automatically share in the state’s monopoly to violence, this means that the space 
to communicate the moral ambivalence that is inherent in any act of violence, is 
considerably reduced, for the non-state actor cannot automatically rely either on 
the a priori, foundational legitimacy of their act of violence nor on the public space 
                                            
52 Here Baumann’s (2013) engagement with Just War Theory and reference to the ethical 
contingency of moral questions in times where ‘life is not calm’ and ‘ideas which seem noble and 
sensible (…) lose their moral glow and practical sense when times are hard’ is insightful. See 
also: (Slim, 2008). 
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to communicate their justification. In fact, more often than not, the act of violence 
by the non-state actor is disqualified as nihilistic, senseless, evil and 
straightforwardly immoral which means that there is no political or moral need to 
engage any further with the motives of and the justification offered by the actor. 
Indeed, Baumann demonstrates that, by convoluting condemnation of terrorism 
with the definition thereof, any political, philosophical or other intellectual 
engagement regarding the legitimacy is, as a matter of principle, excluded 
(Baumann, 2013, p. 82) and terrorism becomes a non-explanation that 
perpetuates injustice and asymmetries of power. (English, 2009, p. 1) And 
because, as we have seen particularly in chapter three, terrorism and particularly 
preventative counterterrorism policies comes to shape core contestations within 
civil society, it cannot be emphasised enough that disregarding the perpetuation 
of injustices, asymmetries of power and exclusionary practises, fails to 
understand the essence of the contestations around terrorism particularly in a 
civil society context. 
While Baumann concludes his moral-philosophical observations that 
violence is always illegitimate because it lacks moral foundation, he is also very 
clear that violence is a common social action. He must account for the fact that 
‘moral thought requires guidance for everyday decision making, particularly in 
exceptional circumstances to translate abstract moral thought into concrete 
ethical action.’ (Baumann, 2013, p. 215) Because Baumann (2013) can 
demonstrate that morality is ambivalent, and any violent action can, in principle, 
be communicated as morally justified, it is necessary for the violent non-state 
actor to achieve a communal belief in the legitimacy of the violence utilised and 
this belief must be coherently communicated. In order to achieve this, an 
ideological motivation needs to be offered as a justification for violence. However, 
such a justification can only be successful if terrorists do not engage in simply 
nihilist violence and ‘kill for killings’ sake. They need to be able to morally 
distinguish and communicate the morally-founded motivation for their violence 
and be able to invoke, as we have seen in the previous chapter, principles that 
direct the use of violence that are accepted for the regulation of a particular social 
relationship. Baumann provides for a foundation that makes possible an 
engagement with terrorism that critically challenges most traditional positions that 
see terrorism as normatively wrong, by pointing to the moral ambivalence of any 
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act of violence and thereby confirms the moral subjectivity of the violent actor. 
Baumann empathetically concludes that, every one of us will at some point have 
to engage in an ethical balancing act, that is, in essence, morally indistinguishable 
from the terrorist’s logic that justifies their violence. (Baumann, 2013, p. 243) And 
this, as we will shortly see, follows from an understanding of the motivation to use 
of terroristic violence within an emancipatory struggle which inevitably leads to a 
moral consequentialist reasoning. 
By taking the normalcy of violence as a starting point and normatively 
demonstrating the moral ambiguity of all violence - even the one that can claim 
prima facie legitimacy because it is perpetrated on the basis of a foundation 
legitimacy that follows from the state - from a moral-philosophical perspective, 
Baumann can critically engage and challenge the observers’, that is those that 
tend to condemn terroristic violence and thereby exclude attempts to understand 
their motives and their logic. He thereby moves closer to understand terrorist 
violence by highlighting the fact that even the terrorist’s violence happens within 
ethical parameters, albeit ones that are not shared by its observers. It is these 
ethical parameters that are communicatively invoked in order justify the violence 
and generate legitimacy. Despite the clear transgression of the supposed moral 
taboo of the sacrifice of civilian life, which can in its application be demonstrated 
to be contingent, the question as to the essence of terroristic violence suggests 
that there is more than the insight of moral ambivalence and the selective moral 
condemnation of an act of violence against civilians. To understand the essence 
of terrorism then, we need to go further than pointing at the existence of double-
standards and hypocrisy but need to uncover the very workings of the motivation 
to participate in acts of terrorism and the incoherence at its heart, precisely 
because we have seen in the previous chapter how we - tragically - have 
cognitively evolved to systematically disguise our own moral embubblement, our 
biases and cognitive fallacies from ourselves.  
Where Baumann points to the need of inner cohesion - that is a reasoned 
and communicated logic that is not merely self-referential - in order to understand 
terroristic violence, he remains focused on the ambiguity in relation to the 
justification of violence. In other words, he demonstrates the lack of moral-
philosophical, that is normative basis, for the selective application of moral-
theories post-act and expressly points to contradictions as the starting-point to 
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encourage self-reflection and emancipatory truth claims if approached with 
methodological empathy, that is the recognition of moral embubblement and the 
concomitant emotional investment therein. Even though Baumann can 
demonstrate, that morality is ambivalent, and violence is morally always 
illegitimate, he is also clear that ethics is contextual and relational (Slim, 2008), 
and the normative evaluation of the violent act happens in exchange with the 
social environment of the non-state actor. Legitimacy of the terrorist’s violent act 
is neither ultimately determined by the method utilised nor by a subjective 
perspective on morality, but by being able to communicatively utilise the inner 
cohesion and values of a constituent community.53   
This ability ultimately raises questions of power. Indeed, the moral 
understanding of self-set ethical parameters that limit violence can be shown to 
be founded upon generally accepted and shared justifications, which the 
individual subjectively perceives as unfairly denied to themselves (or their 
constituency), for they are denied without adequate justification. (Forst, 2011) 
Haleem (2012) emphasises the need for a clear distinction between explanations 
of violence and justifications of violence, in order to understand the essence of 
terrorism. Cottee and Hayward (2011, p. 976) then suggest that we ought to 
understand terrorists as ‘moral subjects who are compelled to give meaning to 
their lives’. Rather than focussing on normalising terrorism, they suggest that the 
central task of Terrorism Studies ought to be to humanise terrorists, for they are 
‘human agents, with all-too-human dreams and passions and desires’. (Cottee 
and Hayward, 2011, p. 980), and conclude, very much in line with Baumann that 
the terrorists’ self-perception is one of a moral agent. (Cottee and Hayward, 2011, 
p. 976)  
While Cottee and Hayward (2011) observe the need to humanise the 
terrorist subject, they also note a striking focus on negative emotions such as 
anger, hurt, humiliation, and grief, while they suggest that positive emotions such 
as love, solidarity and compassion might offer a more promising approach in 
understanding terrorists’ motivations. Indeed, through the lens of the existential 
struggle for recognition as an explanation for the motivation to participate in 
                                            
53 This conclusion broadly follows from Baumann (2013) who suggests that ‘terrorists’ rely on a 
society that regresses to a radical community because this closure allows for the terrorists to 
communicate their aspirations in resonance with the values of that community. 
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terrorist violence, it is not only possible to focus on these ‘positive emotions’ but 
furthermore it is possible to connect the terrorist actor and her environment not 
only to her immediate but also to a generally shared moral grammar that 
motivates the struggle for recognition. (Honneth, 1996)  
Terrorism Studies scholars cannot stop at merely recognising that 
cognitive fallacies are such that they disguise actual incoherence and therefore 
prevent reasoned critique and self-awareness, but it must further connect the 
terrorist actor and observer to a shared humanity to enable critique and moral 
learning. Baumann alludes to the problematic incoherence by oscillating between 
the selective application of moral-philosophical theories to different instances of 
violence and emphasises the need to understand the other’s desire to establish 
legitimacy via communicative justification and the appeal of a different moral 
perspective and points to the need to empathise with the individual terrorist actor. 
While this is a step in the right direction, Terrorism Studies must go further than 
pointing at the inherent moral ambivalence and the need to empathise with the 
terrorist actor, not only because this moral ambivalence will necessarily remain 
disguised to either side because of the inner (illusive) coherence that the appeal 
to legitimacy attempts to establish, but also because merely pointing at 
ambivalent morality and the selective application of moral theories encourages a 
retreat to competing moral bubbles which disguise their own existence and do 
not encourage self-reflective emancipatory truth claims.  
While the normative evaluation of the action ought not to be part of what 
interests in understanding terrorism, the essence of terrorism embodies the very 
workings of the incoherence in the normative evaluation of the action because 
the terrorist action is understood as social and its motivation is shaped by the 
meaning that the individual, who is cognisant of their social environment gives 
their action. In order to understand (the essence of) terrorism, that is an 
understanding of the very workings of incoherence in the motivation to participate 
in terroristic violence as well as the evaluation thereof, pointing to and 
acknowledging asymmetries in power and injustices as perceived by the 
perpetrator of violence is insufficient because it does not manage to connect both 
sides to anything beyond their subjective perceptions of justice, freedom and 
morality and is prone to contribute to relativism and polarities, but not 
emancipation. What becomes clear however, is that the ex-post communicated 
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justifications for violence give an insight into the moral universe not only of the 
individual but also their ‘projected moral universe’ of their social environment. 
This gives an indication, that a shared moral grammar connects the individual 
terrorist actor to a humanity beyond themselves. Haleem (2012) with her 
emphasises on the need for a clear distinction between explanations of violence 
and justifications of violence therefore, not only provides a basis for 
methodological empathy, but also makes explicit her understanding of the 
essence of terrorism in the form of a struggle for recognition. It is this struggle for 
recognition that connects the motivation of the individual terrorist actor to a 
shared moral grammar and humanity. Ultimately, if Terrorism Studies can provide 
for a normative framework that does justice to the humanity of the terrorist actor 
by capturing the existential essence of terrorism in the form of a desire to take up 
ownership and participation in a commonly shared humanity, Terrorism Studies 
can anchor its position of expertise in a normative framework and can thereby 
avoid being drawn into polarities and relativism, but indeed provide guidance for 
emancipatory truth claims and self-reforming dialogue. 
6.2 From existential explanations to consequentialist 
morality 
A significant part of this chapter will focus on the foundation of the moral self-
understanding of the individual as best represented by a struggle for recognition, 
which is an integral part of human existence and existential in nature and suggest 
that violence plays a crucial part therein. Hegel argues that the development of 
human consciousness originates from a sense of identity, which leads to an 
inevitable desire of this very self-consciousness to be recognised as distinct and 
unique by others. (Haleem, 2012) The motivation to participate in violent action, 
can be explained by an existential desire to flourish as a human being whose 
identity is externally recognised and affirmed for the individual; This notion that 
struggles for recognition are existential in nature, leads Honneth (1996) to 
conclude, that these struggles are necessarily moral consequentialist in their 
justification. This follows from Honneth’s central argument that ‘notions of 
morality are constructed to give legitimacy (or a moral license if you may) to 
struggles for recognition.’ (Haleem, 2012, p. 14) While Honneth is clear on this 
point, the implications thereof are often overlooked.  
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Honneth understands, that because the meaning-giving desire of humans, 
that is the desire of having ones distinct and unique traits of identity recognised 
by others, finds its foundation in well-established ethical relations into which the 
individual is conditioned and has learned to frame their moral expectations 
accordingly. When the individual’s moral expectations are then being violated, the 
resulting outrage and struggle to rectify the violation is a moral struggle, because 
the struggle implies a normative evaluation of the legitimacy of existing social 
arrangements that reflect the socialisation of the individual into established 
ethical relations. (Honneth, 1996) Haleem, utilises this insight and links the 
struggles for recognition to the inevitability of moral consequentialist reasoning in 
the justification of Islamist extremist activism. She can thereby demonstrate that 
(violent) activism follows this line of argument and that moral consequentialism is 
indeed the very nature of notions of morality. In fact, what Haleem’s dual-
theoretical work shows for the context of Islamist extremism, confirms the 
conclusions we drew from Virtuous Violence Theory in the previous chapter, 
which stressed the post-hoc moralised justification of violence. It does so 
however, with an explicit appeal to normative theory. 
Honneth’s position in particular allows to derive a normative framework that 
allows to shift the focus from the violent act to the broadly moral expectations that 
she holds in light of well-established and practised ethical relations that binds the 
individual terrorist actor to moral principles beyond herself and beyond subjective 
moral relativism. Where Baumann establishes the subjective justifiability of 
illegitimate terroristic violence, Honneth’s critical social theory does not deny the 
legitimacy of violence per se, because it can be anchored as a merely inevitably 
means of consequentialist morality in an existential struggle for recognition and 
thereby connects the individual terrorist actor not only to their immediate social 
environment but to the existential desires that motivate humanity. 
6.2.1 Struggle for Recognition and the quest for full moral 
subjectivity 
Building on Hegel’s notion of self-consciousness, the struggle for recognition 
is understood to fundamentally challenge any master-slave relationship through 
a dialectic which describes the realisation by the salve of a cyclical causality 
between master and slave. The slave over time achieves an awakening of his 
distinct self-consciousness, that is her sense of autonomy. The struggle for 
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recognition of one’s identity is of identity as at once distinct from the other and 
equally significant to the other. As a consequence, the slave comes to see the 
master’s mastery as rhetorical and does no longer accept this mastery as the 
‘natural’ order of things. The slave comes to a point where she comes to 
recognise her own worthiness despite the lack of recognition form the master. 
Once the slave reaches this self-recognition, she is empowered not only because 
she sees the tenuous nature of the master’s mastery but also because she no 
longer depends on the master for the recognition of her distinct and autonomous 
sense of self. For Hegel, this struggle for recognition is based on the fears of 
negation and desires for recognition and in this way struggles for recognition have 
been argued to be existential, that is a common tendency of all human existence, 
and are in essence universal struggles against the negation of the self. (Haleem, 
2012, p. 13-14) 
Struggles for recognition in the Hegelian sense then, are struggles for the 
demarcation of one’s autonomy and independence from the other, yet at the 
same time the recognition of equal significance to the other. It is important to keep 
in mind, that recognition in this context implies both, identification of one’s distinct 
self-consciousness in the sense of acknowledgement, as well as the approval in 
the sense of respect for that distinct self-consciousness. (Inwood, 1992) From 
this of course follows that the other not only acknowledges but further respects 
differences and can only be experienced intersubjectively. Haleem (2012, p. 16) 
makes clear that  
‘if the other acknowledges one’s distinctness but relegates it an inferior 
status, that is not the recognition that is sought in struggles for 
recognition for in such a case one is not considered equal to the other 
but only distinct from the other.’ (Haleem, 2012, p. 16) 
And because recognition demarcates one’s freedom and independence, and 
carries a sense of dignity, pride and autonomy, the struggle for recognition is 
critical in explaining the desire for recognition, and the motivation to struggle for 
recognition. What follows then for Hegel is that ‘violent combat is not an 
accidental occurrence in human affairs but a necessary element in the process 
of proving oneself a person’ because it serves to break the momentum that 
established existing and hegemonic relationships between the master and the 
slave. Violence then become not only demarcations of self-recognition but also 
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the very tools that challenge the master’s mastery. (Devji, 2005, Haleem, 2012, 
p. 20-23)  
It is against a background that endeavours human emancipation understood 
as ‘liberation of human beings from the circumstances that enslave them’ 
(Horkheimer, 1982, p. 244) that Honneth develops a Critical Social Theory that 
builds on Hegel’s master-slave dialectic but further follows in a tradition of Marx, 
Kant, and Weber. Honneth understands the motivation for social conflict and the 
insight for emancipatory critique as resting within the domain of ordinary human 
experiences (Honneth, 1996, p. 163) rather than intellectual theorising. Although 
he initiates his approach with a discussion of Hegel and building on the existential 
struggle for recognition and in focusing on the dependence of the existence of 
well-established ethical relations for human flourishing, he argues that these 
relations can only be established through a social conflict. Honneth grounds his 
position within experience-based knowledge that persons have about their 
dependence on sound, autonomy enhancing forms of recognition, and further 
that because recognition is intersubjectively experienced, this means that a 
reconciliation of differences and the realisation of universality - that is true 
emancipation - can only be achieved through greater social inclusion, (Adorno 
and Jephcott, 2005, p. 103) because it is only through social interaction that the 
individual experiences herself as the full and trusted contributor to shared social 
projects. Honneth concludes, that the motivating origin of social conflict can be 
located in an individual’s negative experience of having their broadly moral 
expectations violated.54 (Honneth, 1996, p. xvii) This follows from Honneth 
epistemological stance where he identifies three socially sanctioned principles 
that are the result of moral learning, whereby over many generations members 
of society have gradually acquired knowledge of what it means to recognise each 
other with respect to various aspects of moral subjectivity and agency. (Brink and 
Owen, 2007, p. 9) If struggles for recognition are existential in their explanation, 
then they are necessarily moral consequentialist in their justification. This is 
because the individual’s feeling of misrecognition and the concomitant outrage 
are driven by the intersubjectively experienced violation of the moral expectations 
                                            
54 While it is the violation of expectations and negative experiences of misrecognition that 
motivates social conflict, it is the desire for love and solidarity that lies at the core of this motivation. 
Positive emotions indeed provide for a more inclusive approach in understanding the motivation 
to participate in terroristic violence. See: (Cottee and Hayward, 2011). 
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of the distinct but equal significance of the individual’s sense of identity. In other 
words, in struggling to rectify the experienced misrecognition, the individual 
appeals to an already shared moral grammar with the therefore (legitimate) 
expectation of being intersubjectively recognised. 
6.2.2 Conditions for individual identity-formation and the good 
life 
Honneth’s formal conception of an ethical life is understood as the normative 
ideal of society that forms the basis for an individual’s moral expectations and is 
premised on the intersubjective conditions that facilitate the individual’s identity 
formation. This identity formation is premised on the development of three distinct 
versions of practical relations-to-self through which individuals come to 
experience themselves as having a certain status, be it as a focus of concern, a 
responsible agent, or a valued contributor to shared projects. This 
intersubjectively experienced process depends on modes or patterns of 
recognition that allow the individual to acquire the self-confidence, self-respect, 
and self-esteem necessary for the full development of their identity. 
Honneth emphasises that ‘[O]ne’s relationship to oneself, then, is not a matter 
of solidarity ego appraising itself, but an intersubjective process, in which one’s 
attitude towards oneself emerges in one’s encounter with an other’s attitude 
towards oneself.’ (Emphasis added Honneth, 1996, p. 168-170) Morality in this 
context then as the point of view of universal respect becomes one of several 
protective measures that serve the general purpose of enabling a good life that 
is the basis for an individual’s identity formation. This particular understanding of 
the good life has to do with the intersubjective conditions that enable self-
realisation and that can normatively be extracted from the plurality of all particular 
forms of life and it centres on a notion of inclusivity, because it is this that enables 
the individual to know herself as unique as well as equal. Honneth develops this 
from Plessner, whose social ontology distinguishes three degrees of 
intersubjective trust that enable the individual’s identity formation in the form of 
the development of primary bonds, the trusted bearer of rights within society, and 
within as a contributor to a community of shared concern. Honneth goes on to 
justify this three-part distinction, because it can be empirically ‘mapped onto 
different levels of practical relations-to-self’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 93) by which he 
understands the individual’s ability to experience herself as intra-subjectively 
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recognised and ‘worthy’ of concern. Honneth bases the distinction between three 
axes of practical relations to the self on social ontology confirmed by empirical 
observation, affirming his experience-based understanding of knowledge, that 
form the basis for an individual’s identity formation.  
In his approach, Honneth is continuously and consciously committed to 
providing the framework, which identifies ‘accurately the social experiences that 
would generate the pressure under which struggles for recognition would emerge 
within the historical process’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 93) rather than seeking to find 
explanations in intellectual theorising only. It is this inter-subjective experience-
based understanding that makes his framework helpful for Terrorism Studies 
because it makes it easy to map empirical findings and first-hand accounts onto 
said processes of identity formation while at the same time allowing to connect 
these to universal for existential struggles for recognition. Through the 
identification of socially experienced and sanctioned moral principles that lie at 
the basis of social conflict, we are provided with an approach that explicitly 
incorporates terrorism as social action within existing and socially lived moral 
experiences rather than merely abstract principles. Further, because Honneth’s 
framework sees a conception of the good for which the ideal of the autonomy of 
moral subjects and agents who are considered equals is central, he also includes 
an emancipatory standard against which the normative evaluation of concrete 
claims for recognition can be undertaken. (Brink and Owen, 2007)  
Moreover, because the approach is born out of a critical theory tradition, and 
further committed to the intersubjective experience of the perceiving individual, it 
acknowledges the dialectical interdependence of the perceiving subject and the 
perceived object. (Wyn Jones, 1999, p. 21) Horkheimer (1982) argues, that the 
relationship between the subject and the object is far more complex and 
interdependent. He observes that  
‘the object we perceive in our surroundings bear the mark of having 
been worked on by man. It is not only in the clothing and appearance, 
in outward from and emotional make-up that men are the product of 
history. Even the way they see and hear is inseparable from the social 
life-process, as it has evolved over the millennia. The facts, which our 
senses present to us are socially performed in two ways: through the 
historical character of the object perceived and through the historical 
character of the perceiving organ. Both are not simply natural, they are 
shaped by human activity’. (Emphasis added Horkheimer, 1982, p. 
200)  
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Taken together, this allows us to understand categories of thought as socially 
derived and created. It allows us to appreciate the process and the point of view 
of cognition as always individual, particular (Alway, 1995, p. 64) but importantly, 
intersubjective and neither neutral nor merely self-referential.   
This twofold commitment to emancipation and perception of social facts as 
both contingent and intersubjective can provide for a normative orientation for the 
study of terrorism that restores a de-essentialised subjectivity of the terrorist actor 
because it makes the individual’s identity formation on the one hand central to 
the conception of the good life and at the same time makes this process 
dependant on the recognition of others. In other words, the individual must be 
able to demonstrate that her unique identity traits are at once already represented 
and equal to those traits that find recognition within society and is able to connect 
her identity and her wellbeing to that of humanity.  
In providing a framework that links the motivations for social conflict in 
general, and terrorism as manifestation of a social conflict in particular, to the 
existence of an inherent moral grammar of these conflicts, it is feasible to shift 
Terrorism Studies from a focus on the confrontation of a security problem to the 
provision of a normative framework that encourages methodological empathy. 
This framework allows to recognise the subjectively perceived but 
intersubjectively experienced and collectively shared moral grammar as the basis 
for anchoring an individual’s claim for recognition in a common humanity. It is 
such a framework that provides for an understanding of the essence of terrorism 
as embodying the workings of intersubjectively experienced incoherences and 
subjectively perceived injustices of social arrangements because it can show that 
the individual’s claim for recognition that is based on a shared moral grammar is 
unduly denied. Such a framework can serve as a normative position, to address 
the fact that terrorism highlights incoherences in contemporary politics, which 
manifest in the contestations of belonging and identity and the legitimacy of social 
arrangements, as described in chapter three and further expanded upon in 
chapter five. 
6.2.2.1 Love and self-confidence - the individual as focus of concern  
At a very basic level, Honneth builds on the idea that the first stage of the 
formation of an individual’s identity develops from the love the individual receives 
which makes it possible for individuals to experience as well as ‘mutually confirm 
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each other with regard to the concrete nature of their needs’. (Honneth, 1996, p. 
95) This first stage of reciprocal recognition is experienced through that of loving 
care because both individuals know themselves to be united in their dependence 
on each other. From this Honneth also concludes that a recognition relationship 
is necessarily tied to the physical existence of concrete others who show each 
other feelings of particular esteem. It is the assured experience of care that gives 
the person who is loved the strength to develop a relaxed relation-to-self, which 
enables them to become independent and experience themselves through the 
mutual dissolution of boundaries. In speaking of recognition as a constitutive 
element of love, what is meant is an affirmation of independence that is guided – 
indeed, facilitated – by care (Brink and Owen, 2007, Honneth, 1996) so that the 
individual experiences and recognises herself as the worthy recipient of care. 
Through an on-going exchange of ego-relatedness and boundary-dissolution, 
the individual continuously produces and establishes and maintains basic self-
confidence in relation to the loving relationship to parents, friends, and lovers. 
(Brink and Owen, 2007, p. 11) Honneth affirms Hegel’s assessment of love as 
the structural core of all ethical life, although there is always an element to moral 
particularism to this, because for Honneth, ‘only this symbolically nourished bond 
which emerges through mutually desired demarcation, (…) produces the degree 
of basic individual self-confidence indispensable for autonomous participation in 
public life’. (Brink and Owen, 2007, Fraser and Honneth, 2003, Honneth, 1996, 
p. 107) 
6.2.2.2 The individual as a morally responsible member of society  
The second stage of an individual’s identity formation lies in her recognition 
as the bearer of rights and privileges. This is traditionally conferred upon them 
through a legal system that can be understood as the expression of an 
universalisable interests of all members of society. By recognising the individual 
as a bearer of rights, the individual recognises herself as a free person (Honneth, 
1996, p. 108-109) and a trusted and responsible participant in public life.  
In order to participate in public life as a free and rational being, the individual 
needs to defer to the universalised will as expressed in a legal system and 
thereby signals their trustworthiness with the concomitant expectation for this 
trustworthiness of be recognised. This willingness to defer to a universal will, of 
course presupposes the expectation of reciprocity of the relationship of 
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recognition based on rights. The possession of rights means that the individual, 
in principle, is able to raise socially accepted claims which empowers the bearer 
of the right to engage in action that can be perceived as legitimate, that is right 
and trustworthy by their interaction partners. Importantly, by appealing to the idea 
of reciprocal recognition, the individual is able to relate socially accepted claims 
back to their own personhood. (Honneth, 1996) The notion of personhood 
captures the idea of the moral responsibility of the right-bearer in reciprocal social 
relations (Brink and Owen, 2007) and means that the fullest form of self-
respecting autonomous agency can only be realised when one is recognised as 
possessing the capacities of ‘legal persons’ – that is, of a morally responsible 
agent. 
Legal recognition confers upon the individual the understanding of herself as 
someone who possesses the competent subjectivity and agency that makes 
them a full and responsible member of society. This enables a relation to the self 
that is trusting one’s own sense on one’s needs and urges and gives rise to the 
form of consciousness in which one is able to respect oneself because one 
deserves the respect of everyone else. (Honneth, 1996, p. 114) 
Honneth notes however, that actual self-respect can only be inferred 
indirectly, by making an empirical comparison involving groups of people, from 
whose general behaviour one can draw conclusions about the forms in which the 
experience of disrespect is symbolically represented. It is this general behaviour 
that is the basis for individual empirical comparison, which presupposes the 
existence of an intersubjectively shared value-horizon. This is the case because 
self and other can mutually esteem each other as individualised persons only on 
the condition that they share an orientation on those values and goal that indicate 
to each other the significance or contribution of their qualities for the life of the 
other. (Honneth, 1996, p. 121) 
Due to its universal character, legal recognition however only allows for the 
individual to be recognised for her universal features, or rather, those features 
that make up the individually shared value horizon. Yet exactly not those 
components of an individual that allows for their individualised self-realisation. 
Legal recognition enables only the recognition of the particular qualities that 
expresses the universal features of human subjects. This means that this form of 
recognition demands a social medium that mediates the characteristic 
  219 
differences among human subjects in a universal and more specifically, 
intersubjectively obligatory way.  
This task of mediation is performed, at the societal level, by a symbolically 
articulated - yet in principle always open and porous - framework of orientation, 
in which those ethical values and goals are formulated that, taken together, 
comprise the cultural self-understanding of a society. The cultural self-
understanding of a society provides the criteria that orient the person’s social 
esteem, because their abilities and achievements are judged intersubjectively 
according to the degree to which they can help to realise these culturally defined 
values. (Honneth, 1996) As legal relations can only integrate those dimensions 
where prior agreement have been intersubjectively established, traits and abilities 
with regard to which members of society differ from one another, require 
recognition through alternative mechanisms or an explicitly articulated and 
reasoned justification for the denial of recognition. (Forst, 2011) 
6.2.2.3 The individual as valued contributor to shared projects  
The third stage of identity formation that Honneth specifies is self-esteem as 
a practical relation-to-self in which one’s distinct traits and abilities are 
communally valued. An individual can only establish positive relations to 
themselves if they feel recognised for accomplishments that they precisely do not 
share in an undifferentiated manner with others. This practical relation-to-self is 
formed, Honneth argues, through relations of solidarity in which individuals or 
groups share in a common project or value horizon. The individual then no longer 
has to attribute the respect that they receive for their accomplishments back to 
an entire collective of social standards but can refer respect for the 
accomplishment positively back to themselves individually. 
The individual learns to conduct themselves habitually in line with the 
collective expectations that are ethically linked to their social status or role, 
whereby ‘status honour is normally expressed in the fact that above all else a 
specific style of life is expected from all those who want to belong to the circle.’ 
(Honneth, 1996, p. 132) The identity traits towards which the social evaluation of 
a person is oriented under these presuppositions are not those of a biographically 
individuated subject, but are those of a culturally typified status group. It is 
according to the ‘worth’ of this group - which emerges, in turn, from the socially 
determined degree of their collective contribution to the realisation of societal 
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goals - which the social worth of each of its members is to be measures as well. 
Within the status group, subjects can esteem each other as persons who, 
because of their common social position, share traits and abilities that are 
accorded a certain level of social standing on the society's scale of values. 
Between status groups, one finds relations of hierarchically graded esteem, 
which allow members of society to esteem subjects outside their estate for traits 
and abilities that, to a culturally predetermined degree, contribute to the 
realisation of collectively shared values. (Honneth, 1996, p. 133) 
Social-esteem signifies only the degree of social recognition the individual 
earns for their form of self-realisation by contributing to the practical realisation of 
the society’s abstractly defined goals. (Honneth, 1996, p. xii) With regard to this 
new, individualised system of recognition relations, everything now depends, on 
the definition of this general value-horizon, which is supposed to be open to 
various forms of self-realisation and yet, at the same time, must also be able to 
serve as an overarching system of esteem. (Honneth, 1996, p. 126)  
Under these altered conditions, the experience of being socially esteemed is 
accompanied by a felt confidence that one’s achievements or abilities will be 
recognised as ‘valuable’ by other members of society. In modern societies, 
relations of social esteem are subject to permanent struggle, in which different 
groups attempt, by means of symbolic force and with reference to general goals, 
to raise the value of the abilities associated with their way of life. (Honneth, 1996, 
p. 126) The individual knows herself to be a member of the social group that can 
collectively accomplish things whose worth for society is recognised by all other 
members of society. (Honneth, 1996, p. 127) This form of mutual recognition is 
also tied to the presupposition of a context of social life, whose members, through 
their orientation towards shared conceptions of their goals, form a community of 
value. (Honneth, 1996, p. 122)  
Among themselves, subjects mutually sympathise with their various different 
ways of life because they esteem each other symmetrically. The all-dominating 
agreement in practical goal instantly generates an intersubjective value-horizon, 
in which each participant learns to recognise the significance of the abilities and 
traits of the others to the same degree. (Honneth, 1996, p. 128) Symmetrical 
understood as free from being collectively denigrated one is given chance to 
experience oneself in light of one’s own accomplishment and abilities as valuable 
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for society. (Honneth, 1996, p. 128) In modern societies then, social relations of 
symmetrical esteem between individualised (and autonomous) subjects 
represent a pre-requisite for solidarity. In this sense, to esteem one another 
symmetrically means to view one another in light of values that allow the abilities 
and traits of the other to appear significant for shared praxis. Relationships of this 
sort can be said to be cases of ‘solidarity,’ because they inspire not just passive 
tolerance but felt concern for what is individual and particular about the other 
person. (Brink and Owen, 2007, Honneth, 1996, p. 129) 
Unlike rights, solidarity carries a communitarian moment of particularity. 
Particular traits and values are being endorsed, yet these values are a contingent 
matter and are the result of social and cultural struggles that lack the universality 
of legal relations. (Emphasis added Honneth, 1996, p. xvi) However, a truly 
inhibiting factor for solidarity is already included in the pattern of recognition that 
cannot extend beyond the collectively shared goals and value horizon. (Honneth, 
1996, p. 172) By situating esteem in the horizon of values of a particular culture, 
Honneth opens up the possibility of conceiving of the conditions for self-esteem 
as a field of contestation and cultural struggle for the recognition of previously 
denigrated contributions to the common good. (Honneth, 1996, p. 125) 
6.2.3 Misrecognition and the struggle for recognition - towards a 
normative position for Terrorism Studies  
Honneth locates an individual’s ability to develop positive relations to 
themselves within three distinct patterns of recognition, all of which carry in 
themselves the potential for the expectation of reciprocity of mutual recognition 
to be violated. Feelings that the institutionalised standards of recognition in 
society – standards that claim legal and moral legitimacy – are in fact unjust, for 
their violation of expectations of mutual recognition, frustrate the formation, 
sustenance, and further development of valuable aspects of the persons’ identity, 
their subjectivity and their agency. Feelings of shame, hurt, or indignation ‘are, in 
principle, capable of revealing to individuals the fact that certain forms of 
recognition are being withheld from them’. (Honneth, 1996, p. 136) It is the 
individuals’ knowledge, which is founded on their intersubjective experience of 
social relations, and their awareness of their constitutive dependency on 
adequate social conditions that facilitate the symmetrical recognition for the 
formation of the individual’s identity and the concomitant meaningful relations to 
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the self that make such feelings of injustice possible. (Brink and Owen, 2007, p. 
15) Each of the negative emotional reactions that accompany the experience of 
having one’s claims to recognition disregarded holds out the possibility that the 
injustice done to one will cognitively disclose itself and can become a motive for 
political resistance – the struggle for recognition. (Honneth, 1996, p. 138) 
Hurt feelings of this sort then can become the motivational basis for 
(collective) resistance only if subjects are able to articulate them within an 
intersubjective framework of interpretation - a moral grammar - that they can 
show to be typical for an entire group; something that can potentially affect other 
individuals. This practical process in which individual experiences of disrespect 
are interpreted as typical for an entire group can motivate collective demands for 
expanded relations of recognition, a desire for greater justice and the inclusion of 
traits that have thus far not found collective recognition. 
Individuals experience a situation as unjust only, if it violates claims, which 
they take to be legitimate; these expectations of legitimacy are represented by 
moral reasons, grounded in internalised but experienced for social practised 
patterns of recognition. Individuals have been socialised into accepting these 
patterns of recognition by observing their social surrounding. It is this social 
environment which already contains the corresponding principles of legitimacy. 
This means that individuals only form expectations of legitimacy in response to 
moral principles that possess factual validity in a social culture or social universe. 
(Honneth, 2007, p. 366) Expectations of legitimacy presuppose shared 
semantics, that is a shared moral grammar, which enable personal experiences 
of disappointment to be interpreted as something affecting not just the individual 
herself but also a circle of many other subjects. It is this semantic that allows for 
an anticipation of a future ‘communication-community’ that will recognise the 
currently misrecognised individual with and for their present abilities and traits, 
and further the anticipation that the individual will find themselves socially 
respected as the person that they cannot under present circumstances be 
recognised for being. (Honneth, 1996, p. 166) As the individual’s expectations of 
justice and legitimacy result from her internalised experience of socially accepted 
patterns of recognition, or alternatively socially accepted patterns of justification 
for misrecognition (Forst, 2011), the injury of expectations is legitimated by the 
surplus validity of what is already contained in existing patterns of recognition, 
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that is the possibility of the expansion of existing patterns of recognition by an 
appeal to the actualisation thereof within a future community. It is this 
understanding that leads Haleem to conclude that morality is necessarily based 
on consequentialist reasoning. (Haleem, 2012)  
The investigation of social struggles, in terms of a struggle for recognition, 
presupposes an analysis of the moral consensus that unofficially governs, within 
a context of social cooperation, the distribution of rights and responsibilities, 
(Honneth, 1996, p. 167) or  the justifications for the limitations thereon (Forst, 
2011) as well as the promises of inclusion that can be staked at future 
communication communities. 
Honneth supports his theory with anthropological studies which show that 
cultural formulae define socially acceptable and unacceptable needs. Similarly 
this thesis has noted the perceived social appropriateness of violent strategies in 
the regulation and maintenance of social relationships in chapter four. Virtuous 
Violence Theory provides a social-psychological explanation for the centrality of 
subjective moral concerns that lie at the heart of not only the regulation of social 
relationships but, also violence as one strategy to organise social relations. 
Moore moreover suggests that ‘one of the most powerful sources of moral 
outrage is to see someone else getting away with breaking a moral rule one has 
undergone great pains to make a part of one’s own character’ (Moore, 1978, p. 
36) which of course confirms what Honneth sees as the individuals’ dependency 
for their identity formation on the validity of their moral experiences which is 
grounded in their lived participation in an existing moral grammar. Honneth 
concludes, that if one interprets social struggle form the perspective of moral 
experiences in the manner mentioned, there is no theoretical pre-commitment in 
favour of either non-violent or violent resistance. Instead, at the level of 
description, it is left entirely open whether social groups employ material, 
symbolic, or passive force to publicly articulate and demand restitution for the 
disrespect and violation that they experience as being typical. (Honneth, 1996, p. 
163)  
The grammar of such struggles then is moral in the sense that the feelings of 
outrage and indignation driving them are generated by the rejection of legitimate 
claims to recognition and imply normative judgments about the legitimacy of 
social arrangements (Honneth, 1996, p. xi) but not in relation to the means utilised 
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to address the experienced misrecognition. Honneth’s approach mirrors the 
insights of Virtuous Violence Theory in its focus on the descriptive and subjective 
moral concern of regulating social relationships rather than the more common 
focus on the instrumentality of violence but further serves as a basis to 
understand all appeals to morality in relation to their consequentialist reason.  
On a descriptively explanatory level, the means employed in the struggle for 
recognition do not, in and by themselves, impact on the morality of the struggle. 
Honneth’s framework complements the social psychological perspective that we 
have seen in the previous chapter, where we concluded that morality consists of 
intentions, motives, emotions and judgements about realising relationship models 
according to cultural preos as the perceiver interprets and applies the preos to 
the situation (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 138) which left us with a situation in which 
morality is ambiguous and contingents. 
On a normative level however, Honneth’s framework suggests that patterns 
of recognition, neither have an ontological status that is entirely independent from 
the culturally specific life worlds from which we judge and act, nor are they to be 
understood in a strong relativistic manner. He suggests in fact that a conception 
of the ethical good understood as an ethics of autonomy and equal respect builds 
the foundation that can help us to recognise valuable qualities in others. It is a 
normative commitment to equality and respect for the self-realisation of others 
that is founded in an understanding of the individual’s dependence for their 
identity formation on intersubjectively experienced meaningful relations to the self 
that necessitates an expansion of the concrete spheres of recognition that serves 
as the normative benchmark for a formal conception of the good life. With this 
orientation to a formal conception of a good life, the feeling of being unjustly 
treated and the experience of being disrespected, both of which are relevant for 
the explanation of social struggles, no longer appear only as motives for action 
but also come to be examined with regard to the moral role that must be attributed 
to each of them in the development of relations of recognition. (Honneth, 1996, 
p. 168) 
Morality understood as the point of view of universal respect, has then to do 
with individual self-realisation, which can be normatively extracted from the 
plurality of all particular forms of life. (Honneth, 1996, p. 168, p. 170) Claims for 
recognition that are concretely expressed in social conflict are made from a 
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particular perspective that has not yet found appropriate consideration by appeal 
to a general recognition principle, or alternatively, the claim for recognition of a 
particular form of self-realisation is denied without an adequate, socially 
developed and established justification. (Forst, 2011) Against the dominant 
interpretative praxis, it is shown that there are particular, hitherto neglected, facts 
whose moral consideration would require an expansion of the spheres of 
recognition (Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p.  186) that enables a moral learning 
process by outlining the factors that inhibit moral learning. 
Taking particularly the latter two stages of identity formation that we have 
outlined above, as a morally responsible member of society as well as a valued 
contributor to the common good seriously, Honneth provides a theoretical 
framework that can answer why well-meaning policies that utilise values to 
provide orientation for preventative counterterrorism measures, such as 
PREVENT or the Counter-Extremism Strategy, are poorly received. It is because 
these policies represent the mediated cultural self-understanding of a society as 
a fixed value horizon, where the individual who has deferred their individualised 
needs to the universalised will of society. Their contribution to the common good 
however is not recognised as equally valuable and trusted and the individual must 
experience herself as, at the same time not being entrusted with the moral 
personhood, which equal citizenship would empirically entail, as well as excluded 
from being recognised for her contribution to the common value horizon of a 
society that she sees and has reasonable grounds to believe herself as part of.  
But, as we have seen in chapter five our cognitive heuristics systematically 
disguise from ourselves to only our own moral embubblement but our biases 
which limits us in our cognitive capabilities to consider the perspective of others 
as the first step of moral learning. These cognitive limitations, as we have also 
seen however, merely serves the purpose of preserving cognitive energy but can 
be corrected by conscious reasoning and the availability of previously excluded 
perspectives and arguments. It is for this reason and as the second step of moral 
learning that Terrorism Studies must inject normative reason as the position from 
which it can exercise its expertise into the debate on terrorism. As an academic 
discipline it must be in a position, to not only understand terrorism as an 
unbounded object of knowledge whose meaning is malleable, manipulatable and 
socially contingent, but Terrorism Studies also can recognise that, beyond 
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strategic considerations surrounding the problem of counterterrorism, at the heart 
of terrorism in fact also lies a struggle for recognition. For this very reason, the 
manner in which societies relate to terrorism raises questions that touch the very 
core of the legitimacy of social arrangements and the individual’s place and 
contribution therein. 
6.2.3.1 Violence and the struggle for recognition 
What becomes apparent is that for Honneth, the ensuing struggle for 
recognition represents not only a normative judgement about the legitimacy of 
existing social arrangements but it also follows that the struggle for recognition 
necessarily relies on a moral consequentialist reasoning for any and all means in 
its pursuit are utilised for the purpose of achieving recognition. Haleem observes, 
that when struggles of recognition ‘are not disguised through reference to 
religious tenets, consequentialist notions of morality appear in terms of the 
imperative of ‘justice’, ‘self-defence’, ‘national security’ and even ‘humanitarian 
action’ (Haleem, 2012, p. 33) and concludes in fact that consequentialist morality 
is a universally relied upon narrative (Haleem, 2012, p. 96), a narrative that 
Habermas (1972) notes has a particularly persuasive appeal, and thereby 
confirms what we have already seen in Baumann (2013), who falls but short of 
making explicit this very observation. 
For Honneth (1996, p. 190), what is central to the understanding of the 
motivation for social conflict and rebellion is his understanding of the foundations 
for the ‘sense of what one deserves’. But because he also recognises that this 
motivation is born out of concrete experiences of misrecognition, what 
necessarily follows is the moral consequentialism of struggles for recognition 
because the dynamic reinterpretation of morality is the necessary corollary for 
the individual/group that perceives itself as disadvantaged, because within a 
struggle for recognition, it ‘can define the rejection of their negation and 
oppression as ‘just’ and thus as ‘morality’.’ (Haleem, 2012, p. 34) The appeal to 
justice for example, even when provided with reference to religious, that appear 
to be deontological tenets, merely disguises the necessarily consequentialist 
essence of morality. 
Haleem however goes even further than this and explicitly relates Honneth’s 
theory to violence. By utilising this understanding of consequentialist morality to 
revisit Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, she argues that violence, rather than 
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serving an instrumental purpose, is utilised to deconstruct ‘the master’s mastery’. 
She demonstrates that with reference to violence, radical Islamist discourse 
highlights ‘the illegitimacy of the master’s control, a control that it presents as 
dependent on physical force and not moral superiority.’ (Haleem, 2012, p. 63) 
Indeed, Devji suggests similarly that it is a humanitarian logic at the heart of 
Islamist violence that demonstrates a unity which is made manifest by violence. 
It is this violence which 
‘builds a bridge between enemies by demonstrating that all men are 
equal if in death alone. It is as if this macabre equivalence has replaced 
the quality that is supposed to exist between men and unite them as 
part of a single humanity. The militant’s violence, then, ironically, links 
the world’s people together in the web of mutual obligation and 
responsibility.’ (Devji, 2008, p. 43)  
In other words, violence is rhetorically presented as morality in its justification 
and this morality reflects the consequentialism of the struggle for recognition 
because such struggles are driven by the expected consequences of actions, 
namely the desire for recognition of the self as distinct and equally significant to 
the other (and as not inferior to the other). (Haleem, 2012, p. 135) What this 
confirms furthermore is that the essence of violence, even from a normative 
perspective, rather than being instrumental is indeed socio-moral, and confirms 
our observations in chapter four, as to its centrality of socio-moral relationship 
regulation. 
6.3 A normative framework to relate to terrorism 
When we looked at the moral psychological foundations of Virtuous Violence 
Theory and further looked at cognitive heuristics to understand the affect-laden 
processes that lead individuals to morally evaluate social actions and interaction, 
we did so with the intention of demonstrating that individuals do this to preserve 
cognitive energy and do not need to engage in conscious reasoning. And we 
have further seen that these dynamics privilege the maintenance of social reality 
and predictability over accuracy and emancipatory truth claims. We have also 
seen however, that social psychology suggests that conscious moral reasoning 
can at times correct and override moral intuitions. There we concluded that 
people reason morally because they care about how they and others treat people 
and how they and others (are seen to) participate in groups. While we remained 
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sceptical as to the power of moral reasoning in conflict situations because it is 
here where individuals tend to fall back to quick and automatic moral intuitions 
and heuristics, and a priori formulated moral theories as post-hoc justifications, 
individual moral reasoning can correct and even override moral intuition 
especially in response to individuals navigating different and/or conflicting social 
goals and they do so via conscious reasoning, through reframing and through 
social interactions that bring to light new perspectives and arguments.  
While this chapter thus far has tracked a normative framework that 
emphasises the existential and necessarily moral consequentialism essence of 
terrorism for it ought to be understood as a struggle for recognition, and thereby 
wanted to demonstrate that consequentialist morality is the norm rather than a 
deviation and must be conceptualised and methodologically approached as such. 
Against the objection of a tyranny of the minority that wishes to expand hitherto 
accepted principles of recognition, it is prudent to point out that Honneth 
(Honneth, 1996) makes clear that he understands the underlying conception of 
the good life, that is emancipation, in liberal-egalitarian terms. While Honneth’s 
framework initially opens the door for any unique trait to be potentially worthy of 
recognition, Honneth also provides a caveat in accepting morality only for those 
struggles that overall expand the circle of those whose unique traits that are 
socially valued for their contribution. Emancipation thus understood, is committed 
to expanding patterns of recognition so as to include the endeavours for individual 
self-realisation that continuously expand the circle of valuable and respected 
contributions to society and confronts exclusionary practise, which can be 
demonstrated to affect shared but unique traits necessary for the development of 
meaningful relations to the self as the basis for an individual’s identify formation. 
Of course, we can anticipate the tension, that is the social conflict, that can arise 
between established patterns of recognition that represent the shared value 
horizon of a society and the desire for recognition of contribution that expand 
these shared values beyond existing patterns. But because we can demonstrate 
that this tension is both existential and universal and also that these tensions 
follow from an already shared moral grammar as lived in existing social relations, 
we can also demonstrate that the essence of this struggle is moral.  And it is this 
conclusion that can provide for the framework that enables the normative position 
for Terrorism Studies. 
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Honneth provides a normative framework within which the individual’s 
struggle to be recognised as an equally worthy carrier of rights is challenged by 
their wish to be socially valued for they unique traits and characteristics. What 
distinguishes the individual from others is at the same time to be seen as the 
source of self-esteem and solidarity so as enable the individual to develop a 
practical relation to the self and is further existential and universal. This carries 
the potential of unresolved tensions where the individual’s unique traits are not 
(yet) socially valued or recognition is denied without adequate justification. What 
follows is firstly, that the motivation that is born out of the attempt to resolve this 
tension, is an affirmation of modes of recognition as legitimate, both socially and 
individually. The feeling of misrecognition then humanises the actor because she 
can relate her negative experience to a mode of recognition that is already being 
granted to everyone else as being withheld from her without adequate 
justification. The essence of the struggle for recognition necessitates that 
practically, that is experientially, modes of recognition need to be expanded or 
alternatively an adequate justification need to be provided for why unique traits 
are not socially recognised in spite of the moral grammar of modes of recognition. 
(Forst, 2011) Moreover, as the framework is founded upon accepted and 
practised modes of recognition, it is the struggle for recognition that is moralised 
for it demands only what is owed to the individual based upon accepted modes 
of recognition withheld without appropriate justification. What the individual is 
demanding is already owed to them in the first place and does not go beyond the 
moral foundations already accepted, albeit pushing the boundaries for modes 
and traits of recognition. The framework understands morality in strictly 
consequentialist terms and morality does precisely not hinge on the fact that 
violence is utilised in its pursuit. 
Overall, this normative framework, by building on Hegel’s existential and 
universal struggle for recognition, not only serves to illuminate the necessity of 
the moral consequentialist justification for terrorism, but via Honneth’s 
understanding of the importance of intersubjective experiences for an individual’s 
identity formation. This framework locates the motivation for the struggle for 
recognition with the individual and in actual experiences of misrecognition. This 
makes it useful for empirical and practical applicability rather than mere abstract 
philosophising and lays out a path for applied and empathetic reason as to the 
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manner in which policy makers, the media, academics and society at large can 
relate to terrorism, beyond a focus on the state. Haleem’s observations on the 
dialectical reason in radical Islamist discourse give an important indication as to 
the importance of unpacking radical and/or extremist rhetoric where she shows 
that it is here where the slave demarcates her autonomy and independence 
through violence and thereby challenges the master’s mastery. With this as the 
double-theoretical background, she can show that there is a critical difference in 
between the understanding the nature of the motivations and the essence of 
Islamist extremism. Hereby the important implication of course is that only the 
existential essence, that is the rejection of misrecognition, combined with the 
dynamic dialectical reason can explain the resonance of the radical’s message, 
where violence is at its core reciprocally causal. (Haleem, 2012, Chapter 5)  
Where Honneth’s theory can demonstrate the necessary universality of moral 
consequentialist reasoning even in the justification of violence, it can help inject 
reason and thereby opportunities for empathy and moral learning into the 
contestation of terrorism. It is this that we have argued to be so crucial not only 
within the academic study of terrorism, but also when it comes to counterterrorism 
policies. Not only does this framework help to provide a position from which to 
present its expertise, but it also provides a vehicle that helps to recognise the 
moral consequentialism that is inherent in the contestation of terrorism, because 
it mirrors the contestation at the heart of the struggle for recognition and serves 
to normatively problematise the exclusionary practises that not only serve to 
sustain lines of orientation for preventative counterterrorism but also hide from 
examination the biases that are inherent to claims of analytical objectivity and 
neutrality in Terrorism Studies.  
6.4 Recognising shared humanity and emancipatory 
research 
As long as terrorism is conducted by a well-defined enemy, we are comfortable 
condemning it, but when it is done by someone who looks a bit too much like 
ourselves, and who perceives himself to be a warrior in the fight against the 
terrorist enemies, we have been used to condemning, things get complicated. 
(Ugilt, 2012, p. 98) 
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The previous chapters have focused on establishing that terrorism as an 
object of knowledge occupies and intersitial position that Terrorism Studies, as 
an academic discipline has been unable to control. Terrorism as an empty 
signifier and unbounded object of knowledge is susceptible to being filled by 
desire and further shaped through a fluid and permeable discourse. The notion 
of the potentiality of terrorism concomitantly evoked not only a politics of terrorism 
that has been shown to rely on vague, ambiguous and abstract notions of values 
to provide orientation against the uncertainty inherent in the threat of a potentially 
catastrophic future act of terrorism but has further demonstrated that the 
contestation over the conceptualisation of terrorism finds actualisation in 
preventative counterterrorism policy and discourse.  
Indeed, we have demonstrated that at the heart of the contestation of 
terrorism lie much broader questions of identity, belonging, and legitimacy. What 
we have also seen however, is that this essence is usually not made explicit and 
missed. By relying on the struggle for recognition as a framework to understand 
the essence of the nature of motivations in Islamist extremism as existential and 
having been able to demonstrate that the justification for this struggle are 
necessarily consequentialist, we managed to show that the motivating 
experience of a particular struggle for recognition lies in an actual or perceived 
experience of misrecognition, which if it can rely on a shared moral grammar not 
only affirms the legitimacy of that particular social order but also provides for the 
basis that individual experiences of disrespect can be read as typical for an entire 
group, and in such a way that they can motivate collective demands for expanded 
relations of recognition, based on the pre-existing moral grammar. (Honneth, 
1996, p. 1) As Honneth (1996, p. 153) points out ‘empirically, whether the 
cognitive potential inherent in feeling hurt or ashamed become a moral-political 
conviction depends above all on how the affected subject’s cultural-political 
environment is constructed: only if the means of articulation of a social movement 
are available can the experience of disrespect become a source of acts of political 
resistance. The developmental logic of such collective movements, can however 
be discovered via an analysis that attempts to explain social struggles on the 
basis of the dynamics of moral experiences. (Sorel, 1976, p. 102). Morality though 
is based, not in the subjective self-understanding but rather in the recognition of 
meaningful relations to the self that are dependent on recognition. Then, the 
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action that is thus motivated, manifests socially and serves multiple social 
functions. Events, or actions for that matter, as Munson points out ‘can speak in 
two voices’ and ‘experiences can take on multiple meanings, events can take on 
multiple voices, and behaviours can simultaneously express multiple intentions 
and beliefs.’ (Munson, 2008, p. 184) Yet, at the same time there is a tension 
between the meaning that the action is meant to have and the meaning that it is 
given by the audience and further the manner, in which the act works 
independently as demonstrated by Ugilt’s elaboration of terrorism as 
meaningfulness-as-excess. It is this nexus, that makes understanding the 
meaning of the motivation of the individual violent Islamist activist difficult to 
grasp. In other words, the individual actor does not establish an entirely ‘new’ 
ideology or worldview but rather attempts to communicate the unique traits they 
perceive for themselves as legitimate for already recognised as valuable. What 
the actor demands with their act and what is communicated as their motivation is 
already expected and accepted. In essence, actors use ‘external’ (socially 
agreed) values to understand their own action in moral terms to bridge the gap 
and incoherence between their subjective meaning of the act versus the social 
function that their action is being given. 
It has been the purpose of this chapter then to articulate a normative-
theoretical basis for Terrorism Studies from which to produce expertise. In 
noticing that the critical issue in understanding the essence of terrorism is the 
‘popular inability to distinguish between the nature of reason in the radical Islamist 
explanations of violence and the radical Islamist justifications of violence’ Haleem 
(emphasis added 2012, p. 144) inadvertently points towards the need to confront 
the very core issue of Terrorism Studies in lacking a basis from which to produce 
knowledge; knowledge which empathetically takes into consideration the fact that 
the motivation to participate in terroristic violence originates in an existential 
struggle for recognition that necessarily is moral consequentialist in its 
justification, and precisely located within the existing social order.  
Utilising the insights from this chapter as its normative-theoretical position, 
allows to both navigate the tragic at the core of the struggle for recognition, and 
further to explicitly confront moralising approaches that, at the very least detract 
from our individual yet universal moral embubblement but are so very 
symptomatic of said popular inability to distinguish between the nature of reason 
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in explanations as opposed to justifications of terrorism. Recognising the 
consequentialist moral necessity of existential and universal struggles for 
recognition in relation to terroristic violence, augmented by the insights as to the 
social and psychological mechanisms that tragically facilitate our moral 
embubblement has demonstrated to equip academic researchers with a position 
from which to implore a more deeply reasoned, normative and most importantly 
introspective engagement with terroristic violence by making more explicit its 
moral essence and thereby facilitating a normatively-reasoned, yet affect-
empathetic engagement with terroristic violence, which ultimately resides within 
an emancipatory struggle for recognition. If the ‘function of academic enquiry is 
to say the unsayable’ (Heath-Kelly, 2010, p. 252), then Honneth’s framework 
offers a normative position to understand terrorism through eliminating an a priori 
condemnation and thereby marginalisation of the terrorist subject because it 
allows for the possibility that the terrorist’s struggle can be understood as morally 
motivated and embedded in a shared moral grammar. It outlines the steps, 
necessary for moral learning and ultimately emancipatory truth claims. Moreover, 
if we take serious the fact that it is the potentiality of terror that makes terror 
‘meaningful in excess’ and it is the excess of potentiality, which serves a political 
and moral purpose, it must be clear that the threat of terrorism does not 
necessitate a response. (Ugilt, 2012, p. 159) It is the responsibility of Terrorism 
Studies, to utilise its position to moderate the perceived sense of urgency 
triggered by the politics of terrorism and confront the popular inability to 
distinguish between the nature of terroristic violence and its moral 
consequentialist justification. Hereby it has been shown that Terrorism Studies 
can rely on a framework that takes seriously the existential nature of the 
motivations to participate in terroristic violence and the necessarily 
consequentialist justification. This is the case because it is this universalist 
essence, which not only humanises the terrorist actor and equips her with her 
own voice and desires, but further that can give Terrorism Studies the stability to 
act as a point of reference to confront the exclusionary practises that hide behind 
the contestation of terrorism. This allows Terrorism Studies a claim to 
emancipatory knowledge and expertise in spite of the unboundedness of its 
object of knowledge by understanding the terrorist act explicitly as moral social 
action. Taking such a position seriously can provide for the framework to 
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responsibly engage with terrorism and the wider questions central to social and 
cultural life that are being raised by terrorism, by providing an understanding of 
the barriers to moral learning and thereby providing an explicit impetus for moral 
learning and self-reflectivity from a normative, that is emancipatory, position.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has argued, that at the core of the academic study of terrorism, 
must lie a concern with the questions, which are raised by the contestations of 
(the concept of) terrorism. These questions reach to the core of social 
coexistence and societal boundaries and are intimately linked to questions of 
norms and values. The thesis has demonstrated, that a disregard for the social 
embeddedness of terrorism expertise and its participation in hegemonic power-
relationships stemmed from, Terrorism Studies’ reliance on positivist research 
approaches. This methodological position treats normative questions as 
tangential and oftentimes merely preparatory in its quest to answer the more 
compelling question as to why individuals turn to political violence. Against this 
background, the thesis has demonstrated, that Terrorism Studies however, 
always invokes and builds on questions of normative relevance, because 
terrorism is an unbounded object of knowledge. The thesis has argued further, 
that the emergence of Critical Terrorism Studies with its focus on critiquing the 
manifestation of state-power in the study of terrorism, has not managed to 
overcome the dominance of positivist research either. This is the case, because 
neither perspective has managed to methodologically relate terrorism to wider 
questions of social, political and cultural relevance and the normative questions 
this invokes.  
 Methodologically, both, Terrorism Studies and Critical Terrorism Studies 
chose to capture a reality where the nation state, rather than the subjective reality 
of the individual actor or their social relationships, becomes the central point of 
reference through a restrictively instrumental understanding of violence. Chapter 
four has demonstrated that this centrality of violence becomes problematic and a 
crucial point of origin for the failure of Terrorism Studies to leave behind its 
embeddedness with the hegemonic power-relationships circumscribed by the 
state. This has been shown to be the case because instrumental violence is 
always evaluated from the perspective of the only legitimate monopoly of violence 
resting with the state. This leads to a moralisation of violence because terrorist 
violence falls outside the readily available, taken-for-granted and accepted 
justification and can only be conceptualised as an instance of violence that has 
no (legitimate) place in politics.  
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Chapter four has shown, that Terrorism Studies’ focus on the 
instrumentality of violence removes the individual’s choice to use violence from a 
wider social and cultural explanatory framework, which does not focus on the 
state alone. It contrasted this observation with the suggestion, that violence can 
also be understood as a strategy intended to regulate social relationships. 
Pointing to Virtuous Violence Theory, the chapter has argued, that violence is a 
morally indifferent social action, because independent of the perspective of 
culture or the actor’s perceptions and intentions, there is nothing about the 
features of the act as such, that give it its moral quality. 
Chapter five then has emphasised, that the violent act acquires its moral 
quality when evaluated from the perspective of meaningful principles focused on 
the act, but not in isolation from these principles. The chapter has shown that 
these principles generally follow from moral principles, which represent the 
hegemonic consensus. This consensus arises, and persists, because the 
individual’s cognitive heuristics and social practises function to enable 
predictability and stability. These moral bubbles are difficult to overcome because 
cognitive heuristics and social practises are such, that the tranquillity transferred 
by them, translates into social and normative beliefs, which provide for the 
plausibility of the inevitability of our own subjective social universe and subjective 
reality. The chapter however, has also shown, that the empirical existence of 
others and their subjective social realities, can confront the individual with 
alternative social realities and offer opportunities for (moral) learning. This is the 
case, because empathetic perspective-taking can challenge the taken-for-
granted inevitability of one’s own subjective social reality and inject different truth 
claims. 
Chapter three therefore, can be read against this background to have 
illustrated how the failure to recognise, that terrorism serves to shape how wider 
questions of cultural and political life, are being experienced in the context of 
preventative counterterrorism in the United Kingdom. The chapter has shown the 
inherent tension between the necessarily bounded preventative logic of 
counterterrorism policies and the concretely experienced broken promise of 
openness and equal citizenship for all citizens in a post-migration society. It is 
these incoherences, which have demonstrated, that at the heart of preventative 
counterterrorism, lie contestations over values and normative questions. The 
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chapter thus has illustrated, that the disregard for normative theorising in the 
academic study of terrorism, has led to an inability to confront the fact that at the 
core of the invocation of values in preventative counterterrorism remains the 
maintenance of a hierarchical citizenship. It has further shown, that when the 
contestation of the concept of terrorism takes place in the context of national 
security rather than civil society, it does so in lieu of a wider social, cultural and 
political debate on (national) identity, the boundaries between political and private 
life, and ultimately, the legitimacy of violence. Terrorism Studies keeps struggling 
with the unboundedness of its object of knowledge, because it remains 
committed to a conceptualisation, which takes the political instrumentality of 
violence and the state as its central point of reference and thereby embeds a 
normative position, which it has not managed to overcome. It is for this reason, 
that the normative framework proposed by this thesis, in the form of the struggle 
for recognition, was aimed at an explanation of social conflict and the 
confrontation of exclusionary practises, which stand in the way of an individual’s 
identity formation. 
Terrorism, so the thesis has argued, occupies an interstitial position and 
always invokes an excess of meaning. Terrorism therefore, functions to mediate 
the scholarly production of knowledge by taking shape in conjunction, rather than 
independently from, a permanent dialogue with political, public and media 
discourses as well as counterterrorism policy making and its subjectively 
experienced application. Failing to methodologically capture, that subjective 
values and morality lie at the heart of much of the contestation over the 
conceptualisation of terrorism and in the way its excess manifests in the concrete 
contextual application, as has been shown for preventative counterterrorism in 
chapter three, therefore misses an important dimension of critique and 
responsible knowledge production. 
The central question, this thesis has confronted therefore, was what 
methodological tools Terrorism Studies requires in order to firstly, identify and 
secondly, better navigate, terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge that 
triggers a normative ‘excess’. This thesis has suggested, that such a 
methodology must understand the production of knowledge and expertise that 
recognises terrorism as social action to which normative judgement applies. It 
has argued, that it is precisely this judgement that is intertwined with the 
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reproduction of hegemonic power-relationships and therefore wider questions of 
social, cultural and political significance. While the thesis recognised that the 
nation-state circumscribes hegemonic power-relationships, it was important to 
emphasise, that these relationships manifest in the concrete experiences of 
individuals. For this reason, the thesis saw it most fit to utilise a critical theory 
perspective, which understands the production of knowledge as inherently 
interested and furthermore with the goal to identify the potential for change 
through the empowerment of people, which challenge injustices in social 
relationships. (Howell, 2013) In its state goal, the thesis thus followed in the path 
of Critical Terrorism Studies and sought the potential for change through the 
empowerment of people. In the spirit of critical theory, the thesis sought to identify 
the potential for transformative practise and moral learning by identifying 
structural and cognitive barriers to emancipatory knowledge and suggested that 
explicit normative theorising is paramount in that endeavour, because it explicitly 
addresses the fact that the production of knowledge is inherently interested. To 
exemplify the importance of treating normative questions not as merely 
tangential, the thesis has demonstrated, that questions of values and morality are 
central to the study of terrorism from the beginning. The survey of the literature 
in Terrorism Studies of chapter two for example, has shown that the attempts to 
‘purify’ the concept of terrorism to arrive at a more objective and/or neutral 
definition, necessarily fail, because ‘the political is baked into the concept from 
the start’ (Stampnitzky, Forthcoming) while chapter three has shown that 
preventative counterterrorism relies on values to provide lines of orientation 
where the dominant security paradigm is one of uncertainty. 
The thesis expands on Critical Terrorism Studies by adding a normative 
framework in the form of the struggle for recognition. This framework locates 
barriers to knowledge, as well as opportunities for moral learning, within mundane 
social relationships and thereby moves beyond a critique of hegemonic power-
relationships circumscribed by the nation state as its primary point of reference. 
The thesis has proposed, that the struggle for recognition provides a promising 
normative framework, because not only does it make the individual and their 
existential struggle for recognition its central point of reference, but it furthermore 
considers the existing social order as providing for the moral grammar, which 
enables the individual to articulate their subjective justification for their struggle. 
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It did so by demonstrating that different acts of violence are morally 
indistinguishable. Within this framework it is possible to reflexively engage with 
the terrorist actor in spite of, and yet with reasoned recognition of, the origins of 
the moral valence of the actor’s violence and the observer’s evaluation. This was 
demonstrated to be the case because the moral framing of the motivation that is 
the actor’s justification for activism within the framework of a struggle for 
recognition, is anchored in the self-understanding of the individual activist. Their 
struggle is moral because the very self-understanding of violence originates from 
an appeal to a universalised and shared, that is taken-for granted, moral grammar 
to which the individual can lay claim. It is such a framework, which provides 
Terrorism Studies with a normative position that enables it to act as a point of 
reference to confront the exclusionary practises that hide behind the contestation 
of terrorism and allows Terrorism Studies a claim to emancipatory critique. This 
provides for the foundation for the field’s participation in the confrontation of 
questions more central to contemporary political life, which positivist leaning 
methodologies problematically remain silent on. It is in the identification of the 
scarcity of explicit normative theorising and the consecutive suggestion of a 
normative framework in the form of a struggle for recognition where the thesis 
offered a contribution to Critical Terrorism Studies approaches and an original 
contribution to the knowledge of the field. The thesis then is an explicit recognition 
of the fact, that ethical questions (such as the ones raised by Stampnitzky 
(Forthcoming)) cannot be bracketed from terrorism scholarship or policy making. 
This thesis should however not be misunderstood as a dismissal of individual 
contributions to the academic study of terrorism, but rather wishes to suggest by 
means of an intervention, that a permeable field that engages with a topic as 
accessible to the public imagination and discourse as terrorism, ought to invest 
further resources in exercising its expertise on the basis of an explicitly formulated 
methodology, which enables addressing questions of normative concern, so as 
to provide concrete and measured ethical guidance for counterterrorism 
practitioners, policy makers and everyone who participates in the debates and 
practices triggered and implicated by terrorism. The strength of the struggle for 
recognition as a normative framework for the study of terrorism, lies in its potential 
to navigating the inconsistencies and absurdities of modern life, by recognising 
the barriers to moral learning as well as locating the impetus for moral learning 
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within the existing moral order. This position encourages self-reflection and 
empathy because it understands the identity formation of the individual to be 
dependent on the experience of being recognised as a valuable contributor to 
shared projects. This framework therefore, can provide ethical guidance to 
confront the questions central to contemporary political, social and cultural life 
that are being raised by terrorism, with the individual and not the state as its 
central concern. The thesis has argued, that it is this universalist essence, that 
humanises the terrorist actor and equips them with their own voice and desires, 
vis-à-vis a shared moral horizon.  
By addressing the lack of a normative anchor point in Terrorism Studies, 
the thesis demonstrated a distinct contribution to the knowledge of the subject. 
The thesis has provided Terrorism Studies with the methodological tools to 
exercise its expertise from a methodological framework, which allow its experts 
to be explicit about the normative positions they invoked and from which they can 
confront exclusionary practices and hegemonic power-relationships, which hide 
behind the contestation of terrorism. This thesis has not tried to argue, that a 
more authentic understanding of terrorism can be achieved via normative 
theorising or indeed abstract philosophising alone. Rather, the thesis has 
suggested, that hidden behind the workings of terrorism expertise, that is in well-
constructed, innovative and informative research on terrorism, but also 
counterterrorism policy making and vernacular discourses on terrorism, lie 
normative questions of hegemonic power relationships, which are much more 
central to the lived experiences of individuals and their navigation of the 
contradictions of modern social, political and cultural life.  
Addressing these hidden workings is paramount to unlock the potential for 
moral learning and emancipatory truth claims. With its explicit normative 
framework, this thesis offered a methodological approach so that Terrorism 
Studies can provide concrete ethical guidance to navigate the incoherences of 
modern political, social and cultural life despite the unboundedness of its object 
of knowledge. In that, the thesis has provided an intervention against the potential 
for a negative binding to the usual targets of critique (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 
2009, p. 167) and has also encouraged a look at social relationships as the site 
for critical self-reflection in answering the questions in relation to values, identity, 
boundaries, and exclusionary practises raised by terrorism. The thesis has 
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presented an approach that, while bringing us no closer to knowing what leads a 
person to turn to political violence, treats terrorism as a social phenomenon to 
which judgement applies. This has moved the key concern of the study of 
terrorism away from its relationship with the state to a focus on moral learning 
and emancipation of the state’s citizenry and institutions. This concern allows to 
understand ‘terrorism’ as a crucial site of political struggle over boundaries and 
inclusion, at the heart of which lie normative questions and values, in which each 
individual has a stake. In a climate, where real security concerns are dominated 
by uncertainty and a sense of urgency, a failure to self-reflectively confront how 
taken-for-granted normative positions are projected, shape and give legitimacy 
to preventative action, the thesis has highlighted the difficulty to understand the 
subjectivity of others. It is the individual actor, whose perception of reality is 
complex, multi-faceted and shaped through her many mundane social and 
political interactions, which circumscribe her taken-for-granted understanding of 
her social world. Terrorism scholars, taking on the role of public intellectuals, must 
encourage a willingness for open-minded, self-reforming dialogue, which can 
yield the most promising opportunities, not only for understanding the 
incoherences of modern political, social and cultural life, but further for moral 
learning and emancipation. 
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